A year after Arafat

ONE year after Yasser Arafat’s death, things in Palestine remain much the same. The civil war which the western media had predicted did not materialize. All said and done, there was an orderly and peaceful transfer of authority in the state as well as in political organizations. Mr Mahmoud Abbas was unanimously accepted as chief of the Palestine Liberation Organization while Mr Farouk Kaddoumi became head of the PLO’s Fatah faction. There was no power struggle, and the legitimacy of the two leaders to their posts was recognized. Mr Abbas was the man behind the Oslo peace accord and was acting as PLO chief during Arafat’s illness, while Mr Kaddoumi, even though living in Tunisia, was named by Arafat as Fatah chief during his lifetime. Then in January this year, Mr Abbas was elected president of the Palestinian Authority after winning 62 per cent of the votes. The fact that Hamas and Islamic Jihad boycotted the election made no difference, because the voting was orderly and an estimated 50 per cent of the voters went to the booths. The turnout could have been higher but for the Israeli security forces, which fired on a school serving as a polling station, and set up innumerable blocks, which prevented thousands of people from casting their votes. In fact, European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana criticized Israel for interfering with the electoral process.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Ahmad Qorei, nominated as prime minister by Arafat in September 2003, was accepted as such by President Abbas, but there were demands from his political opponents for a new reform-minded cabinet. On Feb 24 this year, Mr Qorei formed a new cabinet and won a vote of confidence from the legislative council. Another major development in the context of democratization is Hamas’s decision to take part in the coming parliamentary elections. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has unfortunately refused to help with the electoral process on the West Bank if Hamas took part in it. This is a most negative attitude, for the coming of Hamas into the political mainstream should help contain violence.

Thus, a year after Arafat’s death, one can say his legacy survives. He was criticized by hardliners inside and outside the Arab world for the Oslo “surrender”. But they failed to point out an alternative, especially when Arafat’s Arab and Muslim “brothers” had abandoned him and his people. Yet he made the world realize that a Palestinian state had to come into being. His triumph came in September 1993 when his enemies, who had denied the very existence of a Palestinian people, accepted the idea of a Palestinian state in principle and shook hands with him on the lawns of the White House. Now the recognized aim of American policy is a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

From the geopolitical point of view, the most hopeful development was Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza strip. This was welcomed by the world, including the Arabs. But the Likud government failed to capitalize on it. Instead of pursuing the peace process in earnest, Mr Sharon suspended talks with the PA because of violence in Gaza. Israel has also continued the expansion of settlements and the work on the separation barrier — declared illegal by the World Court. Unless Israel pulls out of the West Bank and an independent Palestinian state comes into being there is no possibility that the holy land will have peace.

Managing disaster in S. Asia

A POSITIVE decision taken by the foreign secretaries of Saarc members in Dhaka is to set up a disaster management centre for the region. India, which has an institute for disaster management and is working on a plan to set up an early warning system for ocean disasters, has offered to help set up the regional centre. Given the three major natural calamities that have affected areas in South Asia — the earthquake of October 8, the tsunami of December 2004 and the Gujarat earthquake of 2002 — it makes sense for the South Asian states to pool their expertise and resources to tackle natural calamities that befall them without any regard to boundaries.

It might be recalled that quite a lot of the misery and loss of human life that came in the wake of the tsunami last year could have been averted had there been an early warning system in place. Since such disasters affect large areas, it is practical and economical to handle them on a regional basis rather than every country trying to cope with them individually. Moreover, when a regional infrastructure, namely Saarc, is already in place it is wise to make optimum use of it. Experience shows that when such tragedies take place, relief and rescue operations should be organized on a cooperative basis among all the countries that have been affected. Even those states that may not have been hit can help alleviate human suffering on account of their geographical proximity. This was clearly established in the case of the tsunami and the earthquake in Kashmir.

Considering the improving relationship between India and Pakistan, the two biggest members of Saarc, one can now expect political friction not to hamper joint efforts in the affected areas. One hopes that the Dhaka summit will announce this agreement in its declaration today and, more importantly, the decision will be implemented without delay. The governments of the seven countries should immediately start working on the organizational and institutional aspects of the disaster management centre so that it is set up as soon as possible.

Chemical attacks in Fallujah

THE documentary telecast by the Italian state television and showing evidence of chemical attacks on civilians by American troops during their Fallujah offensive in Iraq in 2004 should come as no surprise. The US may have signed the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention that prohibits the use of the deadly weapons, but it was not averse to using these in the past as its resort to napalm bombs in Vietnam shows. Moreover, while today it might be critical of Saddam Hussein for gassing 5,000 of his own citizens in Halabja to death during his anti-Kurd offensive of the 1980s, it must be remembered that it was a US biological company that provided killer pathogens to Iraq during its war with Iran. In the case of the Fallujah onslaught, the Americans have defended the use of white phosphorus, saying that its use was not banned and that the chemical was used to illuminate enemy positions and not to attack civilian areas.

Even if white phosphorus has not been specifically banned during warfare and is considered more of an incendiary device than a chemical weapon, its effects are lethal and its victims die an agonizing death, as shown in the documentary. While the US has been consistently denying that it used this or any other deadly device to attack the civilian population in Iraq, the footage from the documentary and accusations by human rights organizations should be noted, so that an independent committee can be formed to investigate the charges. This is necessary as it is difficult to believe the US adhering to any wartime code on torture of civilians, especially in the light of its disgraceful treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Meanwhile, signatories to arms conventions would do well to revise their definition of chemical weapons and include any devices contributing to a chemically-induced death or suffering, including white phosphorus.

Saarc: implications of Afghan membership

WITH Afghanistan’s entry into the seven-nation South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation a foregone conclosion, one hopes Islamabad has considered what the full implications of that country’s membership of this regional grouping could mean to Pakistan.

It should be noted here that all Saarc countries recognize the international borders of all fellow-members. There may be a dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, but Pakistan’s border with India — starting from the Raan of Kutch on the Arabian Sea coast to what is called the “working boundary” between occupied Kashmir and (Pakistani) Punjab — remains an internationally recognized border. India has accepted it without reservations since 1947.

However, if admitted, Afghanistan will be the only Saarc member which does not recognize a member-country’s international border which is 2,300 kilometres long. Not only that, Afghanistan has not officially renounced its claim to areas to the east of the Durand Line.

There is no sign yet of a resolution of the Kashmir dispute, thanks to the Nehruite mindset that still has New Delhi firmly in its grip when it comes to Kashmir. If the Line of Control has now become soft, let us thank cruel nature and not New Delhi for the movement that we now see across the LoC. However, a resolution of the Kashmir dispute — if and when it takes place — will mean that Pakistan and India will have renounced irredentist claims on each other.

Has Afghanistan renounced its irredentist claims on Pakistan’s territory, or has Islamabad secured Kabul’s guarantee that it will do so after it becomes a Saarc member? More importantly, has Afghanistan given Pakistan any assurance that it will conduct itself correctly at the Saarc forum?

The truth is that by making Afghanistan a Saarc member, Islamabad is giving New Delhi an ally on the silver platter. India suffers from a sense of acute isolation at Saarc forums. Barring Bhutan, which is in its pocket, India has no genuine friends in Saarc. Thus, for the first time in Saarc’s history, India will find a natural ally and friend in Mr Hamid Karzai’s Afghanistan.

The Karzai government’s posture towards Pakistan is dubious, full of distrust and based on expediency, and the friendly remarks that sometimes come from Kabul stem from the compulsion of circumstances existing in Afghanistan and the region following 9/11. His administration is dominated by the pro-Indian Northern Alliance, which in turn is led by Tajik warlords and Uzbek bandit Rashid Dostum. (It was in Dostum’s airless and sizzling containers that many Pakistanis caught and herded into them like animals after the fall of Kabul were asphyxiated.)

The Karzai government looks at Pakistan as a potential enemy who could re-exercise its Taliban option if and when it finds it necessary to do so. Of course, it recognizes that America’s military operation leading to the fall of the Taliban government would not have been possible without Pakistan’s help. But it feels — and perhaps not without justification — that Islamabad went along with the US on this question because it had no other option but to cooperate.

Let us note here Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmud Kasuri’s statement in Islamabad when he announced that he would propose Afghanistan’s membership at the Dhaka summit. The foreign minister said, “Pakistan and Afghanistan share the bonds of history, culture, tradition, values as well as a common perception of peace, stability and harmony in our region”.

He may be right with regard to the first four — history, culture, tradition and values — but do Kabul and Islamabad really have a common perception of “peace, stability and harmony” in the region?

Until the advent of the Taliban, Afghanistan considered India its ally in its claims on what it called Pakhtoonistan. The Taliban — nurtured, armed and funded by Pakistan and operating from bases in this country — had little time for anything else besides warring on other Afghan factions and consolidating their hold on power. But even they never for a moment gave any indication that they would recognize the Durand Line as an international boundary if they came to power.

This writer interviewed Gulbadin Hikmatyar — a key figure in the Taliban hierarchy and a man so intelligent that he had both Bhutto and Zia give him money and arms — and asked him if the Taliban would recognize the Durand Line as the official border between the two countries if they finally won? He said this was a superfluous question, because the Durand Line in any case was an artificial barrier created by the British, and people were moving across it so freely that it had lost all meaning as a dividing line.

That was, of course, true. Given the constant movement of troops, supplies and smugglers, the Durand Line had virtually ceased to exist. But that was not in Pakistan’s interest, for Islamabad would have wanted then, and will want Kabul now to recognize the Durand Line as the international boundary. But Hikmatyar, who was once embraced by President Reagan in the White House, said everything that was charming, sweet and “Islamic” — yes, we are brothers, this is an artificial line created by the British, and so on.

Yet, the one thing he would not say was that the Taliban would accept it as the official boundary between the two countries when the Taliban finally won. This being the Taliban’s position, does any Pakistani in his right mind really feel it ever possible that the post-Taliban Afghanistan with a dominance of Tajik warlords and harbouring inimical intentions against Pakistan would recognize the Durand Line as the official boundary?

Let us accept the harsh truth: Taliban or no Taliban, the Afghans have a broad consensus on the Durand Line — they do not accept it as an international frontier. During the Zahir Shah-Daud days — with Moscow and New Delhi fully on their side — Kabul never missed an opportunity to create problems in the Frontier. At present, the Karzai government cannot resurrect the Pakhtoonistan bogey because nobody — not even India, at least for the present — would encourage it to do so. But one does not know what the situation would be like say half a decade from now.

There are indications that the US is in the process of scaling down its military operations in Afghanistan and wants Nato — the unwilling Nato that considers its soldiers more precious than the neocons in Washington consider theirs — to share greater responsibility for security in Afghanistan. The Republican administration is already low on the popularity ratings, and if a Democratic president moves into the White House in 2008, most probably a new era of chaos will begin in Afghanistan. Mr Karzai may not politically survive an American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and what happens next is anybody’s guess.

It could be a repeat of the ferocious civil war Afghanistan saw in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, and such questions as a Durand Line recognition will be on hold. Having such a country in Saarc will be of no help to anyone, and most certainly not to Pakistan.