Opposition in disarray

IT IS often the case that in an authoritarian or a military-dominated system, criticism of the opposition, which is already suppressed by the state machinery, tends to be muted. Even criticism coming from independent and unbiased quarters can only reinforce the government, whose spokespersons seem to have nothing better to do than, sitting and standing, flay the opposition.

However, with general elections looming, it is hard to ignore the disarray in opposition ranks or to believe that all the opposition’s weaknesses are due to the machinations of the government. The inconclusive Benazir Bhutto-Nawaz Sharif meeting in London is an indication of the distrust that separates the two main national parties.

It is impossible to say whether the PML-N’s pique at alleged contacts between the PPP and the government is only because of the fact that for the time being Gen Musharraf has opted to ignore Mr Sharif in his approaches to the opposition or whether the party’s stand is based on a principled position —— that it will not talk to the general in any circumstances. Perhaps the military right now needs a party with liberal credentials more than the PML-N or the MMA, the latter having served its purpose and now weighing more and more like a millstone around the general’s neck. Anyway, the PPP seems closer to reality in refusing to altogether rule out the possibility of a compromise with the military; it is also right in its decision not to resign from the assemblies without a coherent alternative strategy in sight.

The search for a grand alliance of all opposition parties is blocked by the ideological differences that separate many of them from one another. In the absence of any ideological compatibility, alliances can be formed only on the basis of limited objectives — to dethrone the person in power or to restore the supremacy of the Constitution. These are politically justifiable goals, but the objective conditions must be right. It is difficult to convince the masses, given their experience that simply by ousting one person, their daily lives would change in any meaningful way in terms of economic and social uplift.

If the anti-Bhutto alliance had succeeded in the 1970s, it was because of Mr Z.A. Bhutto’s own strangely misguided policies that included not only the over-fixing of the 1977 elections but weird steps such as the nationalisation of rice and flour husking units and even monopolising the distribution of fodder, whose distribution was given to the control of local PPP workers. The late Abdulla Malik, that prolific commentator on Punjab politics, used to say that he had never seen a political movement in the province with a spread so far as to involve even remote tehsil and thana towns as during the agitation launched by the Pakistan National Alliance, which drew its following from traders and shopkeepers.

It should also be remembered that the military, which had never taken to Mr Bhutto because he really didn’t belong to the establishment but had no choice but to bring him in after the 1971 crisis in order to save itself and the country, no longer needed him. It also knew that the Americans had withdrawn their blessings from Mr Bhutto and were in sympathy with the PNA. This is pure hearsay, but Mr Asghar Khan was quoted by a senior journalist as saying at the height of the PNA agitation that even if Mr Bhutto hadn’t fixed the elections, he would have been removed: he only made the task easier by his poll manipulations.

It is difficult to see the same conditions being replicated in today’s Pakistan. The biggest challenge before the PML-N and the PPP is to garner public sympathy on a scale wide enough to lend any movement launched by them some credibility (this is presuming that there will be no deal with the MMA). This means that in the time now available and within whatever political space is permitted by the government, opposition parties should consider undertaking mass contact drives, compile membership lists, try to find out whether they are functioning political parties or just something in the minds of their leaders and in newspaper columns, organise party elections, come out with manifestoes approved by elected members and undertake social work in inner city localities and rural constituencies where the hold of feudal and tribal chieftains is particularly strong.

It has been the recent experience that whenever political parties have taken part in projects relating to the public weal, such as earthquake and rain relief, they have done so to project themselves and their leaders. When relief goods were being distributed in Hyderabad following the city’s rain ordeal, posters of the party’s ‘quaid’ could be seen prominently in the background.

It is also perhaps time for some of our political leaders to answer at least some of the questions that have been raised and that refuse to go away from the public mind. It is a time to be honest with the electorate. For instance, Mr Nawaz Sharif has to explain his shoddy and absolutely clumsy attempt to block the aircraft carrying Gen Musharraf back from Colombo from landing in Karachi. If he had to remove Gen Musharraf, who he suspected of planning a coup, shouldn’t he have relied on the strength of his “heavy mandate” that had emboldened him to assault the Supreme Court?

Mr Shahbaz Sharif, if memory serves, had first said his brother had not ordered anyone to block the general’s plane from landing but had actually insisted that it should be permitted to land in Karachi. In court in Karachi, he was reported as saying that he was asleep when the incident occurred (why was the PM’s brother and confidante asleep at a moment like this?) and Gen Musharraf says in his book that Mr Shahbaz Sharif was in the bathroom at the time, to which the latter has said he was in the bathroom because he wanted to destroy the notes of the speech the PM was later due to deliver.

Ms Benazir Bhutto has to tell us who owns the so-called Surrey Palace. It doesn’t really matter — so many of us would love to have a house like that in England — but somebody down the line somewhere should have the guts to admit wrongdoing or to establish with some clarity that the government’s accusations are false and that the mansion in question was bought through money legitimately earned.

If the Constitution, rightly or wrongly, rules out a third term as prime minister, why must Mr Sharif and Ms Bhutto insist that they will become prime ministers again? They should say that if their parties get a majority, they will nominate a person to be elected prime minister till they can have the Constitution amended to provide for a third term. This whole business of leaders sitting abroad and pulling the strings from there should be seriously considered by all those concerned.

Since Gen Musharraf will be a key figure in electoral politics, he too should answer a couple of quick questions. He has been engaged in a debate with Mr Sharif on the Kargil issue, and says, among other things, that it was the prime minister who had ordered the withdrawal from Kargil. Could a civilian prime minister wind up an operation ordered by the military and survive in office even for a day? Was it also the PM who had authorised the Kargil operation and the crossing of the Line of Control?

Is it not possible that the decision to withdraw was taken neither by the general nor by the prime minister but was forced on us by the US and the international community? Beating about the bush has become a national pastime. We have learnt to lie and mislead without losing a night’s sleep.

Meanwhile, about whether Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif should and can return or not to take part in general elections, they have a better constitutional and moral right to do so than Mr Musharraf presiding over as president and COAS over PML-Q meetings and brazenly campaigning for the party. If this partisanship continues, a caretaker or interim government set up before the general elections will have no meaning and no credibility.

It is to be hoped that all those interested are closely following current developments in Bangladesh. In the old days, pressure for democracy used to come from East Pakistan; may be now it will come from Bangladesh.

Engaging the Taliban

PRESIDENT Musharraf has described the Taliban as the biggest threat to the region at present, a threat even greater than Al Qaeda. The Americans view the Taliban as sworn enemies who gave and continue to give protection and sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives. The US has been engaged in a fierce military conflict with them since 9/11.

Nato forces, operating for the first time outside Europe, are now fighting them along with the newly trained Afghan army, but with little success. India is getting nervous as the Taliban are a resurgent force. The Indians find their aspirations thwarted and their investments in Afghanistan at risk. The Chinese and Russians are not saying much in public but dread the advance of the Taliban, lest this movement links up with separatist movements in Xinjiang and in Russian Dagestan and Chechnya.

It is, however, possible that both Beijing and Moscow are pleased that American power is being dissipated in fighting an open-ended war with the Taliban. The Central Asian states consider their resurgence as dangerous and destabilising for their regimes. The Arab regimes, in fact all Muslim countries, shun them and find their world view and interpretation of Islam despicable. Iran, in particular, considers them a disgrace to Islam and an enemy of the Shia sect, although, for reasons of political expediency, Tehran might find some utility in them for distracting America while its confrontation with the superpower continues. Pakistan’s moderates consider the Taliban as the anti-thesis of the Quaid-i-Azam’s vision of Pakistan.

How is it that, despite these heavy odds, the Taliban are operating as an entity outside the state structure, in fact in confrontation with it, and with only divided support from the Afghans, essentially the Pashtun community? They are standing up to the onslaught of the global superpower and multinational, powerful and technologically advanced Nato forces. Not only are they putting up fierce resistance, they have reestablished their hold on many areas of Afghanistan and their influence is rapidly spreading to Pakistan’s tribal belt and adjoining areas.

The reason for the Taliban’s success is that they enjoy grassroots support in the south and southeastern provinces of Afghanistan and find resonance in Pakistan’s tribal belt and beyond. Also, for no better alternative, the Afghans are falling back on the Taliban. Poor governance, harassment by warlords, drug traffickers, corrupt bureaucrats and “collateral damage” caused by US air and ground strikes, has led to wide disillusionment among the Afghans. There is hardly any development activity and a growing feeling that despite the presence of foreign forces the state is crumbling.

The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan is more of a phenomenon than a movement. Their resurgence is indicative of a failing state because people are falling back on extremist religious and nationalist groups to provide them security and livelihood, even if it means forgoing their basic rights. Moreover, there are other factors which have contributed to their resurgence. The Taliban enjoy wide sympathy among the local population, whereas Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his government are considered as American puppets, notwithstanding that he came to power through an electoral process.

There is a similar perception regarding President Musharraf — that he is advancing American interests. Ordinary people in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal belt and the NWFP find it easy to relate to and coexist with the Taliban, as compared to those who are perceived as foreign agents. Strong anti-American sentiments in the region are also a contributory factor to the Taliban revival. The unjustified US intervention in Iraq has also mobilised Pashtun sentiment against the Americans in Afghanistan and distracted the US from remaining focused on it.

President Musharraf, realising that the policy of military confrontation with the Taliban was going nowhere, decided on a peace agreement with the tribes of North Waziristan and to engage the maliks and militants in dialogue. In the prevailing circumstances, this was perhaps a wise move, for, after all, jirgas have always been the traditional approach to resolving disputes in that part of the world. Moreover, the peace agreement has saved the lives of Pakistani soldiers, militants and especially innocent civilians who were getting caught in the crossfire.

But there is a flip side to this deal. Many questions still remain unanswered. Firstly, whose writ will eventually prevail in Waziristan — the government’s or the Taliban’s? Already there are reports that the militants have established a parallel administration and are even imposing taxes. Nato forces and the Afghan government are complaining that the insurgency is growing because of cross-border infiltration, although they could be merely using Pakistan as a scapegoat for their own failures.

Ever since the start of the Afghan jihad, the Durand Line has become irrelevant. Now, with the Taliban operating on both sides of the border, this is acquiring a permanent character. Moreover, the JUI, a component of the ruling religious parties’ alliance (the MMA, which is also a coalition partner of the government in Balochistan) in the NWFP is politically sympathetic to the Taliban and has links with militants in the tribal belt. The government finds this relationship useful and uses the JUI leadership as an interlocutor for talking to the militants and the Taliban, but in the bargain gives greater space and influence to religious parties and militants.

This is not to say that the Taliban have not suffered severe military setbacks as was the case during the recent encounters in September and October when Nato forces in Helmand and Uruzgan attacked their positions and killed hundreds of newly-recruited Taliban. Losses multiplied as the Taliban reinforced failure by continuing to give conventional fight to Nato forces rather than relying on guerilla warfare in which they excel. Nonetheless, the hard core Talibans survived the debacle and should be able to make a comeback. Loss of life has become a common occurrence in this region and fresh recruits from Afghanistan and the refugee camps in Pakistan are likely to make up for the losses.

Retaining control over Kandahar is critical for Nato forces. It is not only the stronghold of Mullah Omar and the ideological mecca of the Taliban, it is also strategically important. If it were to fall into the hands of the Taliban it would unhinge Kabul, and that would be then their next destination.

The question arises: can the Taliban be defeated militarily? Perhaps yes tactically, but they will regroup and come back and the victory would be short-lived, as in the past. Regrettably, the situation at present is disappointing and the Americans and British are realising that, as in the past, Afghanistan is relatively easy to invade but very difficult to occupy. Putting it in another way, the battle for Afghanistan was easily won but the war is being lost.

The battle against the Taliban has to be won in the political, ideological, cultural and economical realm with the military instrument being used only for containing their advance and neutralising their military power. In essence, we have to transform mindsets and world views and this can only come about through education, economic development, political evolution and opening the world. There is no quick fix. Patience, prudence and commitment are needed to face this monumental challenge.

In essence, an achievable alternate paradigm has to be developed, which is attractive for the Afghans and the tribal people to shun the archaic Taliban ideology. All this has to be undertaken in close coordination — between Pakistan and Afghanistan and with the moral and financial support of the international community.

The battle for winning the hearts and minds of the people has to be fought primarily by indigenous forces over a long period and not by Nato and the US military. The greater the foreign involvement the less the chance of success, because nationalist forces resisting foreign intervention are likely to side with the Taliban even if they have nothing in common with them.

The writer is a retired lieutenant-general.

The real Adam Smith

FEW have been more maligned than the economist Adam Smith — in life, a man who theorised about moral sentiment; in death, a posterboy for those who grasp price but not value. News that he is set to grace the new £20 note, the first Scot on English notes, provides a welcome chance to put the record straight.

Smith is, of course, best known for the “invisible hand” — the idea that, through markets, people who believe themselves to be acting in self-interest can in fact meet the needs of others. But this insight did not lead him into free market fundamentalism. Rather, the conclusions that he drew — that slamming the door on international trade was misguided, and that producer cartels were “a conspiracy against the public” — are those that economists of left and right agree on.

— The Guardian, London