Improving ties with Kabul

AFGHANISTAN, a neighbour with close cultural, historical, ethnic and economic links with our country, has always occupied a very prominent position on the radar screens of Pakistan’s policymakers. The development of close friendly ties and mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields would be the most natural thing for these two countries to actively seek. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case in the past. The responsibility for the unhappy past lies with the leadership of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

However, there is a promise of a happier relationship in the future if both the countries learn from their past mistakes and build up brotherly ties on the basis of recognized principles of inter-state conduct, the reservoir of goodwill that exists between the peoples of the two countries and the vast potential for cooperation between them at the bilateral and regional levels.

Despite the close brotherly ties between the peoples of Afghanistan and Pakistan going back to centuries in the past, their formal relationship started on a sour note as Afghanistan was the only country to object to Pakistan’s admission into the UN in September 1947. It wasn’t surprising, therefore, that even after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1948, the relations between the two countries should have remained turbulent.

Historically speaking, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations can be divided into two main periods: the period between 1947 to 1979 which was dominated by the issues of the Durand Line and Pakhtoonistan, and the period after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 the defining features of which were the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation and, following the Soviet withdrawal, the internal armed conflict in Afghanistan.

Besides being an act of blatant aggression, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan posed a direct threat to Pakistan’s security and drove millions of Afghan refugees into Pakistan where most of them still live. The struggle of the Afghan people to liberate their homeland, therefore, received Pakistan’s steadfast support. But, equally important, the Afghan jihad was also supported by other Muslim countries and several major powers of the non-communist world led by the US. The epic struggle of the Afghan people was crowned with success in 1989 when the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan leaving behind the puppet Najibullah regime. Unfortunately, internal armed conflict in Afghanistan continued even after the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992.

There is no doubt that the internal divisions — ethnic and linguistic — and the Mujahideen commanders’ lust for power were the primary factors responsible for the non-implementation of the Peshawar and Islamabad accords and the resultant mayhem in Afghanistan in the post-Najibullah era. But the situation was made worse as some of Afghanistan’s neighbours were sucked into this conflict through their support to opposing sides leading to disastrous consequences for Afghanistan, the region and the rest of the world.

Pakistan’s pro-Taliban policy in the second half of the 1990s reflected Pakistan’s foreign policy and security establishment’s penchant for short-term and short-sighted policies for the sake of short-term gains. This policy incurred the lasting hostility of non-Pakhtoon communities in Afghanistan, isolated us at the regional and international levels as even during its heyday the Taliban regime was recognized by only three countries in the world, delivered a serious blow to the cause of regional cooperation within the framework of the ECO, and promoted extremism, obscurantism and even sectarian terrorism in Pakistan.

To any dispassionate observer it was clear that our pro-Taliban policy was not sustainable because of the strong resistance to it from the non-Pakhtoon communities in Afghanistan and the overwhelming opposition to it at the regional and international levels.

Despite our best efforts, the Taliban regime could not take Afghanistan’s seat in the UN and even our best friend, China, did not extend recognition to it.

It goes to the credit of our policymakers of the time that in the face of all the negative factors afflicting our pro-Taliban policy, they pursued it steadfastly and in a single-minded fashion till the events of 9/11 brought us to the brink of a major national disaster. It was only then that the headlong pursuit of this disastrous policy was brought to an end but only under US pressure as is well known by now.

In the process, Pakistan’s social fabric was torn apart, our society was brutalized, we earned the opprobrium of the international community for having supported a group of obscurantists in Afghanistan, our relations with Iran and many of the Central Asian Republics were badly damaged, even China developed misgivings about our pro-Taliban policy. We were faced with isolation at the regional and international levels, and our image was badly tarnished in the eyes of the international community.

Undoubtedly the government took the correct decision, and I may add a courageous one, in executing the somersault in our pro-Taliban policy in the aftermath of 9/11. But the net result of our post-1992 Afghanistan policy has been that we have been left with few friends in Afghanistan. Our pro-Taliban policy alienated the non-Pakhtoons in Afghanistan from us. The reversal in this policy alienated the Pakhtoons from us. This background, more than anything else, explains the frequent anti-Pakistan demonstrations in Afghanistan.

This narration perhaps would have been pointless but for the fact that it is extremely important to analyse the reasons for the serious mistakes committed by our foreign policy and security establishment in the management of our Afghanistan policy during most of the 1990s and after until September 2001 so as to avoid such blunders in the future.

Further, an important lesson of the history of our Afghanistan policy is that we should encourage, without fear or favour, free debate and discussion on foreign and security policies both within the government and outside if we want to avoid such disasters in the coming years.

The downfall of the Taliban regime in the wake of 9/11 led to the Bonn agreement and a new political dispensation in Afghanistan enjoying the support of the vast majority of the international community, including also two of its most important neighbours, Iran and Pakistan, and the endorsement of the UN.

With the holding of the presidential and parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, the Bonn process has been completed. However, the Karzai government continues to face internal difficulties owing to the insurgency of the Taliban elements, especially in southeastern Afghanistan, despite the presence of the International Security Assistance Force and US troops.

US officials, from time to time, have expressed their appreciation of the steps taken by the government of Pakistan against the alleged presence of Al Qaeda and other terrorist elements in our tribal areas but have also emphasized the need for a more effective action on our part. The US air strike of January 13, 2006 in Bajaur which caused the death of several innocent Pakistanis besides reportedly killing a few prominent members of Al Qaeda was undoubtedly a consequence of our inability to come up to US expectations besides being a serious and indefensible violation of our territory.

The fact that President Karzai, on returning to Kabul after his recent visit to Pakistan, publicly expressed the hope on February 18 that Pakistan would take action on the list given to it of the Taliban leaders active in Quetta, Peshawar and Karachi shows that all is not well between the two governments on this issue. Needless to add that the two governments must settle this issue in a satisfactory manner bilaterally and through discussions within the trilateral commission.

The prospect, thus, is of continued instability in Afghanistan for quite some time till the Taliban insurgency is overcome and national reconciliation is achieved through an inclusive political dispensation which gives both Pakhtoons and non-Pakhtoons their due share in running the affairs of the country. This would be a difficult task even under the best of circumstances. But given Afghanistan’s history of armed conflict between different ethnic groups, a weak centre, warlordism, and easy and plentiful availability of weapons, the task has assumed more daunting proportions.

Afghanistan alone is in no position to accomplish the task of restoring internal peace and making progress in the gigantic task of reconstruction and development. It desperately needs the assistance and support of the international community, especially its neighbours, for success in this task. This the international community can do by encouraging the political process of integrating the various communities in Afghanistan into a cohesive whole, assisting in the re-establishment of internal security, and contributing to the country’s reconstruction and development.

Despite the economic assistance provided by Pakistan to Afghanistan since the Bonn agreement, the cooperation extended by it to the Karzai government in the implementation of the Bonn process and the fast growing economic and trade links between the two countries, there are underlying tensions in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations as a legacy of the past, particularly of the period from 1992 to September 2001.

In addition, while Afghanistan complains of the activities on its territory of the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements operating from our tribal areas, some circles in Pakistan have alleged that arms are flowing from Afghanistan to the troubled areas in Balochistan. (Afghanistan has officially denied any involvement in the insurgency in Balochistan). The prospects for Pakistan-Afghanistan relations will remain cloudy in the foreseeable future if the two governments are not able to remove mutual misgivings and misunderstandings on these issues which can have disastrous consequences for them and for the rest of the region.

The demands of our Afghan policy have obvious implications for Pakistan’s internal policies. The government’s ability to take effective action against extremist elements and terrorists within the country, especially in our tribal areas, will remain severely circumscribed if the moderate political forces and parties are marginalized and elements espousing extremist views are encouraged.

As for Afghanistan, the political process there would have to be broadened further to accommodate the various political groups and tendencies so as to give them their due share in running the affairs of the country. In this regard, the Afghan government’s peace programme, headed by former president Mujaddedi, is a step in the right direction. It may also be desirable at some stage along this process of national reconciliation to replace the ISAF and US forces by a UN peace keeping force consisting of troops from non-neighbouring Islamic countries enjoying wide acceptance in Afghanistan.

The writer is a former ambassador.

No beating about the Bush

WHEN Inder Kumar Gujral, then India’s prime minister, met President Clinton in 1998 — the first summit after many years — the former is believed to have remarked that America seemed to have forgotten that “there is a country called India.” Clinton apologized for Washington’s lapses. But he still took two years to visit India.

Even after the end of the Cold War, Washington had not forgotten New Delhi’s unequivocal rejection of military pacts against the Soviet Union. When assembling allies against Moscow at that time, Washington had said that those who were not with it were against it. India’s retort came in the shape of a non-aligned movement, stringing together some 100 countries to serve as a bulwark against war which New Delhi feared from the West.

Clinton’s visit to India was America’s first public admission of neglect. Washington wanted to take visible steps towards conciliation with New Delhi. That the two were open, democratic societies did not need to be projected. It was known even during the Cold War. What Clinton wanted to convey was that America which rubbed India on the wrong side at one time was keen to make up with it. He was so solicitous for good relations with New Delhi that he did not visit Pakistan for more than a few hours. This was the time when New Delhi and Islamabad were hardly on speaking terms with each other.

Probably, America’s equation with India would have exceeded all expectations if the latter had not exploded the bomb. New Delhi’s ‘no’ to the signing of non-proliferation treaty (NPT) despite Washington’s pressure irritated Clinton. But nascent good relations went up in smoke when India exploded the bomb. Clinton could not have done anything even if he wanted to repair the damage because Washington and its allies saw in the explosion a New Delhi which had dared them and upset their scheme of things.

How could a country like India, yet struggling to overcome its backwardness, dare do so? This was the dominant feeling in the state department and the Pentagon which provided the nuts and bolts of the policies anvilled at the White House. Clinton’s efforts — and personal wishes — came to naught. The two countries were back to square one: the Cold War-type of relationship.

President George Bush has picked up the threads from where Clinton left off. The 9/11 attacks on America changed both Bush and his country. They wanted support. Pakistan caved in no time and offered all help in less than 24 hours. Bush realized that the war against terrorism was hard and long. India, with a large non-Muslim population, fitted ideally into America’s plans which were essentially against radical Muslim countries. He decided to woo India.

It was also a big market. America and other western countries were so saturated that they could not absorb their own goods. Washington also noted with appreciation the economic reforms which New Delhi had introduced on its own. India’s huge technical manpower made it all the more attractive.

This was the backdrop to the Bush initiative to do away with the sanctions imposed on India after the bomb explosion. He said bluntly that America needed India’s 300-million middle class for the goods it produced. He signed with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in last July an agreement to share nuclear technology for power. Hostile opinion in both countries slowed down Bush. He has now done it, whatever his difficulties with the US Congress.

Once again, the bomb came in the way as it did during the days of Clinton. America recognized India as a nuclear power but did not want to give it the status which the nuclear club members — America, the UK, France, China and Russia — enjoyed. The plea that India should not keep its fast breeder reactor (FBR) hidden from international nuclear safeguards was not the real reason. Nor was it the difference over the separation of civilian plants from the military ones. The argument that America would have to accord the same status to Pakistan some day too did not matter because of Dr A.Q. Khan’s freelancing in the nuclear field. The main objective was to deny New Delhi a seat at the high table of nuclear powers. The agreement at Delhi may or may not do so. But the de facto status will in due course turn into the de jure one.

The US Congress and the media may still be biased against India for a variety of reasons. They have not yet reconciled to China’s progress. How can they do so in the case of India which is still a land of snake charmers for most of them? But we are growing at the rate of eight per cent annually. Our economy needs technology and foreign investment. So long as we can work out some deal with America in these fields, we need not bother whether Washington is happy with our identification of civilian and military nuclear plants.

True, energy is our greatest need. The visit of President Chirac from France last month has prepared the ground. Now America’s green light to all such countries should give us nuclear reactors and fuel. One thing we should remember is that there is no free lunch. America will expect from us more access to our market. How far we can go will be our predicament. Washington is not worried about the Left which has made little difference to the Manmohan Singh government’s economic blueprint.

America’s worry is that India is not implementing economic reforms fast enough and in the way it wants. In spite of this the two countries have developed confidence in each other. Bush’s visit has shown that Washington is keen to span the distance with New Delhi at full speed and cover in a few months the ground that they did not for decades. India is reluctant to go that fast.

People are generally indifferent to America. They may or may not like Bush but they are not against the US. Even now when they talk about America, they talk about its riches. They consider it a maharaja, the title with which they are familiar. The worry is that the pro-American lobby has become so blatant that it wants to push New Delhi into Washington’s lap, not leaving even the fig-leaf of non-alignment to cover its tilt towards America.

Islamabad is always at the back of New Delhi’s mind. How can America be equally friendly with Pakistan? India sees the US tilt towards Pakistan. Bush’s trip to Islamabad is viewed as yet another proof. It is comical to see both New Delhi and Islamabad vying with one another to be in Washington’s good books. Bush’s visit has only intensified the competition.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

A trying spectacle

SADDAM Hussein’s trial is proceeding much like the invasion of Iraq: poorly planned, messier than expected, deadly to participants and far from over.

Hussein has clearly learned from former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, whose courtroom antics have helped turn his trial on similar charges of crimes against humanity into a seemingly interminable circus. But Hussein’s theatrics are far more dangerous; his continual exhortations to his Sunni Arab followers help prop up Iraq’s insurgency.

Hussein was quiet in court Tuesday as his trial resumed, but the good behaviour is unlikely to last. His most recent tactic was to pretend to be on a hunger strike; his lawyer later said Hussein ended it for health reasons, apparently under the impression that hunger strikes are supposed to be good for one’s health.

Hussein’s former intelligence chief, Barzan Ibrahim Hasan, who enjoys coming to court in his pajamas, was in his usual form, shouting his defiance at judges. This comes after two defence attorneys have been killed, three new judges have been named to head the proceedings, and the original defence lawyers boycotted the trial, forcing the judge to appoint new ones, whom Hussein immediately rejected. The original lawyers returned to court Tuesday, although the two lead counsels walked out when their request to remove the chief judge was rejected.

The trial’s chaotic nature has led to questions about its legitimacy (which is, of course, Hussein’s aim). Many critics suggest that it should never have been held in Baghdad with Iraqi judges but instead should have been conducted by a body such as the International Criminal Court. Anyone who thinks an international court is harder to manipulate by a crafty defendant such as Hussein need look no further than the Milosevic trial, now into its fifth year.

It would have been better to hold Hussein’s trial in Iraq with some respected international jurists on the panel. That would have avoided this trial’s most troubling problem: The new lead judge, Raouf Rasheed Abdel Rahman, is a Kurd from Halabja, where Hussein is suspected of ordering a poison gas attack that slaughtered thousands.

That atrocity is unrelated to the trial. It focuses on the torture and execution of nearly 150 people in Dujayl as alleged retaliation for a 1982 assassination attempt against Hussein.

—Los Angeles Times

Rethinking India

PRESIDENT Bush is in India to pursue one of his longtime foreign policy objectives: bringing the United States and India closer. It’s a worthy goal. India is the world’s largest democracy, and its economy is growing.

And although the White House doesn’t want to draw too much attention to old-school realpolitik, India is in a strategically important neighbourhood, sharing borders with China and Pakistan.

But the price Bush has paid for closer ties with India is too high. The deal he struck last summer for nuclear cooperation with New Delhi would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It would reward India, which never signed the treaty, cheated on an earlier technology deal with the United States, then went on to test a nuclear bomb.

The message to Iran, North Korea and other nuclear wannabes couldn’t be clearer or more destructive.

These regimes and others will rightly conclude that the United States is interested in stopping the spread of nuclear know-how and technology only to regimes it dislikes.

—Los Angeles Times