A new India policy

STARE decisis is a Latin term used in legal parlance to connote the importance attached to precedence. The term means “to stand by things decided”. Such an approach may mean sense in law and how it is administered but it should not stand in the way of reflection and redesign when the issue is a nation’s relations with the world outside.

Yet much of Pakistan’s foreign relations have been dictated by the principle of stare decisis. The country continues to approach the world outside its borders on the basis of what may have seemed sensible in the past. Prudence and pragmatism demand — and it would certainly not be an unprincipled thing to do — that Islamabad takes a careful look at where the country’s interests are at this time. It should then develop a foreign policy based on that determination rather than on fears that are no longer relevant or reflect some romantic notions about the larger interests of the Muslim world that should never have informed policymaking in the first place.

This was the basis of my argument, made in this space last week, for a fresh look at the way Pakistan should view the state of Israel and the powerful Jewish diaspora in the United States and Europe. My suggestion that these relationships should be built on realizing Pakistan’s own interests rather than those of what is loosely defined as the world of Islam brought some emails both in support of that view as well as some questioning of my motives for making such a suggestion. One critic said that I had been out of the country for so long that I no longer knew what the majority of the people wanted and cared for.

Today, I would like to extend the same approach to another area of foreign relations, this time with India. In this case as well Pakistan needs to pull down the pillars on which it built a fragile structure of relationship with its large neighbour. There may have been good reasons why Pakistan’s India policy of the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and beyond may have made some sense. But in the early years of the 21st century, continuing confrontation with India and hostility towards it is unproductive and cannot help Pakistan in the realization of its objectives.

Perhaps recounting a bit of history will help to make the argument that Islamabad needs to think again about the way it should approach Delhi. Pakistan’s birth nearly 60 years ago was resolutely opposed by the Hindu leadership in India that led the struggle for independence from British rule.

The opposition to the creation of an independent state for the Muslims of British India came from both the left and the right of Hindu politics. The left, inspired by Jawaharlal Nehru, believed in what the Indian historian Anil Khilnani has called the “idea of India”. According to this an independent India would be able to develop political, economic and social systems to protect all Indians, without regard to their religion, caste and social status. To some extent, the success of the Indian democracy and the more recent success of the country’s economy suggest that the idea of India has indeed worked.

The Hindu right opposed the creation of Pakistan for a different set of reasons. It considered Islam to be an intrusion in what it regarded as the sacred Hindu land. After all, some of the areas the Muslim leadership wanted to be sliced out of British India to create the state of Pakistan had a rich Hindu history. These were the places from which Asoka, the legendary Indian monarch, had ruled. It was also resentful of the fact that a large majority of the Muslims who lived in India had converted to their religion from Hinduism. Pakistan’s creation would hurt the realization of the concept of Hindutva, the recreation not only of a Hindu domain but a society that lived by the teachings and philosophy of that religion.

Given this history it is not surprising that the first generation of Pakistan’s leaders looked at Delhi with suspicion bordering on apprehension. A number of policies adopted by the leaders on the Indian side did little to inspire confidence among the Pakistanis. Stanley Wolpert, another historian writing on India, has written that Nehru would have liked to see Pakistan fail as a state and as an economy. He and his administration took a number of steps that could have brought Pakistan to its knees but for the remarkable resilience shown by the leaders of the first generation of leaders operating out of Karachi, the country’s first capital.

The series of acts to humble the new Muslim state included the initial refusal to pay the cash-strapped government of Pakistan what was due to it from the “Sterling balances” — the debt London had accumulated as a result of British India’s support to its war effort. The Indians then went on to stop all trade with Pakistan in 1949 at the time when almost one-half of Pakistan’s imports came from India and an equal proportion of its exports were sold to that country. The reason for the launch of the trade war was Pakistan’s refusal to follow India in devaluing its currency with respect to the American dollar.

Then in 1949-51, India began to implement a number of schemes to divert the waters of the Indus River system for its own use. Given these acts, it is not surprising why Pakistan shaped its India policy the way it did. The Indian water threat brought the then Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan famously to the balcony of his residence in Karachi to show his fist as a sign of Pakistan’s resoluteness. Paranoia about India and its intentions seemed highly warranted.

It is no wonder then that for more than half a century Pakistan’s foreign policy was driven by only one strategic interest: how to balance India’s inherently greater strength. This Pakistan sought to do in two ways. One, it spent a great deal on the military to balance the greater Indian strength. Two, it sought to align itself with the countries it thought would come to its rescue if the Indians translated into military action their inherent dislike of Pakistan and what it stood for. Pakistan’s close relations with the US — and later on with China — were part of that strategy. But that stance may have been appropriate then.

Taking note of the enormous changes that have occurred in the shape of the global economy and India’s place in it and the structure of the global political system and, again, how India is positioned in it, Pakistan has to evolve a different foreign policy. This needs to be multifaceted rather than one that looks only at one possible threat — a threat that India once posed for the country’s integrity and existence.

I say “once” for good reasons. The Indian foreign policy now has much more ambitious objectives than simply humbling Pakistan. Delhi’s policymakers view their country as a potential global superpower. Seen from that perspective, Pakistan, at worst, is viewed as a nuisance that has to be dealt with since it is still not reconciled to the Indian occupation of the state of Kashmir.

For nearly six decades Pakistan has been engaged in the relentless pursuit to correct the wrong that was done at the time of partition by making it possible for India to lay claim to the Muslim majority state of Kashmir. This is now a good time to review the situation realistically and dispassionately to devise a new stance towards India. In the recent series of articles on Kashmir I have already explored the reasons why Pakistan needs to redefine its Kashmir policy.

Saner elements in India are also looking at Pakistan from a different angle. The Hindu right has also begun to look differently at Pakistan. There is no better evidence of this than the historic visit to Pakistan earlier this year by L.K. Advani, the hard-line Hindu leader, and the homage he paid to Mohammad Ali Jinnah while visiting the grave of Pakistan’s founding father. Indians of all political stripes have begun to see their neighbour as a country with which it would be useful to cultivate good working relations. This realization has been forced upon them for a number of different reasons.

To begin with India cannot hope to achieve the status of a global power to which it aspires, if it continues to remain embroiled with Pakistan over a dispute in which it cannot be a winner through the use of military means. The problem of Kashmir will not be resolved by force by India and the Indians now also realize that they cannot totally shield what they are doing in the state from the world’s view. Even such an Indophile as the novelist Salman Rushdie has painted a grim picture in Shalimar the Clown, his latest novel, of the way Delhi is attempting to suppress the insurgency that has now gone on for more than a decade. India will seriously sully its reputation if it does not find a way to exit out of the Kashmir conundrum.

There is also an advantage in working with Pakistan to deal with the problem posed by Islamic extremism. The Indians don’t like to be reminded that they have a large Muslim population which is not altogether immune from some of the troubling trends in the world of Islam. The standard Indian response to the suggestion that Islamic extremism can also take hold in their country is that in a functioning democracy — which India indeed is — extremism cannot flourish. That is true only up to a point and for as long as a cause is not provided to a segment of the population that believes that their values and their beliefs are under assault.

After all, Britain is also a working democracy but it has not succeeded in integrating a large group of the Muslim population into the mainstream. If the British Muslim youth can get so alienated with their country that they are prepared to give their lives to show their anger, there is no reason that a democratic system such as India’s should be entirely immune from this kind of reaction. India has some 140 million Muslims in its population, perhaps even more than Pakistan. Some of them are unhappy, alienated, and getting very angry. This is another reason why the Indian leadership has to work hard to find a solution for the problem of Kashmir.

Then there are good economic reasons why it is also to India’s advantage to work with Pakistan. Pakistan sits across a number of trade routes through which Indian goods must pass to reach Afghanistan and the countries beyond, particularly in Central Asia. Pakistan can also become an energy hub for the supply of natural gas to India which has a serious shortage of energy. If India does not secure access to diverse and reliable sources of energy, it will seriously constrain its economy and inhibit the rate of growth.

Moreover, Pakistan and India together could exploit the enormous potential of the Indus River system for generating power. It would be extremely damaging over the long run if the two countries continue to go their own way to develop the rivers of the Indus system for generating power — as they are doing at this moment — ignoring the fact that working together would bring much greater benefit for their people and for the long-suffering masses of Kashmir. However, the recognition in India that it is time to work with Pakistan will not necessarily translate into quick action on Delhi’s part. Why India is likely to go slow is a question for next week.

Presidential polls in Egypt

EGYPTIAN President Hosni Mubarak’s landslide victory in presidential elections held on September 7 has not come as a surprise to any observer of the Middle East political scene. President Mubarak won his sixth five-year term with 88.5 per cent of the vote. The 77-year-old former air chief has ruled Egypt for nearly a quarter century and his re-election was a foregone conclusion, given the electoral system and his stranglehold on Egyptian politics.

Yet, in many respects, the election was a defining moment in Egyptian history. It was for the first time that the presidential elections were pluralistic and opposition candidates were allowed to challenge Mubarak. Since he took over in July 1981, President Mubarak has been re-elected successively for four terms through a process of referendum where voters were asked to poll ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Each time Mubarak polled 99 per cent of the votes.

This time, the political lethargy, indifference and cynicism among the Egyptians nurtured in the last 24 years were in evidence when the turnout did not exceed 23 per cent. Some opposition parties put the figure at 18 per cent. As expected, the elections drew fire from the opposition for alleged rigging on a wide scale. Egypt has a population of 70 million with registered voters numbering 32 million, of whom only 6.3 million cast their votes, representing less than 10 per cent of the population. The low turnout and credible accusations of election fraud have marred Mubarak’s victory. In fact, these two factors are being advanced by the opposition as a sign of no-confidence in Mubarak’s rule.

Nevertheless, the September 7 elections are a landmark in Egyptian history as after decades of stifled dissent and poor democratic traditions under emergency laws since the last 24 years, the Egyptians experienced political freedom, albeit limited, for the first time. The emergence of the political opposition, particularly Kifayah (Enough) and Ghad (Tomorrow) was in itself an event of historic proportions.

The elections was contested by nine candidates but the credentials of only two, Ayman Nour of Ghad and Noman Guma of Wafd, were acceptable. They polled only 6.8 per cent and 2.9 per cent of the votes respectively. These figures, however, don’t reflect the enthusiasm and excitement that the contest generated.

The vitriolic attacks against Mubarak for corruption, unemployment and other social ills carried by the media and vociferous anti-Mubarak public speeches, were a rare experience for the young generation that has seen and known Mubarak as the only leader, one who is often referred to as the “last pharoah”. The open and aggressive challenge to his despotic rule has sown the seeds of change that will have an impact on the forthcoming parliamentary election scheduled for November.

Observers agree that through these elections, and despite blatant rigging, Egypt has now embarked on the road to democracy, pluralism and dissent in politics — no mean achievement by any standard. These winds of change could gain momentum and transform themselves into a hurricane destroying the arcane leadership and an antediluvian political system.

The irregularities in the conduct of elections ranging from ballot stuffing to forced voting at unnamed polling stations have been detailed in a 22-page report by the Egyptian Commission on Human Rights. The refusal to allow foreign election monitors gives credence to these accusations that have grievously undermined the moral authority of President Mubarak, whose rule is already in question with only 20 per cent of the 6.3 million electorates voting for him — a paltry 8.6 per cent of Egypt’s population.

This is likely to cast a long shadow on the next five years of Mubarak’s presidency. The election campaign has given unexpected strength to the opposition. Not only that, it was for the first time in the modern history of Egypt that multiple candidates challenged the incumbent president and focused on his failure to address poverty, illiteracy and corruption in his 24 years of authoritarian rule. Two major parties, Kifaya and the Tagammu, boycotted the elections saying that the system was unfair and that the continuation of the emergency had rendered the exercise futile. The absence of independent observers and foreign monitors strengthened the suspicions of foul play by the government.

The real significance of these elections will be felt in the parliamentary polls scheduled in November. Electoral reforms and democracy will be the vital issues. The fierce public debate on whether to participate in or boycott the elections in view of restrictive and unjust provisions will put pressure on the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The opposition has made significant gains in public support by highlighting Mubarak’s authoritarian rule. The public debate following these elections will generate further domestic interest and bring foreign pressure to bear on Mubarak to ensure that in the next phase the elections are fair, transparent and more representative.

It is pertinent to recall here that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in her last visit to Egypt in June had publicly urged Mubarak to enact genuine reforms in Egypt’s political system and asked that the elections “meet objective standards that define every free elections”. Ms Rice’s spirited declarations in her address to the students at the American University in Cairo that “the day must come when the rule of law replaces emergency decrees — and when the independent judiciary replaces arbitrary justice” had buoyed the spirit of the opposition. However, the manipulation of the presidential elections shows that those expectations have not been fulfilled.

It appears that Mubarak has successfully played on the fears of the US administration that a hasty transition to democracy could usher in the Islamists and members of the outlawed but most popular party, the Muslim Brotherhood, resulting in a situation akin to the 1990 elections in Algeria where the FLN victory was rejected by the army. This had led to a vicious and prolonged civil war there. The Sharm-el-Sheikh terrorist act in Egypt in July, and the growing political and parliamentary role of the Hezbollah in Lebanon and of Hamas in Gaza have also contributed to this perception and apparently made a strong impact on the US.

Mubarak’s re-election has, however, paradoxically weakened his grip on the government, as he has lost his moral authority with a poor turnout and through manipulation of the vote. As the Washington Post observed in an editorial, “When the totals are finally announced...there will be no reason for anyone to take them seriously.”

Rulers fail to respond to changing times and the public mood, and do not recognize the fact that their long stay in office has led to the stagnation of the political process and that the time has come for them to quit the scene. Their efforts to prolong their stay mostly backfire leading to a humiliating exit, besmirching their image and nullifying the good work that they may have done during their long tenure. Lee Kuan Yew, Nelson Mandela and Mahathir Mohamed are the only examples of leaders withdrawing in time leaving behind a legacy of political freedom and economic emancipation.

President Mubarak has regrettably failed to follow this tradition. His re-election will strain public patience and may trigger violence.

Whatever the political faults and foibles of the Mubarak era, there is no denying that under Mubarak, Egypt has registered phenomenal economic progress and political stability in a region known for its volatility. His astute policies have earned Egypt esteem among Arab and African nations. It would be tragic indeed if his achievements should be obscured because of political misjudgment.

The career of President Suharto of Indonesia has a close parallel with Mubarak’s career. Both had a military background and are rightly credited as architects of strong and vibrant economies and polities. During his 30 years in power, Suharto changed the face of Indonesia lifting it from LDC status to become one of the economic tigers of East Asia. But his ambition to cling to power led to his unceremonious fall. Hopefully, Mubarak will acknowledge public sentiments and allow younger leaders to emerge and put the country on democratic rails, thus carving out for himself a well-deserved niche in Egyptian history.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Talking to Al Qaeda

ISN’T IT clear by now that the US and its allies are not likely to be able to wipe out Al Qaeda or ensure that the West is not attacked again domestically? As the British acknowledged in July, the London attacks were just a matter of when, not if. To be sure, the terrorists can’t win this war, but neither can the West.

The most serious risk is that Al Qaeda will sooner or later be able to attack the western world with a biological or nuclear weapon, not merely the conventional bombs used in London and Madrid or the suicide car bombs being used to such gruesome effect in Iraq during the last few days.

Long-term strategies to win Muslim hearts and minds — through democratization, public diplomacy and greater economic opportunity — are therefore likely to be a case of too little, too late.

Even if, somehow, many are won over, such strategies will have no effect on the recruits who are being drawn to Al Qaeda every day, especially among Sunni populations where US troops are stationed.

So is there a Plan B? The most recent videotaped message from Ayman Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s second-in-command, broadcast on August 4, is a reminder that there could be — in the form of some sort of political engagement.

Unthinkable? In his message, Zawahiri referred to Osama bin Laden’s April 2004 offer of a truce to any European country that made a commitment to stop “attacking Muslims, or intervening in their affairs.” European governments immediately dismissed the offer. Why?

For starters, because the West believes there is nothing to be negotiated when it comes to Al Qaeda. Terrorist acts are either senseless violence (which means there is nothing to talk about) or part of a plan to destroy the West’s way of life (which is non-negotiable). As White House spokesman Scott McClellan said, “Terrorists will use any excuse to carry out evil attacks on innocent human beings.”

It’s also believed that a truce is impossible because Bin Laden and company will not act in good faith. In the words of former US secretary of state Colin Powell, “How can you make a deal with a terrorist?” And finally, even if the US could make a deal with Al Qaeda, it shouldn’t as engagement with terrorists would only encourage them.

It’s time to take a fresh look at this logic.

Does Al Qaeda have non-negotiable goals? Zawahiri said: “There will be no salvation until you withdraw from our land, stop stealing our oil and resources and end support for infidel, corrupt rulers.” Some argue that this is an initial set of demands, that the real goal is imposing Islam on the West.

Maybe. But what if, instead, Al Qaeda’s agenda is what its leaders repeatedly say it is: an end to the western military presence in Muslim lands, to “uncritical political support and military aid” to Israel, and to support of corrupt Middle Eastern regimes. Most scholars of Islam argue that because jihad is a defensive concept, the attacks on the West must be understood as retaliation for perceived provocations, and that Al Qaeda’s stated agenda, which has been consistent since 1996, should be taken literally.

But can one make a deal with terrorists? The British eventually dealt with the IRA, and the French with the Algerian FLN. A few months ago it was reported that US Army officers negotiated with insurgent leaders in Iraq.

As to whether the West should deal with them, there is a legitimate concern, but it’s a Catch-22: if aggrieved parties are ignored by an authoritarian government, they often eventually resort to violence, and then if the government is loath to engage them for fear of legitimizing their tactics, the grievances remain and the violence continues. (Think of the American colonists and George III or the early Zionists and the British.)

Sooner or later the West may find itself having little choice but to seek a truce with Al Qaeda, no matter how much it galls one. And waiting until there are many more American — and European, Egyptian, Saudi, Iraqi — casualties only weakens one’s position because it will then be clear that Plan A has failed and that the West is desperate.

Is all this hopelessly naive? Consider this: in the wake of the Beslan terrorist attack, none other than neocon theoretician Richard Pipes called upon Russia’s Vladimir Putin to negotiate Chechen sovereignty with those terrorists, on the grounds that the conflict had historical roots (there were real grievances) and because the Chechens had “resorted to terrorism for the limited objective of independence — not [destroying] Russia.”

Pipes then tried to distinguish the Russian situation from “America’s war with Al Qaeda,” asserting that the latter was non-negotiable because Al Qaeda’s attacks, unlike the Chechens’, “were unprovoked and had no specific objective. Rather, they were part of a general assault of Islamic extremists bent on destroying non-Islamic civilizations.”

But Al Qaeda does feel provoked, and if, as I have suggested, it has limited and specific goals, then Pipes’ advice to Putin applies to the West.

Some argue that the West should just unilaterally change the policies that provoke Al Qaeda. I would argue that if one does, one risks not getting the peace one seeks, and one would then have already given away the negotiating leverage.

I’m not suggesting that the West engage in direct meetings with Al Qaeda, nor that it stop pursuing those who commit or support acts of terror. But, through back channels, it should seek to determine if Bin Laden would withdraw his fatwa against Americans in exchange for certain policy changes, if Al Qaeda would settle for less than its maximum demands and if its far-flung followers would honour a truce.

There is evidence that the answer to all these is yes, but it’s inconclusive. With the stakes this high, shouldn’t the West find out for certain?

—Dawn/LAT-WP News Service