Alarm and apprehension pervaded the atmosphere of the July 2 talks. Serious negotiators from the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed and Mufti Mahmood, were visibly disillusioned, mirroring the disappointment of the government party.

The central committee of the PNA was meet on July 3, around 11 in the morning. Before the meeting, however, Sardar Abdul Qayyum reportedly called on Maulana Kausar Niazi. “Some of our leaders are in contact with the army and I fear they may take over,” Qayyum told Niazi. “Please tell Mr Bhutto not to delay signing of the accord. In fact, it might be better if you arrange a meeting with him for Mufti Mahmood and me.”

The cabinet was also scheduled to convene simultaneously, where representatives of the armed forces and special assistants were also invited. Niazi informed Bhutto about what Sardar Qayyum had said. Bhutto did not take Qayyum’s message seriously, “Friend, forget about them. They only want an interview with me.”

The PNA meeting began a little later than scheduled. All party leaders had rushed to attend the meeting, as did legal advisers Mahmood Ali Kasuri and Khalid Ishaq. The participants heard the viewpoints of the legal experts and decided to meet again in the evening. The second meeting too was attended by all party leaders.

Asghar Khan stuck to his hard line and argued that the legal team should prepare a new draft. He found support from Khan Ashraf of Khaksar Tehrik.

This suggestion was disputed by Sardar Qayyum, who said that a new draft was not needed and that the government should be given the opposition’s main points only. According to Qayyum, the opposition team should finalise the suggestions and take them to the government. If they were not in contradiction to the PNA standpoint, then these suggestions should be accepted.

Nawabzadah Nasrullah Khan also disputed the suggestion of preparing a fresh draft, but insisted that someone’s draft should be final for discussion.

Mian Tufail of Jamaat-i-Islami was very clear in his stance; he contended that when 90 percent accord had been reached, then amendments, which do not affect the spirit of the accord, should be accepted. He said Bhutto had become weaker; and that it would be better if the negotiating team accompanies the legal experts and finalises the accord.

There was also heated discussion over the Balochistan and Hyderabad tribunals, but as it turned out, these were not the issues that were the bone of contention.

As a result of intense debate, two camps had emerged within the opposition. One disputed the authority of the negotiating team and insisted that once the draft had been finalised and presented, why was it being changed with a new one. The second group held that the draft could be changed at any time.

It first appeared as if the opposition’s meeting would remain fruitless. But eventually, it was decided that the opposition team and legal experts should meet with Bhutto immediately, and convey to him the points raised by the PNA.

It was a long session which ended at nine in the evening. The new points were immediately jotted down:

1. The federal government, the PPP and the PNA should be the parties in the accord;

2. Change of governors would be made with the consent of both parties, and they would not have any administrative or legislative powers;

3. The Implementation Council would have constitutional guarantees;

4. The appointment of members of the Election Commission would be made with the consent of both parties;

5. The FSF would be given in the armed forces’ command;

6. Proceedings in army courts would be according to civilian courts;

7. Preparation of constitutional amendments would be approved by the PNA before signing of the accord.

Since Professor Ghafoor had become dejected with the remarks of certain leaders, he hesitantly accepted to take the amended points to the Prime Minister House. Mufti Mahmood and Nawazadah Nasrullah Khan accompanied him.

At the meeting, Mufti Mahmood began talking: “The shape in which the draft was presented is not acceptable to the PNA’s central council.” Maulana Niazi narrated the conversation in these words: “We are in a tight corner. It seems that some of those in our ranks have connections with army generals. It is they who threaten of martial law.”

Nasrullah Khan implored: “You should strengthen our hands. We have brought some technical points with us. These do not need to be added to the accord but are necessary to make it appear more plausible.”

Mufti Mahmood then had his say: “All that you should do is to add an interim clause to the constitution, which would provide a safeguard to the Implementation Council.”

When the Hyderabad Tribunal and the issue of Balochistan were raised, Bhutto replied that he had already made it clear that these issues related to the army, which did not want to end them. But he promised his guests that he will discuss the issue with his comrades and then respond.

The PNA team found that Bhutto’s attitude was remarkably different from that at the earlier rounds of talks. However, they were told to rest till he replied to them.

Next week: Operation Fairplay, finally

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