Islam in Turkish politics

THE theme of this article has been determined by an e-mail from a young student of international affairs who found my analysis of the Algerian crisis (Dawn, October 10 ) objective but my reference to Turkey’s success in addressing the Islamic question as ‘over-optimistic’.

It was not my intention to fudge the interventionism of the Turkish officer corps. Turkey, a country of immense geo-strategic importance, is vastly more complex and would need to be discussed in some detail. Insofar as the danger of a potential confrontation between the armed forces and the Islamists is concerned, it is a success story.

Since the Turkish praetorian guard constrains Islamic parties in the name of Ataturk, it is pertinent to recall briefly the circumstances in which the ‘father of the Turks’ committed his young republic to secularism. He reacted against Islam as the basic law of the state as part of his passionate rejection of the ancien regime. The man who had performed a near miracle in extricating Turkish army from hostile Arab lands and then saved the Turkish homeland from the invading western powers decided that Turkey’s future security and prosperity required modernization and westernization. Mustafa Kemal was not cut out to develop an alternative Islamic discourse. He opted for an eclectic approach to European models and tried to put together a conceptual framework for an honourable place for Turkey in the post-Ottoman world.

Ataturk’s basic ideas were strikingly simple: indivisibility of the nation, Turkey’s territorial integrity, secular character of the republic and modernization. The emphasis on the state sector in the economy reflected the contemporary ethos both on the European left and right.

Ataturk’s successors often defined the Kemalist ideology according to their own needs. They discarded his aversion to army’s interference in the affairs of the state on many occasions. A dynamic economic management has also periodically corrected the heavy reliance of the Kemalist era on state monopolies.

Situated at the hub of post-war East-West rivalry, Turkey permitted a partial revival, especially amongst the youth, of religious ideas as a counterweight to nascent leftist movements. The National Salvation Party (MSP), the flag-bearer of political Islam, was part of the ‘nationalist camp’ based on a fusion of nationalism and Islam. The armed forces did not perceive these early Islamic movements as a threat.

More pertinent to the rise of Islamic politics in Turkey was the dynamic of socio-economic changes. Rapid urbanization and industrialization produced a large class prone to alienation and anxiety in the big cities. In 1980, 44 percent of the Turks lived in cities; by the end of the century their number increased to 65 percent. Since the 1960s, the armed forces have seized power three times. Each of these coups led to transformation of the political landscape, with centrist parties like True Path and Motherland Party seeking to dominate. Necmettin Erbakan built up the MSP by harnessing the insecurity of the new under-privileged urban dwellers and by articulating the concerns of the small businesses threatened by the emerging corporate economy.

The military coup of 1980 forced many ‘Islamists’ to join Turgat Ozal’s new party. He will probably be remembered in Turkish history as the politician who boldly faced up to the challenge of broadening the one-dimensional and linear nature of Kemalist secularism. Under pressure from the armed forces, Erbakan’s followers tried to survive through a protean change of parties. The first manifestation of this process was the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) which, upon being banned, resurrected itself as Fazilet Partisi (the Virtue Party).

Many years before he became prime minister of a coalition cabinet, Erbakan visited Islamabad. At a quiet, unofficial dinner, President Ziaul Haq permitted me to question Erbakan closely about prospects of an Islamic movement in Ataturk’s secular state.

The Turkish ‘Islamist’ did not deviate even once from moderation, constitutionalism and democracy. He appreciated secular education, reasonable restrictions on religious seminaries and the need for an honourable accession to the European common market.

It was difficult to understand why such a moderate ‘Islamist’ was subsequently deposed and why in 1998, he was stripped of his civil rights for five years. Perhaps his unforgivable sin was to refer recommendations of the National Security Council (NSC) for eliminating Islamic reaction to parliament in February 1997. Historically, NSC’s recommendations have been mandatory.

The ban on ‘Fazilet” (Virtue) split the ‘Islamists” into the more traditional Saadat party and the more dynamic ‘conservative-democratic’ Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party’, AKP for short). The latter was a broad Islamic-democratic initiative by the former members of Refah and Fazilet parties dubbed as “Renewalists” (Yenilikciler). It has been ably led by 51-year old Recep Tayyip Erdogan who overcame an economically disadvantaged childhood to receive higher education at Istanbul’s Marmara University and then to become, in 1994, Istanbul’s successful mayor.

In the general election of November 2002, AKP, under his leadership bagged 363 out of 550 seats of the Grand National Assembly while the Republican Peoples’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; CHP for short) took another 178 seats. Several well-known parties failed to get any representation as their share of the vote was below the required 10 percent. AKP maintained its electoral leadership when it won 44 percent of the vote in the local elections of 2004.

AKP has coped well with diverse challenges in the economic sphere, the highly delicate civil-military relations, the Iraq war, the Kurdish question and, above all, the commencement of negotiations for entry into the European Union. Erdogan’s success is often attributed to his dilution of the party’s agenda of establishing an Islamic state. It is true that he has avoided the factors that led the constitutional court to ban the Welfare Party in 1998. Another way of interpreting this ideological shift is to recognize the fact that the phenomenon called Islamic revivalism is better understood and that the Turkish elite is less paranoid about it.

The dialectical tension between the Kemalist state and Islam is a deeply absorbing narrative that will be taken up in a separate article. It is not as linear as is often assumed. Here we need only a few markers. The idea of separating the state from religion was rooted in several reformist movements under the Ottomans. The severity with which anti-Islamic measures, such as the abolition of the caliphate, the office of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the Arabic call to prayer (azan), the Ottoman head gear called the fez, were taken pertains to specific historical situations.

Occasionally, there was the fear that secular-republican ideas were not gaining wide acceptance. The adoption of the Latin script and European legal codes was also designed to highlight the break from the past. A major event was the conflict with Sufi orders (tarikat) following the Naqshbandi revolts in 1925. In 1928, the provision of Islam as the state religion in the constitution of 1924 was annulled.

While the Kemalist emphasis on Turkish nationalism became a driving force of the people, many of the so-called ‘anti-Islamic’ measures were endorsed only by small urban elite. The allegiance to Islam became more visible from 1960s onwards and gradually eroded the harsher steps of a bygone era. By 1990s, Turkey was witnessing a large internal migration from villages to the major cities. The distinctly religious migrants were a caravan of faith heading back to the city of God. As the mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan had demonstrated that a cultural reassertion of Islam need not be acrimonious. This is why a confrontation with secularists is not his first priority.

In fact, AKP’s first priority is to demonstrate that a multi-party Islamic democracy works. Erdogan’s assumption of the prime minister’s office was not without a hiccup caused by military’s reservations about him. He is also mindful of the past sensitivities of the armed forces. NSC is meant to be a recommending body but the “qualitative superiority” enjoyed by the armed forces in it has traditionally left little room for manoeuvre by the politicians.

AKP has the advantage of not being encumbered by coalition politics. Nevertheless, it has pushed for a better balance in civil-military relations quietly; it has enhanced political independence in implementing the NSC’s recommendations without causing a backlash in the officer corps. The denial of overland facilities for the US invasion of Iraq was handled with tact and discretion, with the Grand National Assembly playing a significant role.

Another crucial test for AKP is the management of the economy. Its policy has been described as ‘communitarian-liberal’, and as “an intermediate way between the extremes of freedom and regulation”. The objective is a post-developmental state that ‘aspires to play an important role in promoting both economic growth and distributive justice at the same time’.

This strategy connects AKP to the Islamic voters who were disillusioned with the old established parties. Turkey has maintained an almost five percent growth rate though it may come down to four percent in 2006 because of high oil prices. In 2004, its exports stood at nearly $67 billion while its imports cost $90.7 billion. The AKP government has been able to reduce Turkey’s chronic inflation giving substance to a decent per capita income.

Turkey’s bid to join the European Union impinges on its political and economic development in no small a measure. The process has begun but the outcome is still uncertain. Powerful voices oppose Turkey’s admission on “cultural grounds”, a code word for reluctance to let a nation of nearly 72 million Muslims enter a union of European-Christian states.

The AKP’s rule at this crucial time has ramifications for prospects of democracy in Muslim societies, the role of the armed forces in them, and above all, for the place of Muslim nations in a globalized economy. So far, the party has conducted itself with clarity and imagination. It is an experiment that the people of Pakistan should closely study.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

The safety factor

ALL too often, it takes a tragedy of overwhelming proportions to expose how well a state has served its people, especially the least-privileged, by the way they have been informed and equipped to cope with a disaster.

True, such was the force of the earthquake that hit the northern areas last week that the infrstructural damage might have been no less even in a developed country. After all, it was not unknown that the affected areas sat squarely on faultlines and were routinely subject to tremors and landslides, further aggravated by deforestation.

Not long ago, American geologist, Roger Billham of the University of Colorado, had said that a big earthquake was overdue in South Asia. Clearly, those who should have were not paying attention to it although his study was based on new satellite data while he re-examined the region’s seismic history of the past 300 years. He reiterates that the Indian tectonic plate was constantly pushing northward against the Eurasian plate at the rate of two centimetres a year.

While this appears negligible, over a vast scale affecting tens of thousands of square miles, it is like a sleeping giant stirring. When the pressure and strain finally causes the rock to fracture, the Indian place suddenly jerks forwards and the result is an earthquake. And it was in the offing.

Smitten by he smooth finish and glamour of urban housing enjoyed by the middle and upper classes as by the desire for stronger construction, the knowledge of hundreds of years that evolved among indigenous artisans and builders in northern areas from the point of view of a capacity to withstand jolts of earthquakes have gradually been cast aside and forgotten. Where financial situation permitted, especially with the help of earnings from family members who have ventured to the plains or abroad for better earnings people have adopt took heavy concrete and flat roofs of cities in building new homes or making modernized extensions.

In the quest for modernization, many stopped using wood frames and reinforcements that held ground and straw walls that were lighter and unlikely to kill anyone when they fell. Earlier, stone blocks tended to be used only on the lower few feet to hold up the rest of the walls. Later, financial constraints as well as ignorance of ten affected the quality and proportion of concrete building materials, and therefore the strength and durability of such habitations.

Earth, stick and thatch roofs were sometimes replaced with corrugated tin sheets for economy’s sake. This, despite earth walls being insulating in winter, and cool in the summer, without the need for fans.

The tin roofs did just the opposite, heating up homes when the sun beat down, and less able toward off the cold. Most dangerously, those who could afford concrete roofs, risked head injuries and fractured bones when roofs came down — which was exactly what happened in this disaster — also because walls were no longer designed to fall outward rather than inward in the event of a jolt. But then no one ever advised them better.

In the last 200 years there have been five major earthquakes in the 2,100 kilometre Himalayan range. But Pakistan never seriously prepared itself for such eventualities although it is located in high risk zone. In many countries, far from further developing traditional, time-tested, earthquake-safe technology, it was being discarded for modern concrete constructions inappropriate for mountain areas.

Earthquake deaths and damages have been so great in the past century that in 2000, the International Conference on the Seismic Performance of Traditional Buildings was organized by ICOMOS in Turkey — a frequent victim of earthquakes — supported by UNESCO and other donors. The object was to highlight knowledge of appropriate earthquake-safe mountain construction, which, even if unable to withstand shocks high up the Richter scale, would at least kill or injure a relatively small number; to identify what should be retained from the past and how they could possibly be improved on for the future according to local and regional geology, available raw materials, needs and culture; and what practices should be carefully avoided to limit death and damage.

With aid pouring in for relief and rehabilitation it is important to recognize and set strict guidelines and standards for the huge amount of money that will have to be spent on rehabilitation. Because, disaster, like wars, provide opportunities for large-scale contracts for rebuilding of infrastructure, strict supervision and soruting have to be maintained at every stage of planning and construction.

Among the case-studies presented on some of the worst earthquakes in the South Asian-near and Middle East region and the rehabilitation steps taken in the aftermath, was an examination of the 1993 earthquake in Maharashtra, India. It provides an example of what not to do, and how not to do it.

A World Bank loan for rehabilitation, especially the 20th century style technology with no bearing on mountain conditions, turned out to be a bad idea, even though the World Bank allowed low interest over a 30-year payback period and a 10-year moratorium. Estimated to cost two billion rupees, it soared to Rs 12 billion and did not turn out well for most affectees. Fifty two villages where more than 70 per cent of the houses were destroyed and 27,000 new houses had to be constructed for them.

What about the destroyed buildings and homes that few can afford to rebuild in our upcountry cities, including Muzaffarabad? People could consult architects versed in earthquake-safe technology to check out on the structural state of their houses and reinforce weak spots, especially in high- rises from which it is difficult to escape during an earthquake. But the government also has to work on its credibility; when operators can get away with the negligence and dishonesty that the Margalla Towers episode has illustrated, it cannot act holier-than-thou with the rest of the citizenry.

There’s one cue anyone can take from earthquake-zone dwellers the world over that’s relatively cheap and can be done immediately — the items may already be in use in the home so that there’s no extra expense. It needs getting a strong dining table with strong wrought-iron legs, with no glass or marble top — unless it has a full wooden base.

The surface of the table would have to be as strong as the legs of thick wood for people to make a quick dive under it in seconds and remain there for indefinite lengths of time in the event of a building collapse, especially those living in highrises from where they cannot climb down quickly. It would also be a good idea to make a habit of leaving a few bottles of drinking water and packets of biscuits there at all times.

The alliance still holds its ground

THE most remarkable thing about the six component parties of the MMA is that in spite of the usual rumblings and bickering, they have still managed to stick together — even though there were occasions when it looked as if the adhesive was beginning to dry up.

The first sign that there was trouble in paradise was when news surfaced about a year ago of a major rift between the two stars in the religious galaxy — Qazi Hussain Ahmed who is rigid and stubbornly sticks to principle and Maulana Fazlur Rehman who has achieved his most striking effects by adroit shifting of perspective.

The rupture, according to cynical observers, was orchestrated by the ‘agencies,’ a convenient and somewhat deprecatory label for various sinister organizations that work for the government and are allegedly given the task of creating political unrest, chaos and confusion and driving wedges into the ranks of opposition parties. It is far more likely, however, that the problem was internal and the dispute was charred by a completely different kind of combustion.

The disagreement was so severe that it gave rise to speculation that the component of religious parties was about to split right down the middle and return to the situation that prevailed before 2002 — when a cluster of small rightist parties co-existed with the vague consciousness of a shared common political platform. Nothing of the sort happened and the alliance has managed to survive.

Last week differences between the two major factions, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the JUI Islam came into the open, as alliance president Qazi Hussain Ahmad made it abundantly clear that the chief minister of the NWFP, Akram Durrani, had not been given the green signal to attend the meeting of the National Security Council, and if he persisted in toeing the government line, was acting entirely on his own.

The alliance president was quick to point out, however, that the issue would subsequently be discussed by a council of elders, suggesting that there was room for negotiation. And then, almost as an after-thought, criticized President Musharraf for holding the meeting of the controversial council at a time of great national tragedy with its scorching account of humanitarian frustration.

In spite of differences, the MMA is nevertheless united on one issue, and that is that Pakistan should become a theocratic state. They contemptuously dismiss President Musharraf’s ‘enlightened moderation,’ and his unconditional support of America. But while their leaders reek of worthiness, they are seen by the majority of the population and especially by the progressive elements in society as representing the sad and savage side of a bleak and lonely landscape filled with stubborn and unyielding men with hungry hearts and cruel mouths who are nasty to women and mean to children.

As a demonstration of their faith they are quick to attack the slightest signs of what they believe are concessions to a secular, liberal order, like that time in April 2005 when hundreds of extremist demonstrators armed with sticks blocked a road to protest against the participation of women in a race. The surprising part is that the event didn’t take place in the Talibanized north-west, but in Lahore, the heartland of Punjab.

Through a series of strikes, protests and local ordinances the MMA has grown more brazen in its challenge to the secularization which is central to President Musharraf’s rule. Some of the resentment found its way into a full page article published early in the year in various national newspapers.

Qazi Hussain Ahmed fired a number of broadsides at President Musharraf, much to the delight of the opposition. The thrust of the attack centred on the fact that the President had gone back on his word and on the promise he made to the nation on state television — that he had agreed to chuck away by the end of the year one of the two hats that he had been wearing.

Western analysts, unused to the idea of a political party being formed on the basis of religion, are naturally a little intrigued at the power and influence the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal continues to wield in the political affairs of Pakistan. In fact, the association of six political parties has been, and is likely to remain, something of an enigma, especially since the president has watched with weary resignation, how the United Action Council continues to frustrate his every move and still emerges unscathed, strong and united.

In a television broadcast aired some time ago President Musharraf accused Maulana Fazlur Rahman, a key figure in the MMA, of having first given his assent for the formation of the National Security Council, and then refused to attend its first session, along with the chief minister of the NWFP. But this apparent display of political ambivalence has a background. The refusal was not really a sudden display of defiance, but part of a larger and well thought out plan to frustrate a president who is now being caught in a web of apparent contradictions, and is desperately trying to avoid having to cross further constitutional hurdles.

Both Qazi Hussain Ahmed Maulana Fazlur Rahman have displayed considerable sophistication, political maturity and a little of what Sir Charles Napier would have referred to as native cunning, when handling all contentious political issues. Initially, the religious leaders kept opposing the government on the LFO issue, throwing up smokescreens but ensuring that the public regarded the MMA, rather than the ARD parties, as being in the forefront of the insurrection against the establishment, until they finally got the president to agree, albeit reluctantly, on a date when he would finally remove his battle fatigues.

It was the same with the NSC. The MMA’s terms for acceptance were simple. The NSC was to be constituted through parliament. This allowed the bill to be passed through the two assemblies by a simple majority, without pushing them into a situation where they had to vote. But even before the NSC was jostled into position, much to the discomfort of the ARD parties, the die had been cast. The MMA had adopted a position of uncompromising hostility towards the establishment, caused no doubt by the country’s foreign policy.

However, the president and his advisers have nobody to blame but themselves. They are now paying the price for sidelining the mainstream parties and denying the PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s faction of the Muslim League the political space to grow, so they could play a responsible role in the affairs of the country. Ever since the MMA mustered enough support to emerge as the third largest political party in the country by bagging 60 seats, or 16 per cent of the total votes cast in the 2002 elections, their importance had been enhanced far beyond their party’s electoral significance.

The MMA leaders haven’t made it to the top slot. They have always tried to adopt the posture of a responsible opposition party and have discovered that by sitting on the fence and playing a game of wait-and-see, they can accomplish considerably more than by throwing in their lot with the parties of the two exiled leaders, or with the party of the turncoats who soon after the election forged a coalition of other retrogressive, reactionary branches of the Muslim League.

As long as US relations with the Muslim world remain at a crossroads, and Washington believes it can afford the yawning chasm between pronouncements promoting democracy while their policies promote dictatorships, the MMA will thrive in Pakistan. Currently, it is the only political party in the country that is giving the president and the PML-Q a king-sized headache.

There is a growing awareness that the MMA is the only party that is “keeping the president in check”, and is, in its own peculiar way, serving the cause of democracy. This is what makes the whole business so tragic. The majority of people in this blighted land are not behind the men of the cloth.

Nor do they want to live under a theocracy. But they nevertheless watch fascinated as the mullahs steal the thunder from the very people who have been sidelined and who should have been incensed, but are doing precious little about it.

The president is seen as a secular, liberal and progressive leader, and he still has support in the country at the grassroots level. But after his recent unfortunate statement about Pakistani women crying rape to obtain visas and political asylum, he has disenchanted the liberal class; and that does not bode well for the future.

On a wing and a prayer

IT would be wrong, though understandable, for public concern about the threat from avian flu to be rising. It would be understandable because even international experts have given widely different estimates of the risk.

One UN health adviser suggests that if the bird flu virus H5N1 mutates to make it more capable of spreading from human to human, then up to 150 million people could be killed. But that expert was promptly contradicted by the World Health Organisation’s influenza spokesman, who thought the maximum mortality figure would be 7.4 million.

The reality is that there are no accurate figures. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the 1918 outbreak of Spanish flu, which first appeared as a bird flu virus, killed between 20 million and 40 million people. But global preventive action has been transformed since then. Separate scientific teams here and in the US, using computer models, have recently concluded that, even if H5N1 mutates, a global pandemic could be stopped if governments work together.

That was what was happening yesterday in Brussels, where experts from across the European Union examined current risks and planned responses by member states in one group, while a separate group of veterinary officers drew up measures to reduce the chance of contacts between wild birds, which carry the virus, and domestic poultry stocks.

Although only 120 people have been infected by the virus since it was first identified in south-east Asia in 2003, the mortality rate is phenomenally high. Some 50 percent of them died, most of them children. Most caught the virus through close contact with live infected birds. Human-to-human infection may have occurred in three isolated cases in Thailand, Vietnam and Hong Kong, but not through the feared mutated form. The most serious threat would come from a person already suffering from ordinary flu catching H5N1 on top.

The new mutated strain that could emerge would have a much lower mortality rate; but because it could spread much more easily between humans, it would kill far greater numbers. The current British approach looks sound. The health department has been purchasing an antiviral drug — there is no vaccine yet — to control any H5N1 outbreak.—The Guardian, London