Refusal to withdraw

ONCE again President George Bush has ruled out giving a time-table for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, though he hinted that the number of soldiers could be reduced. Speaking at the American Naval Academy in Annapolis, Mr Bush repeated that a withdrawal schedule would give a wrong signal to its enemies who would think “America is weak”. The speech seems a response to the growing criticism from both Democrats and Republicans on what looks like an open-ended stay of the US-led troops in Iraq. The number of American casualties is rising by the day. Already, 2,100 US soldiers have fallen, 16,000 have been injured and a lot more have returned home with psychiatric problems. More significantly, the speech comes in the wake of the Iraqi national reconciliation conference held in Cairo last month. Arranged by the Arab League, the conference was attended by all major factions of Iraqi politicians and called for an “immediate withdrawal” time-table. Also present at the conference was Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, who must have surprised the Americans by conceding that the Iraqi people had a “legitimate right” to resistance and offering talks to “non-jihadi resistance”.

In his speech, Mr Bush made no reference to President Talabani’s talks offer; instead, his emphasis seemed to be on the training of the Iraqi armed forces so that they could take over security responsibilities. When will such a day come nobody knows. But to the outside world, and to the Americans themselves, waiting for that day seems to be a convenient excuse for the Bush administration to prolong the stay of occupation forces in Iraq. The truth is that the indefinite stay of American troops is a logical follow-up to the folly that was the Iraq war. In the first place, the Republican administration had no reason to attack Iraq. The hoax surrounding Iraq’s non-existing weapons of mass destruction is now part of history. Both the Bush and Blair governments doctored the intelligence — including the insertion of the 45-minute warning time in an intelligence dossier — to make a case for war. This, despite the fact the UN inspection team headed by Mr Hans Blix had found “no smoking gun” in Iraq. After the war was over, the Bush administration insisted that, even though the WMDs wee not there, Iraq was close to developing them. The world, including people in the US and Britain, did not swallow this nonsense.

The more the Bush administration refuses to give a withdrawal time-table, the more it plays into the hands of the resistance. Consequently, that leads to more attacks, more civilian casualties and more American deaths. There is justification, though, in American fears that a withdrawal could lead to more bloodshed and a full-fledged civil war. But can a prolongation of the occupation avert such a possibility? No matter when Washington withdraws its troops, it is unlikely that the indigenous forces will be able to maintain law and order, given the fact that the new Iraqi security set-up will be American trained. For that reason, it will always be a suspect in the Iraqi eyes. The only plausible exit strategy for America seems to be to pave the way for the induction of a UN peacekeeping force, which should organize a general election. A government that comes into being through such a process could perhaps develop a national consensus and hold Iraq together.

Challenges before the KESC

THE road to the KESC’s privatization has not been a smooth one, but with its handing over to a private consortium on Tuesday, the utility that has been running at huge losses for years stands a chance of improvement provided its new management is aware of the challenges that lie ahead. It is not just about turning the KESC into a profit-making organization. For starters, the biggest challenge lies in winning the trust of consumers who have been victims of years of inefficiency and neglect; their nerves tested owing to KESC’s pathetic customer services, whose attendants were famous for not answering telephone calls or neglecting to follow up on consumer’s complaints. Peoples’ power bills would always increase with each passing year but the service remained poor with frequent power failures. To improve the KESC’s performance, the new owners must reduce the 40 per cent line losses the utility suffers every year. This is abysmal given that the internationally accepted level is below 10 per cent. Then there is the issue of the rampant power theft that takes place in the form of illegal kunda connections, in which the KESC staff is known to be involved. This must be curbed immediately and those involved in this nefarious activity should be duly punished. The new management will thus be sending a clear message to its consumers, and its rogue employees, that corrupt practices will not be tolerated.

But perhaps the greatest test will be replacing or repairing the outdated and faulty equipment that causes so many technical glitches in the system, which result in huge production and business losses besides suffering for common consumers. A thorough overhaul of the vital installations is what is desperately needed. If carried out, this will undoubtedly improve the KESC’s performance and make the system efficient and reliable. The new management should also take into consideration that people want uninterrupted power supply at reasonable costs. If it can ensure this, it will no doubt score big — and not just in financial terms.

Viral fever and sanitation

THE crisis caused by the growing number of haemorrhagic fever cases in Karachi could have been avoided if the city’s sanitation system was not in the terrible state it has been in. Unfortunately, instead of trying to tackle what may well develop into an epidemic and by warning those in danger to take adequate precautions, the provincial health department is telling the media that “everything is under control”. Instead of trying to give the people of the city a false sense of safety, it would be far better if actions were taken to minimize the viral threat. Whether the viral fever cases are of the Crimean Congo or the Dengue variety — both have similar symptoms and both can be fatal — their prevalence and spread is linked to the level of sanitation in the city. The first is transmitted by ticks found in domestic and wild animals while the second is spread by the bite of mosquitoes.

Larger sections of Karachi’s population live in slums where mountains of solid waste and garbage lie uncollected every day. Even those who live in the better localities are not serviced by any kind of waste management/disposal system. The only positive element in this otherwise hopeless situation is the role played by scavengers and roddiwalas but they cannot be a substitute for an efficient municipal waste collection and disposal system. To make matters worse, the city is dotted with pools of dirty water. In short, the sanitation situation is such that it provides fertile breeding ground for mosquitoes, ticks, flies and just about any other germ-carrying insect. Cosmetic attempts at fumigation will not do. A year-round waste disposal and fumigation system that functions efficiently and effectively and concentrates on the slums and low-income areas needs to be put in place. In the short-term, the media should be expected to launch a campaign on educating the people on the importance of sanitation and hygiene in preventing the spread of such contagious diseases, accompanied by massive fumigation.

Iraq — another Vietnam?

THE writer recalls the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings of 1966 when Senator Fulbright brought under debate the growing US involvement in Vietnam. Though the conflict was proving costly, it was considered critical to the “war against communism” and thus to the security interests of the US and the “Free World”.

Nine years later, he witnessed, from his ambassadorial post in Manila, the televised withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, in defeat. It was decided that the US should never get involved in a war in Asia and the Cold War should be tackled with political and economic diplomacy. Indeed, a reaction against excessive involvement in Asia set in. However, the opening to China, facilitated by Pakistan during Nixon’s first term in 1971, was maintained.

The period of US passivity after 1975 encouraged the Soviet Union to become more militant in expanding its sphere of influence. Not only did it back pro-communist leaders in several countries in Africa, but in 1978, it also encouraged Vietnam to occupy Cambodia. The Carter administration failed to take effective action, though China fought a brief war with Vietnam in 1979.

When the Soviet Union did not face strong condemnation, it felt emboldened to intervene directly in Afghanistan in late December 1979. This move finally ended the post-1975 policy of avoiding a military showdown with an aggressive adversary. However, the US did not send its own forces into Afghanistan, but relied on the neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan, to back up the Afghan freedom struggle that lasted for 10 years before Moscow agreed to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. Two years later, the Soviet Union disintegrated and Washington began to order global affairs according to its own designs.

The US now took a U-turn. During the Soviet occupation, Pakistan had been a critical ally that played the leading role in backing Afghan resistance and offering sanctuary to over 3.5 million Afghan refugees. Washington had looked the other way as Pakistan made progress on its nuclear programme, conceived entirely as a deterrent to India’s nuclear capability that was demonstrated in 1974.

After 1989, the main US security concerns centred on the threat of Islamic fundamentalism and of nuclear proliferation. In both respects Pakistan was suspect. Consequently, the Pressler Law was applied, resulting not only in the stoppage of aid but also of supply of military equipment ordered and paid for during the Afghan war. For Pakistan, the decade of the ‘90s was a difficult one as additional sanctions were applied following the nuclear tests of 1998, and the military takeover of 1999. In the meantime, Bush used the Gulf War of 1991 to subdue Saddam Hussein and to establish US military presence in the region.

In the last year of the elder Bush’s single term, two of the neo-conservatives in his administration, Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis Libby, came up with the concept of the New American Century, during which the US would rule the world by virtue of its military and technological superiority. As Clinton defeated him, this concept remained unfulfilled.

One legacy of the elder Bush’s single term was to affect the approaching century in a manner that would have been unimaginable in 1992. Bush had decided to walk away from Afghanistan, without showing concern for the terrible destruction the country had suffered. However, a Saudi jihadist leader, who had been recruited by the US during the Afghan war, Osama bin Laden, took up the traditional concept of the inviolability of Islamic holy places by outsiders. He declared a jihad against the US and found sanctuary in Afghanistan, where the Taliban leadership embraced his ideas. This was the starting point of intense terrorist activity, directed against the US

Meanwhile, Clinton carried out a missile strike against Afghanistan. At this time, Pakistan was accused of encouraging terrorism in Kashmir, and playing host to several jihadist groups. Its recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was politically unpopular.

The election of George W. Bush to the presidency in 2001 brought to power a person who was guided by the concept of absolute US supremacy. He adopted a unilateralist line to the point of repudiating agreements on key issues such as the environment, and prosecution of war criminals entered into by the previous administration. In May 2001, he launched the Ballistic Missile Defence concept without advance consultation, and differences widened between the US and European Union.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks further strengthened the hands of the neo-cons around him. Not only did he declare war on terror that effectively targeted the Islamic world, but progressively expanded the scope of the US to intervene preemptively anywhere, without waiting for provocation.

Pakistan under President Musharraf took a bold decision, following the 9/11 attack, to join the global coalition against terror. Pakistan’s geographical location to Afghanistan, as well as the wealth of intelligence on Afghanistan, proved critical for the success of the anti-terror operations in Afghanistan. As many terrorist leaders moved into Pakistan territory, the government had to show resolve and single-minded determination in quelling the menace. Pakistan won praise for its role in apprehending nearly 700 terrorists, including many top Al Qaeda figures.

President Bush had demonstrated an early interest in using the Bush doctrine of preemption against Iraq, the control of which would guarantee the supply of energy, assure the security of Israel and make its strategic position unchallengeable. Preparations for a military strike against Saddam’s regime began in October 2002, but Saddam maintained that he neither possessed weapons of mass destruction nor any links with terrorist organizations. He offered to open his country to inspection by UN personnel who had been expelled in 1998 on allegations of spying. The preliminary reports by UN inspectors failed to disclose the existence of WMDs or of nuclear capability.

Bush, who had sought to use the UN so far to build up a case for preemption, now became impatient. Secretary of State Colin Powell made a statement in February 2003, referring to intelligence information that the Iraqi regime was preparing to go on the offensive. Britain’s Tony Blair backed the intelligence from his sources. However, a majority of the members of the Security Council, including France, Germany, China, Russia and Pakistan would not authorize military action, preferring to wait for further reports from UN inspectors.

Having taken a decision to go ahead regardless of lack of UN approval, Bush led a “coalition of the willing” of 38 countries to launch a war in 2003. The US calculations had taken into account the fact that Saddam’s regime drew its support mainly from the Sunnis, located in central Iraq, who constituted only about 20 per cent of the population. Some 80 per cent of the Iraqis (60 per cent Shias in the south and 20 per cent Kurds in the north} not only detested Saddam but were also in control of the oil-producing areas.

Two and a half years later, despite having won a re-election, the Bush presidency is in serious danger of being judged a failure.

As the war in Iraq has gone badly, and there are scandals about the way intelligence was manipulated to justify it in the US and Britain, the Bush administration is confronted with challenges both over its exit strategy and its global image. The younger Bush has suffered from the arrogance of power, and must be concerned about his falling approval rate that was as low as 35 per cent according to recent polls. Over 60 per cent of Americans favour an early withdrawal from Iraq, and the percentage of those who think the Iraq war was a mistake exceeds the percentage with that sentiment about the Vietnam war in the 1970s.

Persistence in a foredoomed enterprise would virtually consign George W. Bush to the status of a failure, unless he begins a significant course correction while he still has three years available. US presidents have used the power and wealth of the US rather benevolently, and would resent being called imperialists. The post Second World War record of the US has been creditable, when one recalls the Marshall Plan, and the aid programmes at the height of the Cold War. Even the security posture document of September 2002, was not confined to defence, but included increased attention to diplomacy and development.

As events have evolved, the explanation that the US wants to introduce democracy and development in the Middle East and the Islamic world lacks credibility. Indeed, the war in Iraq has cost the US heavily, not only in military terms but also in terms of its image, taking into account the Abu Ghraib scandal. The treatment of detainees at Guantanamo appears to reflect vengefulness rather than concern for civilized values.

The impetus the post 9/11 attitudes gave to Israel in Palestine and India in Kashmir to step up state terrorism cannot be condoned. The real problems of this crowded planet consist of poverty, disease, and the pressure on the environment. In addition, wars are endemic in regions afflicted by poverty. Therefore, peacemaking and peacekeeping are as challenging as terrorism, and proliferation.

We should expect the US to gradually downplay its show of military might. The policy of pressurizing regimes like Iran and Syria may yield to greater acceptance of their legitimate interests and rights. We can draw encouragement from the greater interest in peacemaking as evident from the active role of Condoleeza Rice in Palestine and of Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in Sudan. The US has the potential to influence the WTO negotiations decisively as evident from its readiness to cut agricultural subsidies. Instead of pushing the war in Iraq to the debacle that Vietnam was, President Bush may yet end up accentuating the positive.

The writer is a former ambassador