A friend & a global player
PRESIDENT Pervez Musharraf is scheduled to pay an official visit to China in the next few days. This is a welcome development that, given Pakistan’s relations with China good as they are at their present state, requires regular and meaningful inputs from our side if we are to remain an important player on the radar screen of Chinese policy-makers in the coming decades.
Having served in the Chinese capital and been a frequent visitor to the Celestial Kingdom, including twice in the last six months, I have had the opportunity of observing the wisdom and resolve with which the Chinese leadership has moved forward, not only to strengthen its economy, but also to forge critical political and economic linkages with major power centres of the world.
Many of us here in Pakistan continue to think of China still in terms of what it was in the ‘50s and ‘60s, when it was poor at home and virtually isolated abroad. Thanks to the resolute leadership and vision of Deng Xiaoping and his close associates, China was able to introduce far-reaching reforms to its economy, in the process abandoning many of the long-held beliefs that had acquired a near sacred status for the old guards. His was a transformation that was truly revolutionary, except that no blood was shed and no lives were lost. More importantly, his reforms enabled China to escape the fate of the Soviet Union, whose well-intentioned but naive leader — Gorbachev — made the fatal mistake of loosening political controls, without having first provided the population with the economic benefits that alone can sustain an authoritarian system.
Since then, the Chinese economy has continued to grow at a remarkable pace, hovering close to the double digit. In 2005, it was 9.9 per cent, with a similar rate of growth predicted for this year. According to Chinese officials, all three main drivers of the economy — investment, consumption and net exports — have performed well. But it is in the field of foreign policy that the Chinese have demonstrated a remarkable degree of realism, without sacrificing principles. This is evident in its dealings with all countries, big or small, enabling the Chinese to forge new ties, without having to abandon existing ones.
In fact, as a Chinese academician pointed out, the main theme of Sino-US relations is no longer ideology, human rights, or even trade, but the vast growth of China and how the US should respond to this development. Chinese scholars have pointed out to their leadership that Beijing must ensure a peaceful international environment for the country’s development and growth. This advice is reflected in the policies and practices that form the bedrock of Chinese diplomacy.
The Chinese government also claims that global development can only take place when the world is in harmony, which is defined as security built around mutual trust and mutual benefit. This guideline envisages a new set of policies, centred on maintaining peace and friendship with neighbours and helping them prosper, and a new pattern of broad international relations focused on partnerships.
There is no doubt that China has contributed enormously to both regional and global political stability and economic growth. In fact, when one thinks of China, one is immediately reminded of its soft power, just as the US has become synonymous with contempt for international commitments. In fact, I was reminded by a Chinese scholar that even as far back as the mid-’50s, Chairman Mao had advised the Chinese people to “become strong but always amicable to other countries.” It is this element of modesty and the desire to accommodate the views of others that has made China so very acceptable to the rest of the world.
US-China relations have remained on an even heel, even though the Chinese are worried about the Bush administration’s increasing proclivity towards unilateralism. Patient as they are, the Chinese refuse to be provoked into reacting publicly to American policies favouring the containment of China. Desirous of being partners of the US in the promotion of regional peace and global stability, they want the Bush administration to abandon its policy of applying pressure on Beijing, either directly or through states such as Japan and Australia, which appear wedded to a policy of promoting American interests.
Instead, the Chinese prefer to focus on those statements of the Bush administration that speak of American desire to concede to China its place under the sun, rather than those that are directed at containing China. Chinese scholars point out that even after Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick’s speech at a National Committee on US-China relations in New York on September 21 last year, the Bush administration has not made it clear whether it considers China a strategic partner or a strategic rival. In fact, they point out that Washington’s policy can be characterized as “conditional acceptance” in which Washington accuses Beijing of “irresponsible behaviour” whenever it deems Chinese policies as not conducive to its own interests.
Beijing is also watching keenly the speed and scale at which U.S-India relations are progressing. But true to their wont, the Chinese have refrained from public expressions of concern at this most worrying development. Instead, Beijing has chosen to reduce India’s temptation to play the China card against the US, by increasing its own economic and trade ties with India. This was clearly evident during Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to New Delhi in April last year when he did not raise contentious political issues and, instead, surprised his hosts by speaking of the benefits of India and China forging strategic ties.
On Taiwan, China has been engaged in a careful balancing act. It continues to unilaterally adopt measures to ease tension and promote bilateral exchanges with the breakaway island, while upholding the policy of as “one China, different interpretations” — which means one China, but with different political orientations. Its relations with other states are based on preventing Taiwan’s independence, but in all other sectors their cooperation continues to grow. Their bilateral trade reached $ 91 billion dollars year, giving Taiwan a trade surplus of more than $ 58 billion. All this is meant to drive home the point to the Taiwanese that independence is not in accord with their interests.
But the most worrying aspect is US encouragement of Japan to adopt an increasingly aggressive attitude towards China. Prime Minister Koizumi’s rhetoric and policies have given Japan’s posture a confrontationist dimension whose most dangerous manifestation is the manner in which Koizumi has come out in support of the break-away Island of Taiwan. Consequently, relations between China and Japan are in a state of stalemate, with political and security issues increasingly becoming evident. While Chinese officials talk of their desire to develop a policy of friendship with Japan, they acknowledge that there are serious differences over territorial and oceanic claims.
The Chinese acknowledge that a healthy development of Sino-Japanese relations will provide an impetus to China’s peaceful development as well as to China’s relations with western powers, apart from being a rebuttal of the “China threat” assertion. These two powerful Asian neighbours are major trading partners that compete with, and complement, each other. Beijing rightly states that good relations between them can have a calming effect on the trilateral relations of China, the US and Japan. Regrettably, Sino-Japan differences are having a negative fallout on the entire region. Aware of this, the Chinese are going the extra length to prevent any further deterioration, but want Japan to refrain from extending support to Taiwan’s effort to gain independence and to also abandon its growing ultra-nationalist posture in dealing with its neighbours.
With the European Union, China has taken special steps to strengthen relations, not only in the field of trade and economics, but more importantly, in the political sphere as well. The Chinese have been urging the establishment of long-term, stable and mutually beneficial relations, so that the two sides can reach a “strategic level” of understanding. This is primarily based on Beijing’s understanding that at the core of the European concept lies its belief in “multilateralism”, something that is close to their hearts as well. Also, China attaches importance to the role played by international organizations and multilateral mechanisms and favours the need to uphold international law and multilateral accords.
It is, however, in the vast stretches of the region known as Central Asia that Chinese diplomacy has been most dynamic and imaginative. In fact, we are witnessing a new version of the “Great Game” of the 19th century. The only difference is that instead of the British and Russian empires battling it out, we now have Russia, China, the US and even Iran and India converging on the region, for its vast untapped oil and gas reserves, as well as for rights to use key military bases. The Chinese are striving for access to the region’s energy and seeking new markets for their huge industrial output. The Russians want to maintain the status quo, which means retaining their historic influence over the region, while the United States seeks a military presence there and a position of political influence so that it can deny others access to the region’s wealth.
The result of all this is that US policies, which are deeply worrying to both China and Russia, is bringing them together on both the political and economic counts, as evident from their cooperation bilaterally, as well as in the context of the SCO. Iran, on the other hand, is investing in economic projects and raising its profile with its defiance of the Americans. India, both singly and with others, is buying every available oil and gas field that it can lay its hand on.
It is in view of the above developments, as well as on account of Pakistan’s own security and economic well-being, that the President Musharraf forthcoming visit to China assumes special significance. It is true that during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Islamabad in April last year, the two sides signed a historic agreement that raised their relationship to an exceptionally high level. Its most important revelation was contained in the article where the two sides affirmed that neither party will join “any alliance or bloc which infringes upon the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity” of the other side.
The next sentence was even more revealing, for it affirmed that they would not conclude “treaties of this nature with a third country”. We need to understand the significance of such an unprecedented commitment by the two parties, to each other and more especially by China to Pakistan.
While some Pakistanis may have felt uneasy with growing rapprochement between India and China, (especially their burgeoning trade and economic relations), the Chinese, too, are worried about the extent of our commitment to America’s agenda in the region, though they are too polite to raise it formally. But these are legitimate concerns, given the publicly stated intent of the Bush administration to “contain” China and its plans to draw India into this project. Not surprisingly, the Chinese scholars show considerable interest in this issue.
I believe that the forthcoming visit should be utilized to assure the Chinese leadership that Pakistan remains true to its treaty obligations. After all, this is the only relationship that enjoys near-unanimous approval of the people of Pakistan. But, more importantly, the government needs to satisfy Chinese concerns about the nature of its commitments to the US. And finally, we need to enhance Chinese involvement in major national projects, even if we have to do so with special dispensation for them. Pakistan’s security and well-being requires that we should not even countenance any dilution in our strategic ties with China.
The writer is a former ambassador.
‘I’d have been a communist’
“I WOULD have been in the Communist Party if there had been no partition,” says Atal Behari Vajpayee, former prime minister, who led the BJP coalition for six years at the centre. “I was a member of the Students’ Federation which had leftist leanings. The communists’ support to the demand for partition disillusioned me and I parted company with them.”
Vajpayee believes that the Congress and the BJP would have come together if Mahatma Gandhi had not been assassinated. He thinks that it would have been “best for the country,” to sort out certain basic problems. “The Congress is so hostile to us these days that it believes we are out to destroy the country.” When the NDA was in power, Vajpayee says, they had good relations with the Congress. It opposed them but considered them desh bakht (patriots). “If I were to compare them with us, we were more circumspect and responsive in our attitude towards them than they are towards us.”
Vajpayee does not blame Prime Minister Manmohan Singh but puts the onus on Congress President Sonia Gandhi, without naming her. He praises the PM but wonders how much power he has. Vajpayee is unhappy to find “all types of people becoming ministers.” To his particular dislike are those who were associated with the emergency and its excesses.
Vajpayee thinks that at one time the Congress looked like having a mid-term poll. It felt it could do better and improve its strength in parliament. But the reverses in state elections, particularly Bihar, made the party change its mind. “Now I do not know,” he says. However, he has no faith in the emergence of the third front. Even if it does, he has poor opinion about some of those heading regional parties.
About his own party, he says that “young lack in idealism and are in a hurry to get positions.” But then he adds: “Come to think of it, this is true of nearly all political parties. The youth is not willing to wait. Nor does it want to go through the fire of idealism.”
My purpose of meeting Vajpayee was to assess the person who represented an era which came to an end with his retirement from active politics. I found him still in harness, although he acts more like a fatherly figure. He postponed the meeting with me twice because the BJP leadership met at his home once to discuss the state funding in elections and the second time to formulate views on Iran. On Iran, Vajpayee is not categorical. He welcomes good relations with the US but avoids any direct comments on Iran. In reply to my query whether the government of India is pursuing the right policy, Vajpayee replies: “The government does not know what to do. It is confused.” Elucidating his remarks, he says that there are three parties involved in processing a concerted response: Sonia Gandhi, Manmohan Singh and the Left. They have different points of view. Power does not lie with one of them. Who will prevail when and where is not clear.
But he avows faith in the foreign policy that Jawaharlal Nehru had formulated. His faith is basically in non-alignment. He claims himself to be a Nehruvite. I recall after he was sworn in as foreign minister in the Janata government in 1977, he told me how he felt privileged to sit in the chair that Nehru had occupied once. He still has his picture at his residence.
On Pakistan, Vajpayee is not happy with what New Delhi is doing. He favours progress but doesn’t suggest anything concrete. Yet he has no doubt that there would have been “an advance” if he had been the prime minister. When I drew his attention to President General Pervez Musharraf’s contention that he had intervened to include Kashmir in the joint statement at Lahore, Vajpayee says, “We wanted to keep Kashmir separate.”
My whole exercise for an hour was to find out where Vajpayee stood. Was he a liberal, the impression he tried to create despite being a swayam sevak of the RSS — an extremist Hindu organization which has now given the call of “Indianising” Muslims and Christians because, as RSS chief Sudharshan, says, “we cannot throw them into the sea,” a phrase used by some Arab countries for the Jews in Israel.
I found Vajpayee as reticent as he had always been when it came to the criticism of the RSS. He is not happy over Sudharshan’s remark. But he seldom minces words when it comes to the RSS chief. Vajpayee does not want to be drawn into — anti or pro — issue. But he does not deny the stress and strain between the BJP and the RSS. “Not much,” he says. He recalls a long discussion on Hindutva once. What it meant and why it could not be Bhartiya. “They have no answer. Some of them are frozen in old concepts, conveying little,” he says.
When it came to the demolition of the Babri masjid, Vajpayee says that the whole thing happened so quickly and so suddenly. “I did not know anything about it. If they had a prior plan, they did not tell me,” says Vajpayee. “Morarji (Desai) was right that the crowd should not have been allowed to assemble.” Vajpayee leaves me in no doubt that he was sorry about the demolition. (I recall meeting him one day after the demolition. He told me then that the temple should be allowed to be built.) He makes it clear that people wanted the temple to come up but did not want the masjid to go down. We both recall the time when the locks were opened with political gains in view. There was no such need.
At least you, as prime minister, he should have done something about chief minister Narendra Modi. He planned the killing. This was my allegation. “There is no evidence,” says Vajpayee. However, he adds that at the Goa session of the BJP, following the Gujarat massacre, there was a serious discussion not to give the assembly ticket to Modi. The majority in the parliamentary board supported him but two members opposed him. He does not say that he was one of the two but mentions that Shanta Kumar from Himachal Pradesh opposed Modi.
We discuss Gujarat at length. He does not defend Modi and, at times, gives the impression as if he should have done something to upbraid Modi. But Vajpayee wishes that Godhara — the burning of a railway compartment with some passengers — had not taken place. Vajpayee may have an explanation why he could not dismiss the Modi government. But posterity will find him wanting on this count.
The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.
The Guantanamo disgrace
IT is time to close the US military prison in Guantanamo Bay. The detainees there, numbering about 500, should be tried in court or released. It is inhumane to hold them indefinitely in a place where torture is not uncommon and due process is absent.
These aren’t our conclusions. They are those of a recent United Nations inspection team that spent 18 months investigating conditions at the Guantanamo Bay prison. It’s not necessary to endorse all of its recommendations - and it’s hard to see how shutting down Gitmo would make the Bush administration any more amenable to respecting human rights and international conventions against torture — to observe yet again that the prison is a global embarrassment that does the US more harm than good in the fight against terrorism.
In a report, revealed Monday by Times reporter Maggie Farley, the UN team found that conditions at the prison regularly violate international law. The detainees, captured abroad since 2002 in Afghanistan and elsewhere, were said to be enemy combatants picked up on battlefields.
President Bush and his senior staff have consistently called them terrorists and soldiers who needed to be removed from the field of battle. They justify the prison as “a military necessity” and note that enemy combatants can be held without charges for the duration of hostilities.
Yet the UN team found little sign that any US officials ever tried to determine whether the men were actually enemy combatants.
It is becoming evident that the majority of the men held in Guantanamo were not, in fact, captured in battle. A recent study has shown that more than half of the detainees currently in Guantanamo were abducted in the mountains of Pakistan by warlords who handed them over to US forces for cash rewards, sometimes $1,000 a head.
—Los Angeles Times