The new CEC’s task

THE appointment of a Chief Election Commissioner has not drawn very positive reactions from the two mainstream parties, the PML-N and PPP. While the former regretted that the opposition had not been consulted in the choice of the CEC, the latter has come up with a list of demands and suggestions to ensure a fair electoral process. They range from disbanding political cells in the intelligence agencies to such details as the posting of police officers and ensuring against “pre-filled” ballot boxes. The PML reaction came in the form of Mr Shahbaz Sharif’s doubts that the government would at all hold a free and fair election. Given the history of elections we have had, one can understand the opposition’s concerns. So far, with the sole exception of the 1970 general election, no electoral exercise in Pakistan has been free from the bane of rigging. The irregularities include the ruling party making unabashed use of the government machinery for campaigning, opposition candidates likely to win being disqualified, harassment of rival candidates and their supporters being arrested on trumped-up charges. On the day of voting, the government uses police and other state agencies to transport their voters to booths, arranges bogus voting on a massive scale and then manipulates counting and results.

It should be noted, though, that manipulation and coercion have not been the ruling parties’ monopoly; in rural areas, feudal lords — whatever their party affiliations — manage to win because their tenant-farmers are forced to vote for them, and election commission officials often feel helpless because of the hold the feudal lords have over government officials in their areas. The biggest problem with our elections has been violence. It occurs during campaigning and on polling day. To ensure against election violence, it is essential for all political parties to agree on a code of conduct that should ban the display of arms and the use of inflammatory language, especially of an ethnic, religious and sectarian nature, besides personal vilifications. Processions, which are a peculiar feature of our elections, often lead to violence and were banned for the 2002 election. Let the CEC maintain the ban, leaving public meetings and the electronic and print media as the vehicle for candidates to articulate their viewpoints.

A relevant point here is the opposition’s demand for a caretaker government to hold elections. In Bangladesh, elections are organized by a caretaker government, and this helps in ensuring a maximum degree of transparency. Some time back a federal minister had declared that the 2007 election would be held under a caretaker set-up. However, this raises special problems, because the resignation of the sitting prime minister and the induction of a caretaker one is unlikely to make much difference, since real power lies elsewhere. This should make the CEC aware of the importance of his job. Ultimately, it is he who should make sure that the EC officials under him do their job without fear or favour. In a country where half the population is illiterate, organizing a national election is a challenging job. But only fair elections can give people trust in the sanctity of the ballot and make them genuinely feel that the only way to throw a government out and bring in a new one is through elections. However, all said and done, the general election will still lack credibility unless the heads of the PML-N and PPP are allowed to take part in it.

Development in tribal areas

REITERATING his government’s commitment to socio-economic development in the tribal areas on Friday, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz emphasised that those sabotaging peace in the area would be severely dealt with. The obvious reference was to militants operating in North and South Waziristan and who the armed forces have been attempting to wipe out since 2004. So far, it has been a losing battle for the government. For although it has had some success in nabbing or killing some key figures of Al Qaeda and other militants, it has little support among the local people who, caught in the crossfire, have suffered heavy casualties as a consequence of the military operations. In this scenario, it has been difficult for the government to go ahead with the development schemes it has promised for uplifting the tribal areas that are regarded as among the most backward in the country. The remoteness and inaccessibility of these areas, coupled with deeply conservative traditions, have made it difficult to assess the socio-economic needs of the people living there.

It is obvious that the government would have to eliminate the militants or limit their presence in the strife-torn region before any major development work can be carried out. However, in the meantime, it is important for the authorities to show restraint in dealing with the tribal elders and the local people to avoid further alienation among them and win their confidence. While at this point it may not be practical to stop action against the militants, it would be wise to involve tribal elders in the attempt to make the extremists surrender — if only as a measure of building trust and to pave the way for development work to begin. In order to demonstrate its goodwill for and commitment to the people, the government can also implement smaller uplift projects in tribal areas that are comparatively peaceful at the moment. This would send out a positive message to the people and lessen their hostility towards the authorities, making them more open to cooperation.

Pressure on Afghan refugees

WHILE so far the residents of the Katcha Garhi Afghan refugee camp in Peshawar have managed to resist government pressure to vacate the settlement, it is uncertain how long they will be able to ward off the move to close down the camp. The truth is that with relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan still frayed, and with growing competition over space and natural resources, it might be time for the refugees to consider moving back to Afghanistan under the UN’s voluntary repatriation plan. Many have done so and the months ahead are likely to see several families returning to Afghanistan from where they had fled during the Soviet occupation of the 1980s. However, to be fair to the refugees, many of them have struck roots here and set up businesses. Moreover, while the general state of the camps may be far from satisfactory, some do have dispensaries and schools. Understandably, many camp dwellers are reluctant to leave for they realise that even relocation in Pakistan would mean starting from scratch.

One can also see the government’s point of view in wanting to close down the camps and ease pressure on resources, besides apprehending lawless elements who may be taking shelter there. Perhaps it would do well to give a realistic deadline to the Garhi camp refugees to vacate the premises and extend the current one of March 31. Of course, the misgivings of the refugees at the prospect of returning to their home country could have been lessened somewhat if Kabul had taken steps to improve security and living conditions besides providing greater employment opportunities for the returnees. Here, the international community, too, is to blame for not delivering on its monetary pledges for reconstruction and rehabilitation in the devastated country. A greater effort by the Afghan government to provide basic facilities and security would see a larger number of refugees willing to return.

Waziristan: is the situation retrievable?

IF use of force was the answer to the resolution of conflicts and frictions, then the Waziristan problem would have been solved a long time ago as every type of armament including jet fighters, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery has been used since the commencement of the military operation in March 2004.

The result has been loss of life and alienation, destruction of property and misery for the already deprived people of the area. A people-friendly and caring government is always ready to consider other options if a particular policy does not yield the desired results, but unfortunately not in our case. Here a course of action once decided by the powers that be usually undertaken without any sane advice or consultation, is continued relentlessly till we are faced with disastrous consequences.

The front pages of national newspapers on March 5 presented a grim picture. One read the chilling news that more than 100 tribesmen had been killed as a result of the army action in North Waziristan the previous day. On the same pages, one saw a smiling President Bush, considered by many as the prime mover of the military operation in our tribal areas, and General Pervez Musharraf, shaking hands. It not difficult to guess the kind of message such a display of careless diplomacy sends out to the people. Couldn’t the action if considered inevitable be delayed for some days, to avoid the accusation that this was done to please the visiting dignitary?

As said earlier, if the current policy had produced positive results for the government — a peaceful and tranquil Waziristan, a tribal population supportive of the government policies — then most Pakistanis would have been squarely on the side of the government and applauded its efforts. But unfortunately, this is not the case. In Miramshah, which has already become a ghost town, more than 150 persons have been killed including personnel of the armed forces in the past few weeks. The political agent, who is the highest ranking political officer and who fondly referred to by the tribesmen as “mai- bap” is constantly targeted. Numerous buildings including a madressah and a hospital have been destroyed in recent operations. The extent of destruction and casualties would indeed be mind-boggling if losses on both sides are computed since the start of the military operations two years ago.

This inevitably leads one to ponder over the reasons for this bloody conflict and the objectives that each side wants to achieve. In my earlier articles on the subject I had outlined and discussed in detail the viewpoint of both sides. The government wanted registration of foreigners living in the area who were accused of launching cross border raids in Afghanistan and asked locals to desist from giving shelter to such elements, and help the authorities implement the developing projects undertaken by the government in their area.

On their part, the tribesmen denied that there were any foreigners living in their area and those whom the government called aliens had actually been living there for decades and had assimilated in society. Asking them to register was to humiliate the tribesmen as it would be totally against their traditions and customs and contrary to the code of Pushtunwali, the tribesmen argued. The tribesmen were also against accepting the responsibility for cross border raids and said that even if some elements occasionally crossed the border, it was for the Afghans and their protectors, the Americans, to intervene.

Further developments are also relevant for this narrative. In early April when the government realized the folly of military action before exhausting other means, it sought the help of a genuine local tribal jirga consisting of maliks, elders, ulema and members of parliament from the area. As a result of successful negotiations, an agreement was signed giving amnesty to those who were accused of opposing the government in lieu of the surrender of some elements as a guarantee of good behaviour. This agreement which was known as the Shakai agreement was signed on April 24, 2004, with great fanfare with the corps commander Peshawar representing the government and some influential maliks including Commander Nek Mohammad, who had by then become the symbol of resistance, representing the local tribesmen.

They were profusely garlanded and Nek Mohammad surrendered his sword to the corps commander as a token of his friendship. Unfortunately, the Americans did not approve of this agreement and the commander-in-charge in Afghanistan, General David Burno, condemned it by saying that these people are to be “killed or captured” and not pardoned as done by Islamabad. This was a signal for further military action, resulting in the brutal killing of Nek Mohammad and some of his man less then two months after the agreement. The killing of Nek Mohammad was the end of all trust and confidence between the parties which has further deteriorated with each passing day.

Where do we go from here? The first thing is to realize the gravity of the situation which has the potential of spreading to other areas and which can attract the attention of some unfriendly foreign powers who are always looking for an opportunity to fish in our troubled waters and to embarrass Pakistan. Up until now, General Musharraf and the prime minister have not shown any meaningful interest in de-escalating the situation.

It is only very recently that the general met a tribal jirga of loyal tribesmen. According to reports, he spoke mainly of development projects as if this is the only problem and the Waziristan problem did not exist. The prime minister has yet to show any interest in a solution to the problem. Currently everything has been left to the governor of the province who was completely sidelined until very recently, and who does not have even a whit of experience in handling tribal matters. In a recent address to a tribal jirga in he is reported to have said that the government was determined to take action against elements who are enemies of the entire world and humanity. “If we do not fix them up, others are ready to follow them till total elimination.”

Are these threats going to endear the government to the tribesmen or de-escalate the tension?

I fear that if the government does not give enough attention and importance to this extremely volatile situation, it can have grave domestic and international repercussions. Already tribal students and lawyers have been demonstrating against the army action and urging the government to start negotiating with the real representatives of the people.

Demand for the formation of an independent judicial commission has been made to investigate the affair and offer mediation. The International Human Rights Watch has also expressed its concern and asked for the protection of the civilian population. It seems to be the only way forward.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Strategic errors

“AMERICA is at war.” So begins President Bush’s introduction to his administration’s National Security Strategy, which was unveiled on Thursday. But the president’s approach to making the US more secure will come at the cost of making many other nations feel less secure. The end result is a more dangerous world.

The 49-page document defines two pillars for national security. The second makes sense. It recognises that the United States must “lead a growing community of democracies” to deal with challenges such as pandemic disease and terrorism; that promoting democracy and economic growth abroad enhance US security; and that reducing global poverty is a strategic priority.

It’s the first pillar that is dangerously askew. It builds on the controversial National Security Strategy of 2002, which raised worldwide alarm with its expansive definition of the right to preemptive attack. Bush’s strategists might have reflected on the events of the last four years and corrected their strategic overreach. Instead, they have set about compounding their errors. The new strategy, justified by the “war on terror,” reaffirms some of the United States’ most self-defeating policies.

The embrace of preventive war, for example, is rationalised by the long-accepted doctrine of preemption. Bush made war on Iraq in part by arguing that Saddam Hussein’s thirst for weapons of mass destruction constituted a grave and gathering threat to the region, and that toppling him would deny Al Qaeda a base of operations after the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Neither justification was true at the time. But in invading Iraq, Bush has created his own nightmare. Iraq is now a magnet for jihadists. And Iran is even more determined to develop nuclear weapons to forestall a fate similar to Iraq’s.

Moreover, the strategy continues to justify preemptive strikes even if the intelligence about an imminent attack is inconclusive: “We do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.” The document also gives the bad guys warning of possible attack: “The world is better off if tyrants know that they pursue WMD at their own peril.” States have always reserved the right to preempt an imminent attack, but this is a transparent cover for regime change.

Another dangerous policy reaffirmed in the document is the reliance on enhanced nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of US national security, even as the US continues to insist that other states not develop nuclear weapons to protect their own security.

—Los Angeles Times