Al Qaeda in the ascendant

POLITICAL analysts have been given, over, time to anticipating disruptive trends in the Pakistani political scenario with some measure of accuracy. The most chilling of these prognostications relate to the impact of Al Qaeda and Islamic militancy on Pakistan.

Today, the truth is apparent. While the prime movers and shakers of our polity, ‘strut and fret their hour upon the stage’ promoting individual agendas, the latest aspirant to world power status is laying foundations on Pakistani soil.Al Qaeda has moved from a hitherto fringe existence in Sudan and Afghanistan to a substantial one in Pakistan. It may be referred to by a number of names — the Taliban, the jihadis and the militants — but the goals of all are identical.Conditions have never been so favourable for the promotion of the militants’ objectives. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars are perceived today as failed attempts by western powers to curb Al Qaeda progression. Closer to home, certain factors have rendered Al Qaeda’s dream of a secure territorial base within recognised territorial boundaries almost palpable.

There is, for instance, support for Osama bin Laden from the military/mullah/madressah alliance supplemented by combat support from the local Taliban. There is also resentment generated by the Muslim cause versus the US imperialism factor.

Furthermore, the street/state/institutional anarchy prevailing nationwide and inconsistent government policies for dealing with the phenomenon have also helped advance Al Qaeda’s cause.

The capture of approximately 300 members of the armed forces by Baitullah Mehsud in Waziristan last August constituted a landmark event in the ongoing struggle between the militants and the state for the soul of Pakistan. By challenging the writ of the state, the militants have given notice of their claim to a stake in the governance of Pakistan.

Within the last few months, the insurrection has moved in an arc of violence from the tribal to the settled areas of the NWFP. Having subsumed Swat, Dir, Bannu and contiguous areas, the offensive mounted by Mullah Sufi Muhammad and Maulana Fazlullah of Swat is now poised within striking distance of Peshawar.

Current radicalism in the NWFP may be seen as an extension of the extremism foisted on the hinterland during the dark age of Ziaul Haq. In doing so, his cohorts anticipated the advent of Islamic militancy by inducting Sunni extremism into religious practice in the guise of Deobandi, Wahhabi and Salafi formats at the cost of the Barelvi tradition followed by the majority of the subcontinent’s Muslims.

So today, with the presence of their surrogate, the MMA, in parliament and in the NWFP government, the militants’ objective of acquiring a stake in the governance of the state has been partly achieved. Such a vantage point could enable it to operate under the cover of the recognition accorded to Pakistan by the international community.

A securely positioned Pakistani base could also be used for launching the ultimate jihad for converting the peoples of the world into a cohesive Muslim ummah: an ummah to be dedicated to the observance of the Sunni Salafi creed enunciated by Egyptian theologist Syed Qutb.

It is not clear as to how the Al Qaeda system works or where its leaders are located. It is clear though, that the US ranks Al Qaeda’s threat alongside the Russian threat of the Cold War era. It is also clear that the US expects the threat to last at least as long as the Cold War did.

In the short-term, however, it is Pakistan that faces the prospect of having to deal with the phenomenon. Of course, Pakistan is not exactly a pushover but resistance to the militants’ manoeuvres is likely to be muted — as witnessed on several occasions — because the core of the state has been softened by insider interests embedded in the army, bureaucracy, the trading circles and professions.

Al Qaeda sponsored attacks on the state have been underway for a while with attempted assassinations on the president, the prime minister and the interior minister, the Lal Masjid offensive, the suicide bombing at Tarbela-Ghazi and the recent audio-taped declaration of war by Osama bin Laden on General Musharraf ‘his government, his army and those who help him’.

A military spokesman has dismissed these threats by referring to the army’s commitment to fighting extremists and terrorism and claiming that ‘the whole nation is behind us and the Pakistan army is a national institution’.

Brave words indeed! But the army’s resolve to defend national interests against Osama bin Laden — who is more popular in Pakistan than General Musharraf — is by no means certain.

The gravity of the military situation is matched by a bleak ‘civilian’ scenario where the culture of self-interest that has been prevailing for decades has found compelling expression in the current crop of power-seekers.

At best, in tandem with the establishment, they perpetuate the tradition of default and dysfunctionalism: small men and small women, incapable of sound leadership and armed with nothing better than rhetoric and ad hocism to counter Al Qaeda’s challenge.

It is, therefore, likely that in the event of a well-orchestrated takeover by Al Qaeda, the creaking structure of state held in place by misguided hands for approximately 60 years will collapse and all the king’s men — the military, bureaucracy, political parties, business elite, feudal order, politicised clerics, empowered mafia and status quo preservers — will be reduced to flotsam and jetsam.

There is, of course, a remote possibility that the political drama currently unfolding in Islamabad may miraculously bring about a democratic order. Such a development could rely on popular support to check the Al Qaeda juggernaut.

However, a prerequisite for the success of democracy is the existence of democratic discipline in society. Given the anarchic state of affairs in Pakistan, the establishment of such a disciplinary order would require time and effort.

Moreover, democracy is not a panacea for all faults in society. There is the possibility, too, that democratic governance at this juncture may be too little and too late in coming to check Al Qaeda. But democracy coupled with a no-holds-barred governmental approach, backed unequivocally by the military high command, may turn the tide.

As for Al Qaeda, assuming control of Pakistan will be no cakewalk. It would have to resolve several imponderables first, the prevention of chaos and insurrection attendant on a possible takeover being just one of them.

Its lack of experience in governance would constitute yet another problem, for instead of localised entities like the retrograde Taliban rule in Afghanistan and the MMA government in the NWFP, it would be faced with a nation of 160 million people divided among four provinces with diverse ethnic, cultural and linguistic traditions.

It would be interesting to see how the US reacts to such a development, especially in the context of Pakistan’s nuclear status.

It would also be interesting to see how Al Qaeda, which adheres strictly to the Sunni Salafi creed and discredits all others, would address the multipolarity of Islamic practice in Pakistan comprising the Sunni and Shia sects, several sub sects and many different religious orders.

If such an event came to pass, the hapless citizens of state would in all probability survive to live another day, albeit under a totalitarian order not averse to using brute force to suppress opposition, but Pakistan is unlikely to survive in the form, shape and style known to us.

The writer is a barrister at law and lecturer in legal studies

Unshaken it stands

MYANMAR has been much in the news ever since the military junta’s decision to do away with subsidies on imported fuel led to price increases and triggered public demonstrations.

The protest marches grew in size and intensity from the small number of monks who appeared on the streets in mid-August to the 100,000-strong throng that crowded the streets of Yangon in the third week of September.

Buddhist monks, much revered by the Burmese people, were in the vanguard of the demonstrations. They were prompted, as one monk told the BBC in an interview, not by a desire to overthrow the military regime but to ease the economic hardship of the people on whose alms the monks depend for their own sustenance.

The regime appeared to have been caught off guard by the intensity of the protests, and its cautious initial response — having truckloads of soldiers follow the demonstrators without any physical intervention — aroused hopes that the regime would be forced to hand over power to Aung San Suu Kyi, the popularly elected leader. (She has been more or less continuously under house arrest since she won the elections in 1990, but was denied power by the military junta). This was not to be.

The junta’s minister of religious affairs met the leaders of the monks on bended knee, as was expected in deeply religious Myanmar, but he delivered a harsh message of retaliatory action if the demonstrations were not stopped. This warning was ignored perhaps because the monks were buoyed by reports of international outrage and the hope this created of international intervention.

In the event, international intervention consisted of no more than some condemnatory statements, the imposing by the United States of some additional and largely symbolic sanctions and the dispatch to Myanmar of the UN secretary-general’s special envoy, the former Nigerian foreign minister Ibrahim Gambari.

The last reports coming from Myanmar, or at least such of them as are filtering through the massive blackout imposed by the junta, suggest that the protests are petering out. A terrified people and priesthood have been cowed by a massive show of force by the military.

One diplomat in Yangon believes that more than 200 people have been killed and other reports suggest that the number of monks arrested or confined runs into the thousands. It would seem, however, that the junta has been able to quell public discontent much more easily and quickly on this occasion than in 1988 when similar but larger public demonstrations also triggered by economic hardship led to the death of more than 3,000 people and forced the junta to permit free elections that were won by Aung San Suu Kyi and her party.

Initial reports of splits within the army’s ranks, fuelled by Internet blogs from within Myanmar and from hopeful exiles in Bangkok and elsewhere, received enormous coverage but were proved illusory.

The UN envoy, Ibrahim Gambiri of Nigeria, now in Yangon has been told by Burmese generals that the protests were the work of disruptive elements backed by foreign embassies. No verifiable accounts have appeared to suggest that the army command has been divided on how to handle the situation.

No end to the 45 years of military rule, or more accurately misrule, appears to be in sight. This is surprising given the corruption of the army rulers. A 10-minute video smuggled out of Myanmar showed the extravagance of the feast arranged by General Than Shwe, the military ruler, for his daughter’s wedding.

The rise in energy prices is seen in Myanmar as being designed not to balance the budget but to benefit the cronies of General Than Shwe who have monopolistic control of the oil import and distribution system in Myanmar. It is surprising because the parasitical army which has swelled to more than 375,000 has thrown up a leadership whose misguided policies and corruption have reduced the inhabitants of a resource-rich country to a virtual state of penury.

Internationally, the lack of action is surprising because this regime has been responsible for fostering insurgencies in virtually every border area of Myanmar and has won reprieve from the insurgency only by allowing the insurgents a free hand in the areas they control.

This has meant allowing the use of these areas for dubious activities in neighbouring countries. Today, there are refugees from the Muslim majority province of Arakan living lives of misery in small shanty villages in southern Bangladesh. There are refugees and drug smugglers in refugee camps in Thailand and China.

Internally, of course, it is the power of the gun that keeps the people under control. Externally, it appears that it is the hankering for access to Myanmar’s natural resources that prompts a hands-off or even more positive attitude by Myanmar’s neighbours towards the military regime. India, which is in serious competition with China for access to Myanmar’s off-shore and on-shore gas and oil reserves, recently lost the battle for gas from one part of the off-shore gas deposits which the military regime granted to China.

China’s mammoth energy company, Petro-China, will not only build a pipeline to carry this gas to China but will also construct alongside a pipeline that will enable it to import oil through Myanmar’s ports and thus bypass the strategically vulnerable Strait of Malacca.

China is today Myanmar’s principal trading partner and these economic interests are said by western observers to be the reason why China is not prepared to join the West in isolating the military regime and in blocking any action against Myanmar in the UN Security Council. Chinese reticence may be owed in part to this consideration but it flows rather more from the traditional Chinese view that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state must be observed in inter-state relations.

India, for all its democratic credentials and for all its fears of the growth of Chinese influence in Myanmar, cannot afford to take an adverse stance towards the regime. There are other blocks of gas and oil for which it is bidding and which it thinks it needs desperately to meet the energy needs of West Bengal and the insurgency ridden northeastern states.

Equally important, it needs Myanmar’s cooperation to deny its insurgents the use of Myanmar territory. It also believes that it must keep its political connections with the regime alive to counter the growth of Chinese influence.

The reality is that these are the two neighbours that can most effectively bring pressure to bear on the military regime, but which have reasons for not doing so.

Regardless of whether or not these reasons are short-sighted, this is a reality that the Burmese people must live with.

Perhaps the best that can be expected under the circumstances is that both these countries will join the rest of the world in nudging the military regime towards some sort of power-sharing arrangement.

Are there lessons that we in Pakistan can learn from this analysis of the Myanmar situation?

For South Asian cooperation

LOOKING at the history of South Asia, it becomes obvious that the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc) has not come up with sufficient initiatives to synergise the process of cooperation and give it an institutional base.

There are deep political, historical and cultural cleavages among the member countries making Saarc an ineffective regional grouping. The realisation of a shared future for South Asia is still a pipedream.

The agreement on a roadmap for creating the Saarc Development Fund back in July 2006 was a positive development, but the mechanism to put into operation the $300m fund has yet to be evolved by the member countries.

Reportedly, working out the modalities of the arrangement was an important agenda item in the recently concluded deliberations of the Saarc finance ministers in New Delhi. The Saarc Development Fund primarily aims at poverty alleviation through the identification and implementation of development projects in the region.

The South Asian region has still not emerged as a strong regional bloc like other regional groupings in the world. There are huge disparities in terms of population, area and international trade quantum within the Saarc member countries. This lack of “region-ness” is partly responsible for the poor performance of Saarc. Political conflicts and crises have consumed their scarce resources.

South Asia is the poorest, most illiterate, most malnourished and least gender-sensitive region in the world. Intra-regional trade has stagnated at about four to five per cent of the members’ total world trade. Per capita income is very low which is responsible for the low purchasing power of people in the region.

All Saarc countries have a low ranking on the Human Development Index. There is a common perception that Saarc is bogged down in observing formalities and not addressing issues of substance, which could accelerate cooperation in the region.

The poor performance of Saarc can be attributed to two major factors. One factor relates to inherent problems in the region, which are not favourable for the promotion of an effective regional grouping in South Asia. These inherent constraints include deep historical and cultural differences, low intra-regional trade due to similar comparative advantage, low complementarity indices, similar factor endowments and the competing structures of their economies.

The second factor is the lackadaisical approach of the ruling elite of South Asia towards the resolution of regional problems and the failure to take bold initiatives for South Asian regional cooperation.

In order to heal the divisions between the countries of the region and to realise a shared future for the teeming millions of South Asia, it is imperative that effective initiatives are taken to target poverty.

Investment in education is inadequate compared with the burgeoning population and pervasive poverty in the region. Education in South Asian institutions lacks in quality. It does not have relevance with the demands of the market due to weak linkages between the educational institutions and industry. Moreover, female education is hugely neglected .

Nutritional poverty is much more widespread than economic poverty as measured by headcount poverty ratios. Numerous empirical studies have shown that nutritional deficiency has a deep adverse impact on early childhood development. Early childhood interventions particularly benefit poor children and families. So, targeting nutritional poverty should be an important ingredient of any programme aimed at poverty alleviation in South Asia.

Rural infrastructure development is another priority area, as considerable and sustained investment in infrastructure increases labour productivity, reduces the cost of production (both farm and non-farm) and promotes rural-urban linkages. The development of infrastructure is also important to increase regional trade.

The high cost of transportation is a big obstacle to increasing the trade volume of the South Asian countries. According to a World Bank study (2002), the average transport cost (as a percentage of commodity prices) is 4.24 per cent for developed countries compared with South Asia where the average transport cost is 9.74 per cent.

Another area where cooperation is direly needed is the energy sector. South Asia has the lowest per capita consumption of energy in Asia. The energy crisis is likely to further aggravate in the coming years.

Some experts on South Asian affairs have persistently put forth a proposal for an interactive energy grid throughout South Asia as it would help build opportunities for cooperation in the energy sector. The South Asian Energy Centre (SEC) should come up with concrete proposals to enhance cooperation in this sector.

Intra-regional trade among South Asian countries is very low. Despite several efforts made in the past, intra-regional trade has not registered any noticeable growth. The South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (Sapta) came into force in 1995 but its impact on regional trade has been modest.

The future of Safta is also not bright in its present form as an analysis of the Sapta experience shows that the factors responsible for its failure have been inherited by Safta. These factors include the protection of products with the potential to increase intra-regional trade through lengthy sensitive lists, the non-inclusion of the services sector, unfavourable rules of origin and high non-tariff barriers especially in India.

It is now fully recognised that trade is an important stimulator of economic growth and economic growth is a necessary condition for poverty reduction. Therefore, it is necessary that sincere efforts be made by all Saarc member countries to increase intra-regional trade. In this regard it is suggested that trade barriers should be removed to facilitate the flow of trade among these countries.

India should take a bold decision to remove non-tariff barriers because almost all the South Asian countries have complaints against India on this issue. The bigger partners in Saarc need to show some magnanimity and take responsibility for assuaging the concerns of smaller partners.

The establishment of banks and other financial institutions across the Saarc countries should also be a target area. Their business processes and standards should be harmonised. The problems relating to business transactions between importers and exporters will then be reduced.

Initiatives like the establishment of the Saarc Development Fund are, therefore, good steps for accelerating the process of regional integration. Mechanisms for putting it into operation should be evolved without further delay. The sooner we do it the better it will be for the collective advancement of all South Asian people.

How to make poverty sexy

WITH everyone’s attention focussed on General Musharraf’s re-election it seems silly to bring to your notice the rather dull issue of Pakistan’s progress on the UN Millennium Development Goals. But it has to be done because long after Mr Musharraf is or isn’t elected, and the media finds another issue to cry itself hoarse over, the issue of poverty will remain unless it is given the due importance it deserves. Perhaps lingerie can help.

But before I get into the link between lingerie and development, let us examine Pakistan’s progress on meeting the UN Millennium Development Goals by 2015. On eradicating poverty and hunger, surprisingly according to UN statistics, Pakistan is an early achiever in meeting this goal: from 47.8 per cent of its population living below one dollar a day in 1991, the figure was brought down to 24 per cent in 2005. However, every third person is classified as poor so the country must not lose momentum on eradicating poverty, especially since inequality is rising.

On achieving universal primary education the results are far from good, despite the increased spending in this and other sectors like health, water and sanitation. While the primary enrolment rate has increased to 52 per cent in the last four years, the rate of increase (around 2.5 per cent a year) means that Pakistan will not be able to meet the 100 per cent enrolment target. The enrolment rate for girls is significantly lower and their dropout rate higher than boys.

Onto some health figures, there has been some improvement in the under-five mortality rate but it is still high compared to other South Asian countries. Out of 1,000 born every year, 100 die before turning five. The infant mortality rate remains unchanged which is worrying because there has been an increase in the number of babies receiving antenatal care. More worrying is the maternal mortality rate whose numbers increased from 350 per 100,000 births in 2001 to 400 in 2004. So Pakistan is lagging behind in meeting these MDG targets.

There are other depressing figures on MDG targets on sanitation, combating diseases like HIV/Aids and gender parity. Suffice it to say that where there are some small gains, the overall picture is a depressing one. Which brings me back to lingerie.

At a recent roundtable discussion with editors from South Asia on development issues, organised by the UN and Oxfam in Goa, it was pointed out that when US lingerie brand Victoria’s Secret came to Sri Lanka to undertake production of their garments, it became news. After a long time, Sri Lanka was in the news not for war but underwear, and thus progress made on development issues in that country. This, the organisers argued, is just one way of bringing oft-ignored issues like poverty into the mainstream news.

There is something depressing about having to “sexify” development issues in order to give them the attention they deserve. How can we create the same uproar on women dying in Pakistan during childbirth as is elicited by news of people dying in Iraq during a bomb raid? To suggest that it is preposterous to equate the two, or that one is a more unjust incident than the other is equally depressing for both acts of cruelty deserve to share news space. Yet that is rarely the case. And for this, those in the media must accept blame. In a ratings race, development stories are sacrificed for politics, for that is considered more newsworthy.

Perhaps it is time to redefine what is newsworthy. A lot of countries like India have. The circus that was the Abishek-Ashwariya wedding is just one example of the shift in priorities in media practices around the world. Pakistan is still immune from the Indian Page Three Culture (social diary pages in newspapers) but given its tendency to ape all things West/East, it may just be on the agenda. That would be a devastating blow to MDG issues whose sexifying is already a difficult task, which will be made harder if it has to compete with the lives of the inebriated spoilt rich brats around town.

There are many dangerous assumptions at play within the media: one being that people are heartless and do not want to read human-interest stories (code word for development) or that to lure the younger generation of readers/viewers, one has to dumb down. Admittedly, the pressure to conform to what others are doing is immense, especially since so much of what newspapers do is advertisement driven but that does not mean it is impossible to report on MDGs in an interesting manner. It requires creativity and leadership, both of which are in ample supply in the Pakistani media.