Thereby hangs a story

THE execution of Saddam Hussein has gone down in Pakistan without any strong reaction. It’s been taken more or less for granted, and no political party has considered it appropriate to stage a demonstration or a public protest. Obviously the Eidul Azha holidays, which the Americans and Iraqis used to hang the Iraqi president, inhibited much of an exhibition of Pakistani anger or resentment. Even in Iraq and the Middle East, only Sunnis and some nationalist groups have expressed their outrage.

The protest at Saddam Hussein’s murder should not be seen so much in the context of the man’s character and his rule. He was a dictator who killed opponents, and invaded Iran and Kuwait. He was a Baathist, but never had a commitment to any liberal ideology or principles, and even his secularism was compromised when he adopted Islamic signals after his attempt to conquer Kuwait. The way he hid himself when Iraq was attacked by the US and its stooges and was dug out of his hideout rather than fight the invader is itself something that should make many people feel ashamed.

But the basic problem that should have attracted much greater notice here and in the rest of the world is that those who tried the former Iraqi leader and decided to execute him were the Americans and their Iraqi henchmen in government. Both have been responsible for killing thousands of Iraqi civilians and at least 3,000 US soldiers, a greater number of American citizens than those killed in the 9/11 attack and which provided an excuse for the US to invade Iraq and Afghanistan.

Saddam Hussein faced a trial that has been described as bogus and totally prejudiced by even many western individuals and human rights and civil organisations, including the US-based Human Rights Watch. How defence lawyers were harassed and persecuted is well known; how a judge who seemed somewhat independent was removed is also a known fact. The Iraqi leader was kept in US security throughout and was handed over into Iraqi custody shortly before his dawn hanging. The Americans strengthened Saddam Hussein for decades and then dismantled him and hanged him.

The sadness and anger against the hanging is an anger that now moves so many people against America, and has moved them ever since that country’s assumption of the role as the world’s leader and creator and plunderer. It would be useful if someone could at this stage recall America’s murderous intervention in South-East Asia and Latin America. No US leader has been tried for the killing of innocent people or hanged, despite the fact that the death penalty remains legitimate in many American states.

There is no proof to support these beliefs, but many Pakistanis feel that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged because of American pressure and that the crash that killed Ziaul Haq was also part of US policy, which also took the life of the US ambassador in Pakistan.

Some emotion is now coming out into the open in Iraq. There is admiration of how Saddam Hussein refused to have his eyes folded before he was hanged. He remained calm and greatly balanced the image he had created when he was dug out of a hole from his hiding place. In his trial too, he took a defiant stand and was outspoken in his criticism. It has now been revealed that he was abused by some of the guards present there, and outrage over this in Iraq and abroad has now led to an investigation that will also investigate how a secret film was made of the hanging. There were also slogans raised on the occasion against Saddam Hussein. This is all a disgrace and a shame. The Americans cannot absolve themselves of the events that marked the execution.

Saddam Hussein at least did not in his final days enunciate the kind of explanations for his actions that President George Bush has been doing for his totally uncalled for attack on Iraq and the events that have been taking place since then. In October 2003, Mr Bush had met Palestinian leaders and claimed that he was told by God to invade Iraq and attack Osama bin Laden’s stronghold in Afghanistan as part of a divine mission to bring peace to the Middle East, security for Iraq and a state of Palestine. Three years later, Iraq’s security is in tatters, there’s no peace in the Middle East and a Palestine state seems as distant as ever. But Mr Bush keeps smiling. That is what is happening in the world, and how countries like ours continue to play Washington’s stooges, and also how often our leaders too invoke divine missions in support of their policies.

There are some other aspects to remember —— not least America’s exuberant earlier support of Saddam Hussein against Iran and in his relations with other Arab countries. What Saddam Hussein did with his use of gas and chemical weapons cannot be justified, but the journalist and commentator Robert Fisk, wrote in The Independent, London, on December 31:

“We’ve shut him up. The moment Saddam’s hooded executioner pulled the lever of the trapdoor in Baghdad yesterday morning, Washington’s secrets were safe. The shameless, outrageous, covert military support which the United States — and Britain — gave to Saddam for more than a decade remains the one terrible story which our presidents and prime ministers do not want the world to remember. And now Saddam, who knew the full extent of that western support —— given to him while he was perpetrating some of the worst atrocities since the Second World War — is dead.” Tariq Ali echoes similar thoughts: “That Saddam was a tyrant is beyond dispute, but what is conveniently forgotten is that most of his crimes were committed when he was a staunch ally of all those who now occupy the country. It was, as he admitted in one of his trial outbursts, the approval of Washington (and the poison gas supplied by West Germany) that gave him the confidence to douse Halabja with chemicals in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war. He deserved a proper trial and punishment in an independent Iraq. Not this.”

If nothing else, at least the world should, whenever possible, enunciate the morally wrong and totally aggressive actions that successive US governments have taken to control every country, with President Bush’s years marking perhaps the most humiliating and destructive of such policies. If Saddam Hussein killed Kurds and Shias, the Americans resorted to carpet bombing, killed civilians indifferently, even Iraqi innocents, and have exacerbated Shia/Sunni divides. A Saudi religious leader has found encouragement to issue a poisonous message against the Shias, recently published in our papers.

There is more sectarian hatred in Iraq now than perhaps there was when Saddam Hussein ruled. This is going to have its own consequences for which the Americans will have to shoulder the blame.

Does the US actually want to divide Iraq into Kurd, Shia and Sunni regions? The people also know who has really been responsible for creating and building up Israel and inflicting damage on Palestine.

In Pakistan, we also know who first helped and backed right wing and religious parties here so that they could figure in the US anti-communist strategy. This will not be included in the history books that are being rewritten and which mention in detail why the coup had to be carried out by General Pervez Musharraf. We don’t want any anti-American feeling to pervade our thoughts, although we never for a half a century have avoided in creating and reviving hatred and dislike against non-Muslims in this region and against India. That’s how we have lived and functioned.

What will Saddam Hussein’s killing do for other Muslim leaders? Will the same fate overtake all those who seek at some point to defy the US or act more independently?

For the moment, leaders like President Mubarak and those in the oil-rich states are all American backers and feel this is the way to protect their own interests. But the aggressive policies adopted by America have encouraged reactionary beliefs in religion as policy, and this is going to strike many, as part of it has struck and weakened Pakistan.

Some of this may sound emotional and superficial, but the issue has to be tackled at some point before we begin to lose all our collective judgment because of the interests of the ruling groups.

Time to restructure Afghan policy

PAKISTAN’S latest response to President Hamid Karzai’s allegations of militant Taliban activities being carried out from “sanctuaries” in Pakistan has been to announce the fencing of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the laying of landmines in order to halt the cross-border movement of the Taliban.

The proposal shows how out of sync our Afghan policy is with reality and the likely complications of such a policy.

Kabul has reacted angrily to the proposed measures with Karzai vowing that Kabul will use “every method” to resist the proposed plan. Besides, there have been negative reactions internally and internationally. Major political parties in Pakistan have argued that the measure will worsen relations between the two nations and divide the Pashtuns along the border. The mining of the border has evoked serious concerns from the international community, the UN and human rights organisations, especially as Afghanistan continues to be among the world’s most heavily mined countries. Mines have killed thousands of civilians over the years.

Pakistan, along with India and the US, is among the few countries that have not signed the Mine Ban Treaty of 1997. Pakistan’s fencing proposal is also flawed and inconsistent. It opposed India’s policy of fencing the LoC in Kashmir to stop militant infiltration into Indian-held territory. The measure failed to achieve the objective in Kashmir. How can Pakistan expect to effectively seal more than 2,000km of a border that runs through some of the most difficult terrain?

The situation calls for a careful assessment of our Afghan policy and necessitates a long-term view of bilateral relations, examining all available options. In this regard, a fundamental issue that needs to be highlighted is Pakistan’s national interest. The volatility and political instability in the region where Pakistan is located demand that security and territorial integrity be secured at all cost. Pakistan cannot afford to have two hostile neighbours on its eastern and western borders and must remove the fault lines. Despite its failure to register any meaningful progress, the composite dialogue process with India continues to be the preferred option. Relations with Afghanistan merit a similar political approach that is pursued with patience and with an understanding of the economic and geo-strategic implications for Pakistan. Central Asia is becoming an increasingly important component of our foreign policy, both for the growing geo-strategic competition involving the US, Russia and China and Pakistan’s economic, especially energy, interests. The huge oil and gas resources in Central Asia firmly anchor Pakistan’s interests in the region. Pakistan’s observer status and eventual membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the current negotiations for a pipeline from Central Asia necessitate delicate and subtle handling.

By 2015, the Caspian Sea Basin, including Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, will produce four million barrels of oil a day — more than Iraq and Kuwait combined. Pakistan must remain alive to the evolving situation, especially with regard to India’s forward policy in the region. A brief mention of Indian activities that are relevant to our Afghan policy need to be highlighted.

India is courting all major powers quietly and steadily increasing its influence in Central Asia. The Central Asian republics have a crucial place in India’s “security calculus”. A number of significant military initiatives have been taken to forge strategic relations. India has been using Tajikistan as a base for ferrying humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Several batches of Tajik army officers have been trained in India that obtained an air base in Tajikistan in April 2006. Once operational, around 12 to 14 MiG-29 fighter bombers will be stationed at the Ayni base.

Stephen Blank, a professor at the US Army War College, has warned that the move is part of a “broad design” to project Indian power in Central Asia, and a policy goal “that not only signifies India’s determination to play a role in Central Asia security but also its genuine ability to do so”. Also, “the Ayni base represents a major element in India’s effort to promote stability in Afghanistan and to enhance New Delhi’s ability to contain Islamic terrorism both in South Asia and Central Asia”. Our Afghan policy must take into account India’s power projections and ambitions in the region.

Hamid Karzai has visited India four times since December 2001 when he took over as chairman of the interim administration in Kabul. His last visit as president was in April 2006. Earlier, Manmohan Singh paid a state visit to Kabul in August 2005 — the first visit by an Indian premier in 29 years. According to a joint statement, the exchange of visits took “the relationship further into a new paradigm of friendship and cooperation.”

India has provided Kabul with $600 million for infrastructure and development projects under its assistance programme for Afghanistan, thus becoming the largest donor in the region. During his visit, Manmohan Singh announced an annual award of 500 scholarships for Afghan students for university education in India and 500 short-term Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programmes for Afghan nationals.

An additional $25 million has been provided for the construction of the Afghan parliament building in Kabul whose foundation stone was laid by Manmohan Singh. A $50 million credit facility to promote trade and investment between the two countries has been earmarked. India has also agreed to adopt 100 villages in Afghanistan to promote rural development by introducing solar electrification and rainwater harvesting technologies. It has gifted three airbus planes to the Afghan airline Ariana.

India’s financial and political investment in Afghanistan is recognition of its geo-strategic position as a gateway to the oil and mineral-rich Central Asian states. The massive reconstruction plans also offer India a bonanza of contracts for the private sector. The underpinning of Indian diplomacy, however, remains to counter Pakistan’s influence. Pakistan intelligence agencies consider the Indian consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif as being responsible for fomenting unrest across the border in Balochistan and the NWFP. There are also apprehensions of Indian missions printing and circulating fake Pakistani currency and recruiting Afghans to carry out sabotage in Pakistan.

A revision of our Afghan policy is also needed due to the huge credibility gap that exists between Pakistan and the international community in terms of Pakistan’s role and efforts in containing cross-border infiltration in India and Afghanistan. Some time ago, Richard Boucher, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, noted that the Taliban were able to use tribal areas “for sanctuary and for command and control and for regrouping and supply.”

Pakistan continues to be the focus of criticism for “not doing enough” and Indian and Afghan allegations of Pakistan being a “nursery for global terrorism” are still received in the West with credibility. US officials, the media and independent think-tanks echo the refrain that Pakistan has largely turned a blind eye to Taliban activities as it sees the group as “a tool to counter growing Indian influence in Afghanistan.” There is also disappointment at the non-implementation of the decision taken at a White House meeting attended by Karzai, Gen Musharraf and George Bush last September to hold jirgas to pacify the situation.

If our government can bend over backwards to appease India and make unilateral gestures to normalise ties, why can’t we have a similar peace-making strategy with regard to Kabul? It is proposed that on the pattern of back-channel diplomacy with India, Islamabad should engage Kabul in a similar exercise.

As a first step, we should abandon the fencing and mining options. Further, instead of trading accusations through public forums, both countries should demonstrate sensitivity and air grievances in private through the plenipotentiaries of the two presidents and hammer out a strategy to put bilateral relations on an even keel. This mechanism must be launched immediately and remain in constant use to discuss options and ideas to promote negotiations and build mutual trust. Political dialogue needs to be institutionalised and a framework put in place to build on discussions.

Pakistan has so far committed $350 million for reconstruction of the Afghan economy, yet it is reviled as a hostile neighbour. While Karzai may have contributed to the present situation through his failure to manage the internal situation, instead of blaming him, we ought to engage his government constructively and with “healing” diplomacy. We must stop issuing forthwith any critical comments at any level, maintain a steady stream of political contacts and open confidential channels for addressing concerns. These are difficult times for both Pakistan and Afghanistan and only an enlightened approach can secure our mutual interests.

The writer is a former ambassador.