Dam: questions to answer

HOW is it that the representatives of almost all parties and groups in Sindh-nationalists, urban, rural, and what have you — and many in the NWFP are not persuaded that building the proposed reservoir on the Indus at Kalabagh would be good for their provinces and the country? Is there no merit to their claims? Are they victims of ignorance or bad intentions?

I don’t think that any of this is entirely true. Like others, they know that the increasing demand for water and power (electricity) in Pakistan in the next 10 to 15 years cannot be met without augmenting the existing capacity. Does anyone know what the range of demand for water and power might be in 10 to 15 years from now? What are the estimates, if they exist, for the country and the provinces?

The opposition to Kalabagh Dam seems to rest on two planks. The differences on technical issues stand on the first plank. These issues include (i) amount of water required downstream for farming and other uses, against intrusion by the sea, and mitigate silt accumulation; (ii) effects on water tables and salt accumulation; and (iii) loss of agricultural and urban land and displacement of people. No one seems to know if the technical committee, headed by Mr A.N.G. Abbasi, has adequately addressed these issues since its report has not been made public for rational discourse and debate in the country.

A deep-seated distrust of the federal (central) government, expressed unequivocally in different ways, rests on the second plank. In the context of Sindh, the oft-cited examples are the Tarbela Dam, Thal Canal, Chashma Link Canal, and 1991 Water Accord. The so-called constitutional guarantees reportedly being offered carry little weight with the antagonists, given their unaddressed grievances and the record of questionable, even wrongful, changes made in the constitution from time to time. The threat to go ahead with the Kalabagh Dam, without revisiting the issue through public discourse and building a consensus, can have far-reaching consequences.

Trust is the glue of all relationships and its absence in any discourse assures failure. One cannot build (or rebuild in this case) trust by imposition of one party’s position on the other, no matter what the other party’s point of view might be. My impression is that trust is the most important missing element in the dispute on Kalabagh Dam.

The issue of expansion of supply of water and power has several dimensions, each of which needs addressing in full. There are two ways by which the existing supply can be augmented. The first way is to reduce losses and increase efficiency in the distribution and use of existing supply of water and power. How significant are the annual losses because of theft and inefficiencies? To what extent have these been alleviated in the last ten years? What policies have worked or not worked and why? What needs to be done and how will it work? From a casual reading of a number of technical and anecdotal reports, it is fair to suggest that the annual losses from the existing capacity range from 30-40 per cent.

I don’t think this guess is too far off the mark. A practical question then is: by how much can the loss be reduced to augment supply and what will it cost to society? The other and more important source of additional supply of water and power, however, has to come through investment in new capacity. It is important though to split the issue of water supply from the generation of power since the latter can be produced by means other than water as well.

With respect to water, there is little dispute about the need to develop reservoirs to harness the river and rain water to meet the national and regional needs on a relatively predictable basis. One of the advantages of a large-size dam is that the water reservoir can be used to regulate the flow of water over a long period and generate substantial power. Kalabagh has been proposed as the prime site to build a dam that will help meet the country’s rising requirements for water and power. But it raises several important issues, on some of which there is a wide, maybe unbridgeable, gulf between the opinions of protagonists on each side. We can formulate these contentious issues in a series of questions.

First, what proportion of the annual flow of water in the Indus system is used for water supply and electricity generation? Has this average flow changed in the last 10 to 15 years? How unstable is the annual flow and by how much has the instability changed during this period?

Second, what is the estimated requirement of the unused water flow for maintaining the delta and holding the sea at bay? By how much will the proposed reservoir affect this flow of water downstream?

Third, how much will the reservoir affect the existing distribution of water between the provinces? Who will gain and who will lose and by how much? How will gainers compensate the losers?

Fourth, one suspects that the use of the reservoir water for various purposes — most of it for irrigating agricultural land but increasingly for consumption by industries and households — will have a significant impact on water tables and salt accumulation. Which areas of the country will get how much of the new water supply? How much of the land area will require drainage at the local and regional level? What kind of drainage system will be provided to mitigate the incidence of waterlogging and salinity in the lower reaches of the Indus system? How much investment will this require?

Fifth, how much area will be inundated by the proposed reservoir and how many communities will have to be displaced in the NWFP? What are the estimates for the loss from these effects? What will be the compensation and how will it be assessed? How will the compensation and rehabilitation programme be implemented?

I have seen no evidence so far that these questions have been addressed adequately and discussed publicly. The competing claims of each side that appear in or reported through the media generate much heat but shed little light on the complex issue. Put it this way: Why is the Kalabagh Dam the most desirable project? What are the alternatives? Have they been examined and why are they not at least as good as Kalabagh Dam?

With respect to the sources of additional power to meet the rising demand, one needs to address several questions. What are the best estimates of the additional demand for electricity in the next 10 to 15 years? I assume that water is the predominant source for generating electricity in Pakistan. Has someone examined the potential for other sources such as sun, wind, nuclear and coal? I think we cannot expect too much from wind and sun in the near future; the nuclear route seems to be a risky one even if politically feasible. However, coal might do. What about the prospects for using low-carbon technologies to generate electricity from the reportedly significant coal deposits in Sindh?

However, if water remains the most important source, are there no alternatives to the large reservoir at Kalabagh? Why not invest in a large number of mini-dams in the northern parts to generate electricity for the rest of the country?

I suggest that the protagonists review the technical committee’s report and record their points of view through their representatives to the provincial and national assemblies for open discussion. It may not be a bad idea that special multi-party committees in the assemblies, assisted by technical staff, examine the central issues and make their reports to the respective assemblies.

Finally, representatives from the assemblies, assisted by technical staff, examine the issues in the light of the reports and finalize their recommendations. These proceedings should be supplemented by well-organized public forums to which all sides are invited and allowed to participate fully. Listening to others is almost always better than speaking to oneself.

The important point is that a process of genuine consultation should take place to allow a consensus to emerge through give-and-take. It seems to me that there are genuine differences on the issue of the Kalabagh Dam that need to be resolved through dialogues in an environment of mutual respect and conducive to creating trust. It wouldn’t be prudent, given the nature and state of the discord, to unilaterally and precipitously decide to go ahead with the project as is being widely reported in the press on behalf of the powers-that-be. Too many similar mistakes have been made in the past and their consequences keep haunting the federation. Why add one more to the litany?

Imperial assumptions

IT seems that the Imperial Presidency has been restored.

The nation’s highest office was cut down to constitutional size three decades ago, when Richard Nixon helicoptered out of town, but listening to George W. Bush in his latest come-out-swinging media blitz has been like an audience with an impatient monarch whose ungrateful subjects won’t just shut up and do as he says.

Last week, he was wrathful. How dare someone reveal that for years his administration has been eavesdropping on the phone calls and e-mails of American citizens? How dare the New York Times publish its story about the illegal surveillance? Investigations would be convened, he warned, and the leakers could be outed.

Then, in his address from the Oval Office, he was expansive. Yes, he acknowledged, some misguided Americans may have disagreed with his decision to invade Iraq. He will be generous enough to forgive that impertinence, as long as everyone now gets with the programme. The only options are “victory” and “defeat,” he warned — without really defining either — so everyone should just stop asking when the troops will come home. “I have never been more certain that America’s actions in Iraq are essential to the security of our citizens,” he said. And, obviously, his certainty trumps all of our doubts.

Later, at a news conference, he took advantage of the sovereign’s divine right to rewrite history. Clearly outraged at the Senate’s recalcitrance on the USA Patriot Act, the president issued a challenge: “These senators need to explain why they thought the Patriot Act was a vital tool after the September the 11th attacks but now think it’s no longer necessary.” The president conveniently forgot to mention that Congress originally set a “sunset” date for the act to expire precisely because members were so deeply concerned about the extent to which it compromised our liberties.

He also sought to explain why he believes he has the right to order the National Security Agency to conduct electronic surveillance of Americans without first getting a warrant. He cited Article II of the Constitution, which of course doesn’t mention telephones or the Internet. When it’s convenient, the president recognizes that “strict constructionism” has its limits.

None of this is really unexpected from a president whose apparent goal from the beginning has been to reinflate the presidency and unshackle it from those inconvenient restraints that Congress or the courts might seek to impose.

Think about the powers this White House has asserted: to detain terrorist suspects indefinitely, without charges or due process; To kidnap suspects and hold them in secret CIA-run prisons, with no acknowledgment that the suspect is even in US custody; To inflict on these prisoners inhumane and degrading treatment that amounts to torture.

And now the president claims the unilateral right to tap your phone and mine whenever he wants. Never mind that there is a legally established procedure to obtain warrants for such domestic surveillance; never mind that this lawful process is conducted quickly and in total secrecy. The imperial president does not bow to lowly courts. He just does what he believes he needs to do.

In his brief prepared remarks at his news conference, the president mentioned the Sept. 11 attacks eight times. None of us who lived through that awful, world-changing day will ever be able to forget it.

I checked, and the Constitution that the president loves to cite — but only when it’s convenient — says clearly that he works for all of us. Not the other way around.

—Dawn/Washington Post Service

No let-up in feudal attitude

A FRINGE of liberals is emerging in Pakistan. They need to be supported by India through unilateral steps in the way of liberalizing visas and reducing tariffs on products from across the border. I noticed the change when an audacious questioner from the audience in Lahore asked me after my lecture on political options in Kashmir why Islamabad had not stopped sending jihadis into the Indian side of Kashmir.

Yet another question from the floor was why I had not mentioned Gilgit and the Northern Areas when talking about Kashmir on the Pakistan side. He was from Gilgit and said that miserable conditions had prevailed there since Islamabad took control of the area. I have been going to Pakistan since 1951 but never before had I heard such talk beyond the drawing rooms. I find the distance between government and people increasing. Not only that but it appears both are trying to acquire more space than they occupy at present. The nation seems to be at war within itself, at every tier of society. For example the controversy over the construction of Kalabagh.

The old religious fervour is there in one form or the other. Textbooks still preach hatred against Hindus, but serious efforts are on to rewrite them. Private schools have already revised new textbooks which do not disseminate past prejudices. The maulvi may be a pejorative term and very few join issue with him, but the combination of his parties, Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal, rules over the NWFP and has a solid presence in the National Assembly. But it is generally said that they are a creature of President General Pervez Musharraf who uses them against India.

Nonetheless, feudal behaviour continues to prevail in every segment of society. Military commanders, politicians and bureaucrats act like masters in their domain, not allowing dissent. This is the main reason why institutions have not come up. A few which have, lack credibility because they are at the beck and call of rulers. The military is most to blame. It has tried to put the gloss of democracy over authoritarianism — achkan over khaki uniform. The military itself has become a problem, although it tries to give the impression that it is solving problems. Yet it is the only institution that works, despite its initial failure at relief and rehabilitation for the earthquake victims in Azad Kashmir.

True, adverse relations with India have made people dependent on the military and they have a feeling that it stands between them and India which is not trustworthy. However, the price the military exacts is heavy: it has most of the top civilian positions, most of the big contracts and most control over expanding businesses.

The judiciary is a check, but in a country where the military has been in power for more than four decades, judges have been overwhelmed at times.

No military coup — Pakistan has had three of them — has been held unconstitutional. It is impressive to find the Supreme Court directing federal and provincial governments to ensure implementation of judgment on prohibition of wasteful and exorbitant wedding feasts. (I wish we could emulate the example). Still, the judiciary seldom locks horns with the military.

However one may blame the military, it is a product of the feudal attitude that prevails in Pakistan. The talk of Musharraf’s exit is laced with the return of Benazir Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif. Issues are not discussed, personalities are. My fear is that if one of them — Benazir or Nawaz Sharif — were to return to power, the feudal outlook would not change. They would use their parties in the same way as they did when they were in power in the past. The party is the means, they are the ends.

The media is free and there is an explosion of TV networks. Journalists have never had it as good as now because their salaries have trebled. One thing distinctive about the Pakistani press is that it is conscious of the limits beyond which it cannot go. The government, too, issues “advice” on what not to use.

The press has dutifully obliged. Still, Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri is correct when he says that the Pakistan press is far more critical of its government than the Indian press which he described as “pro-establishment.”

In my lectures on Kashmir, one at Lahore and the other in Islamabad, I proposed a solution to the problem: that Azad Kashmir, Gilgit and the Northern Areas should be merged into a state and integrated with Pakistan.

The state should enjoy power over all subjects, except foreign affairs, defence and communications. Similar autonomy should be given to Jammu and Kashmir. The sovereignty of the first should vest in Islamabad and of the second in New Delhi.

The LoC between the two Kashmirs should be abolished and the two can jointly have trade offices abroad, an international airline and directly seek aid from foreign countries or the World Bank. The representatives elected to the Pakistan National Assembly from the integrated state of Azad Kashmir should sit in the Lok Sabha and those elected from J&K to the Lok Sabha in the National Assembly.

The formula in Pakistan did not evoke any official reaction, except that it could make a basis for a solution. Many Pakistanis met me after the lecture, both in Lahore and Islamabad, to convey their favourable response. Some said ultimately such a formula would solve the Kashmir problem.

I think that it should be saleable in India because Jammu and Kashmir has already a special status and the instrument of accession gave New Delhi only three subjects: foreign affairs, defence and communications. Moreover, the Kashmir problem would be out of the way once and for all.

However, the best way of selling such a formula is to increase people-to-people contact, which appears to be lessening day by day. The impression in Pakistan is that India is not “flexible” and, to quote opposition leader Maulana Fazlur Rahman, “New Delhi has not reciprocated Pakistan’s gestures even by an iota.”

I was criticized by a retired lieutenant-general when I said that Indians and Pakistanis were “similar” people. His argument was that since they were not similar, they left India and created a new country.

I wondered whether religion made people from the same subcontinent different. We have the same history, speak the same language and enjoy the same food. As for me, I have spent my youth in Pakistan studying in the same colleges as the Muslims did. On this side, there are as many followers of Islam as in Pakistan. I have close friends in the community on both sides. How am I not similar?

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

The evolving confrontation

THE writ of Judge John E Jones III runs only within the state of Pennsylvania. Yet his judgment this week in the case of Kitzmiller v Dover Area School District is the proverbial shot heard round the world.

The implications his ruling that religious dogma has no place in the teaching of science go far beyond the picturesque town of Dover. For this was a legal battle that posed uncomfortable questions about the kind of country that George Bush’s United States is now becoming.

Judge Jones’s ruling may thus help to clarify some of the terms on which the modern world may be able to reconstruct a much-needed dialogue with America. On Tuesday, Judge Jones delivered an emphatic ruling. He said it was unconstitutional for a Pennsylvania school district to treat “intelligent design” as an alternative to evolution in secondary school biology classes.

Intelligent design — the belief that the natural world is so complex that it can only have been designed by a higher intelligence — is a faithbased challenge to Charles Darwin’s scientific theory of evolution. In the last decade or so, it has become a fashionable modern disguise for the view that God created the natural world as described in the Bible.

But Judge Jones ruled this week that “ID” is merely “creationism relabelled” and, since it is a religious viewpoint, it is a violation of the constitutional separation of church and state to teach ID in state-school science classes. —The Guardian, London