A vital step

THE government finally has had the good sense to revive the Council of Common Interests. Even in normal circumstances, the CCI is a constitutional requirement (Article 153), but it was suspended eight years ago with consequences that are before us. Normally, in every federation, the constitution guarantees the rights of the federating units and serves as a mechanism for sorting out problems in the way of coordination — between the federal government and the federating units and among the federating units themselves — on financial, economic, administrative and other matters. In Pakistan, however, the problems of federalism are of a more complex nature, because there have been long periods of authoritarian rule. The 1956 constitution, based on a contrived parity between East and West Pakistan, had a short life and was abrogated in 1958. The 1962 constitution was of a supposedly federal character but was tailor-made by a military ruler and fell by the wayside in 1969. Short of being abrogated, the 1973 Constitution has suffered every imaginable deviation and distortion. Ziaul Haq kept it in abeyance for half a decade, and finally when it went into operation it was disfigured beyond recognition. He remained head of state and army chief until his death and had the infamous Article 58 2-b inserted into the Constitution. As a military ruler, Gen Musharraf too has made changes in the Constitution to suit his purposes, has revived Article 58 2-b, established a National Security Council, which he himself heads, and is now both president and army chief.

Recalling these historical facts is meant to underline the fact that political governments have not had much of a chance to work the Constitution because of frequent military interventions, and even when they did, many of their steps went against the spirit of federalism. The result is that the provinces do not know how to resolve problems amongst themselves because federal governments made it a practice of asking the provincial governments to do as they are told. There is now a long list of inter-provincial problems which have not only remained unresolved; the passage of time has led to bitterness and mistrust among the provinces, while the problems have only become worse. These include the absence of a National Finance Commission award, the disputes over the sharing of the Indus waters, and what is now a raging controversy — the Kalabagh dam. If the Constitution had been in place all along and political governments in Islamabad and in the provinces had had the chance to work according to democratic norms, these problems would have been solved long ago.

On Sunday, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said at a press conference that the ICC would serve as an “effective forum” and help resolve “certain problems besides coordinating inter-provincial matters”. That is what the ICC is all about. Significantly, the makers of the Constitution realized that water held a special place in any federal scheme in Pakistan. That is why Article 155, section 1 and sub-sections a and b are water-specific and lay down a mechanism for resolving any misunderstanding that may arise among the provinces if the supply of water is affected by “any executive act or legislation” or if there is some problem with “the use and distribution or control of water ...” These are all constitutional safeguards that have been consistently ignored. The ICC’s revival is merely a formality that in itself is not going to help matters. Whether it is the NFC award or the Kalabagh dam, ultimately it all depends on how the federal government takes the federating units along on a given issue and how the provincial governments formulate their response.

Bringing peace to Gilgit

ONE wonders what to make of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s statement that peace is a prerequisite to development in the Northern Areas. It would have been more logical for him to say that development was a prerequisite for peace and political stability in the region. This observation specially applies to the Gilgit district where sectarian tensions have been running high since 1988 when many people living in Shia-dominated villages in the area were killed by tribesmen from outside. Of late, the targeted killing of high-profile personalities in the area, violent demonstrations against law enforcement agencies, discord over educational material and frequent curfews and the closure of schools have led to a volatile situation. This has been aggravated by overall poverty, decline in businesses and the general lack of educational and employment opportunities for disgruntled youth. Politically, too, the Northern Areas are unhappy with their constitutional status still in limbo. The Northern Areas’ Legislative Council (NALC) has few powers and remains a toothless body, especially when compared with the military and civil bureaucracy.

The prime minister has said that political reforms, better security and a 183 per cent increase in the Northern Areas development funds made in the past five years will bring prosperity to the region. But up to now, there has been little to show for all this and the Northern Areas continue to remain under-developed and impoverished, despite the 740 development schemes reportedly underway in the area. The way things stand now, the people, instead of expecting and working for better days ahead, are giving vent to their frustrations over the official disregard for their religious and cultural sensitivities. As for making peace a pre-condition for development, Mr Aziz would do well to rein in the government’s own security forces, which have been a cause for tension, and order the ministry for Kashmir affairs and Northern Areas to involve the local community in measures to rid the area of religious strife and promote greater sectarian harmony.

Menace of quackery

ONE gets a distinct sense of déjà vu when one hears of crackdowns on illegal medical practitioners for they are announced from time to time with great fanfare with little to show for these. The same goes for Friday’s statement by the Sindh health minister that a new law against quackery was on the cards. According to Pakistan Medical Association’s statistics, there are 600,000 illegal medical practitioners in the country, many of whom do roaring business “treating” patients who have no choice but to avail themselves of services provided by these quacks — and quacks they are, for many an innocent person has died because of the prescriptions provided by these so-called healers. It is not that the government has not tried to deal with this scourge but attempts to banish quacks always proved futile in the absence of proper hospitals and health centres, especially in the vast rural hinterland.

The government has to realize that until the issue of the dismal state of the public health sector is addressed, quacks will continue to flourish. Here, too, the government has made little effort to create a nation-wide health system and the few attempts have been half-hearted and never vigorously pursued. For example, offering incentives to doctors to serve in rural areas where they are needed the most or trying to revive rural and basic health-care centres have met with little success. Punjab’s plans to make it compulsory for medical graduates to serve in the rural areas for one year — and be sufficiently paid for it — offers some hope for patients. As it is, there is one doctor for 1,300 patients in the country, so it is no surprise that quackery flourishes. To banish it completely will be difficult but not impossible provided a proper health-care system is developed to cover both urban and rural areas.

Bush’s year of follies

THE best thing about 2005 is surely the fact that it has reduced one year from the term of President George Bush. The wisdom of limits has sometimes been questioned, particularly when a sensible president like Bill Clinton comes along. But a George Bush always turns up to reinforce the merits of the law.

George Bush is not malevolent. I have this sneaking suspicion sometimes that he might even mean well. He certainly wants a theoretical democracy to prevail all over the world, for the commendable reason that with all its faults it is the most honest system of governance yet devised. He is simply a man of little understanding, which makes him a victim of the last thing he has understood. Sometimes this is in harmony with previous logic, sometimes in direct contravention, but once he is convinced about something it becomes a conviction, until the next thing he chooses to understand comes along.

His views are a slide presentation of shifting certainties. Because he is well-meaning he is totally sincere about each slide. He was as certain about the need to use torture in America’s war against terror before December 10, as he was sure on the 11th that torture should, pace the John McCain amendment, never be a part of American policy. He does not abandon a past position; he simply forgets about it and seizes ownership of each defeat by reformulating it as victory.

He is not simple. That would be an underestimation. You cannot win two elections in America by being simple. But he is simplistic. He defers easily to those who prey upon his weaknesses with a simple ruse: they win his trust by applauding his horizon, and then map out highways that have little to do with objectives. Having led him to the centre of that inflammatory maze called Iraq, they are now charting non-existent escape routes booby-trapped with death.

When a proper history of his years as the most powerful man in the world is written, it will be a long story of some success, substantial failure — but most of all a narrative of unintended consequences.

Bush was elected in 2000 to take America away from the problems of the world. Those were the innocent days during which he mispronounced “Musharraf”. He was re-elected in 2004 to make America safe from the problems of the world. He will leave, in 2008, America more vulnerable to the problems of the world than it has been in a long while. On paper, he wants to change the Middle East by changing Iraq into a democracy. In practice, Iraq is heading towards what might be called a radical-democracy, where popular support has shifted decisively towards those who oppose American policy as well as American values.

The one thing that Shias and Sunnis are now agreed upon in Iraq is that Americans must leave their land. Kurds support the Bush White House in the hope of achieving independence, or near independence, and that is not an option that anyone in the neighbourhood wants to hear about. Unless matters are managed with tact and intelligence, they could suffer the fate of the South Vietnamese.

The radical-democracy syndrome is visible in Egypt as well, where President Hosni Mubarak opened a vent, possibly so that the West could see who would crawl out from the democratic woodwork. The only surprise when the Muslim Brotherhood got 88 seats in the legislature was why they did not get more.

George Bush and his fawn Tony Blair have now come to the end of their list of reasons for staying in Iraq. They now say that they must stay to train the Iraq Army so that it is able to fight the insurgency. In other words, they cannot pull out because of a problem that did not exist before they came. There was no insurgency before the occupation. (The average death rate, by the way, is 30 per day; Iraqis also die, although there is reluctance to recognize this.) So we have the classic conundrum. American and British troops will not leave until the insurgency is controlled; and the insurgency will not end unless the Anglo-American armies go. Welcome to the near future.

Sometimes I wonder if policymakers in Washington and London know what they are talking about. Every day you hear and read, from sources both civilian and military, that the Occupation forces must arm and train an Iraqi army that can fight the insurgency after the occupiers depart. This is the civil-war theory: after us, the deluge.

This is a familiar of history: empire is always justified in terms of the good that it is doing (civilization, trade, economic growth et al), and there is always going to be chaos after they leave, if the slaves have the temerity to ask them to leave. Winston Churchill kept harping on the chaos that would descend on India once the Haileybury and Oxbridge sahibs left.

Let me suggest an alternative scenario. Once Bush and Blair get out of Iraq, if they do it on their watch, the insurgency will end. There will be some residual violence, because this messy war will have left deep sectarian wounds. But, sooner rather than later, the insurgency will be absorbed into Iraqi life, mostly into its politics and partly into its armed forces.

We have already seen how Shia militias have become an element in Iraq’s politics and emerging power structure. Space will be created for the Sunnis as well, since common sense suggests that sectarian domination does not work. What, however, about unintended consequences? Will George Bush, over the coming two years, help create an Iraqi army which could become the strongest Arab force in the region? Could such an army become a formidable counterweight to Israel, particularly if it works in alliance with Iran? The days incidentally of the Iraq-Iran conflict, which brought such legitimate joy to Washington and London, are over.

Bush is doing Iraq’s Shias a favour they will never forget; has given Iran’s government a lifeline it will never acknowledge; and might have weakened Israel to an extent it will never admit.It is remarkable that the Bush fade began so soon after the Bush pinnacle. Normally, a re-elected president has two years for a cruise towards history, free from the sinews of political compulsions.

By the third year of a second term a president begins to look like the past rather than the present or the future, and starts his farewell visits around the world. In the case of George Bush, the American voter began to ask the very questions that he had ignored when sending him to the White House to continue his war. At the heart of this questionnaire was the most basic of all questions: Every war has a point, what is the point of the Iraq war?

Having admitted that all past answers were wrong, Bush is struggling to find a new answer. If all he can offer is a genie called an imagined caliphate, then there is very little hope for sanity.

There was a poignant moment in the Bush year of 2005, widely publicized when some embedded but obviously disobedient camera captured a scrawl on a notepad. I can imagine the scene: a worthy but never-ending conference at the United Nations where protocol is in command. At some point, Bush sent a note to Condoleezza Rice wondering if there was any chance of a bathroom break.

I daresay nature doesn’t change its rules for the high and mighty. Presidents and prime ministers need a break as often as you and I. Bush surely wasn’t the first eminence to need one. Would Bill Clinton have sent such a note to Madeleine Albright? Somehow, I don’t think so. I rather see him as getting up, making a small but meaningful joke, and promising to return as soon as he could. Television news channels would not have interrupted their broadcasts to telecast this.

George Bush has confidence; you can see it in the arms that loop over on either side, rather than fall down straight, and there is just a hint of swagger in the stride and the eyes. But I am not too sure that he has self-confidence.

The writer is editor-in-chief of Asian Age, New Delhi.