Sino-Indian ties on the mend

After 42 years of cold peace, mistrust and hostility, realpolitik and hard-boiled pragmatism are transforming one of Asia's most important relationships - bilateral ties between India and China. The decision to boost military ties is the latest in a series of steps taken by the leaders of the two countries to build confidence and establish friendly relations.

In 1988, the two prime ministers, Rajiv Gandhi and Li Peng, agreed to push the border dispute to one side and not let it stand in the way of normalizing relations. This wise decision has allowed the development of what appears to be cordial ties.

In 2002, Zhu Rongji, the then Chinese prime minister, paid an official visit to India, and last year his counterpart, Atal Behari Vajpayee, returned the visit which has in fact laid the foundation of rapprochement between the world's two most populous nations.

The most significant part of the joint declaration issued on the occasion of the Vajpayee visit was: "The common interests of the two sides outweigh their differences. The two countries are not a threat to each other. Neither side will use or threaten to use force against the other."

During the Vajpayee visit, both sides made determined efforts to take the sting out of their differences. India formally recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet, and China, in return, extended de facto recognition to India's sovereignty over the former kingdom of Sikkim. The Chinese are believed to have agreed to remove the Sikkim from their list of disputed territories to be made official in 2004.

An important reason for the strengthening of Sino-Indian relations is that New Delhi has made a conscious decision to improve relations with China without reference to Pakistan. But, at the same time, India hopes that its growing ties with China will lead Beijing to exercise a moderating influence on the hawks in Islamabad.

In a new sign of improving ties between New Delhi and Beijing, the defence ministers of the two countries agreed last month to strengthen links between their armed forces.

It was agreed that training including Chinese language training in defence institutions in India, sports and cultural exchanges and friendly interaction between border personnel would be increased. They both invited each other's officers to witness military exercises "in the interest of building familiarity, trust and confidence."

Chinese defence minister, Cao Gangchuan, who had held delegation-level talks with his Indian counterpart said before leaving New Delhi that his trip was aimed at creating "a peaceful regional, political and security environment with all Asian countries."

The mere fact that the Chinese defence minister visited India after visiting Pakistan is by itself a significant signal that Islamabad no longer occupies an exclusive place in Beijing's scheme of things and that New Delhi is back in business.

Commenting on Defence Minister Cao Gangchaun's recent visit to Pakistan and India, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Office, Kong Quan said earlier this month that the Chinese defence minister told his hosts during bilateral talks that Beijing would always support the peace process between New Delhi and Islamabad. It is now evident that China wants to deal with South Asia on a regional basis and show a balance in its ties with Pakistan and India.

The Chinese prime minister, Wen Jiabao, recently expressed "confidence" about the possibility of settling the boundary dispute with India on the basis of the principle of "peaceful co-existence". He even envisioned the possibility of friendship and partnership between the two countries.

Addressing a televized press conference at the conclusion of a historic session of the National People's Congress in Beijing on March 14, Mr Wen noted that the special representatives of India and China on the boundary question had already met twice since the "friendly and very important visit" of Prime Minister Vajpayee to China last June.

It may be recalled that the prime ministers of India and China had agreed, at their summit in Beijing on June 23, to appoint a special representative from each side to explore "the framework of a boundary settlement" as seen from a political perspective.

Addressing the Annual Conference on Security Policy in Munich, held in February this year, the Indian prime minister's national security adviser, Brajesh Mishra, dealt with the positive changes that had taken place in Sino-Indian relations and said that they held the promise "of far-reaching geo-strategic consequences."

Both India and China are using trade to give substance to their relations. Trade between the two countries has more than doubled in the past two years and hit the impressive figure of $7.6 billion in 2003. This figure is expected to rise to $ 10 billion by the end of 2004. A decade ago, Sino-Indian trade barely touched the paltry figure of $100 million.

An interesting development is that initial apprehensions with regard to harmful effects on Indian business and industry caused by the opening of the Indian market for Chinese goods have proved baseless.

With Sino-Indian trade touching the magical figure of $10 billion this year, India is one of the few countries in the world that would actually have a surplus balance of trade with China. What is even more important, Chinese manufactures have not unduly disrupted the manufacturing industry in India.

The Indian businessmen are taking full advantage of the relaxation of restrictions on trade between the two countries. They now see the Chinese dragon as their most exciting opportunity.

It is a big change from the days when Indian businessmen used to fear the influx of Chinese goods in India. The reason is that India is far ahead of China in two important sectors: information technology and pharmaceuticals. One can easily judge the aggressive expansion of Indian information technology from the fact that as many as fifteen Indian IT companies have a presence in China.

India's IT exports in 2002 were about $10 billion compared to $1.5 billion from China. What is even more significant, 40 per cent of Chinese IT exports involve Indian companies based in China.

Therefore, it is actually the trade more than anything else that is bringing the two Asian giants closer to each other, helping them overcome barriers of mistrust and fear. Some Chinese companies are now investing in India to take full advantage of India's lead in information technology. For instance, a well-known Chinese telecom equipment maker, Huawei, is investing $100 million to develop software at its plant in Bangalore.

If we look at recent developments, it becomes evident that there has been interaction in Sino-Indian, Indo-US and Sino-US relations. As Washington and New Delhi draw closer, Beijing is seeking not to be left out.

Similarly, as the initial antipathy of the Bush administration towards China fades away, India has been encouraged to intensify its efforts to improve relations with its big northeastern neighbour.

"We have an essentially triangular relationship between China, India and the US, although we deal with each element separately," said Ma Jiali at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, as quoted in the Financial Times last September.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Turning away from violence

When he completes his five-year term, Qazi Hussain Ahmad - elected chief of the Jamaat-i-Islami for the fifth time last week - will have served as the second longest-serving party head, his 25 years being next only to Maulana Maudoodi's 32.

By any standards, he is the JI's most successful chief. Partly because of his unorthodox policies and partly because of circumstances, his party is no more the underdog it was in the days of Ayub Khan and Z.A. Bhutto but commands influence and political power unthinkable even when Maulana Maudoodi was alive.

Qazi's greatest achievement is the populist image he has tried to give to the Jamaat. This is quite odd for a party which is dedicated to the status quo and has failed to draw up policies which could endear it to the minorities, women and the underprivileged.

The great change in the JI's fortunes came with Ziaul Haq's coup of July 1977. The Jamaat then became for all practical purposes the ruling party, even though it pretended to play the role of an opposition party when Mohammad Khan Junejo and his Muslim League were in power.

The second break for the JI came during the US-led anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. The Jamaat acquired funds and managed to have a following among armed groups the way it could not have hoped for.

More important, it continued to enjoy the army's patronage even after Ziaul Haq had passed into history. Using this opportunity Qazi extended the party's influence to sensitive state institutions. This power Qazi Hussain used with great effect and skill.

He was instrumental in the fall of the Benazir government twice, and even though his sympathies lay with Nawaz Sharif, he always kept Ziaul Haq's protege on tenterhooks and never missed an opportunity to create problems for him. See, for instance, his performance when Prime Minister Vajpayee of India visited Lahore in February 1999.

His tour de force came in October 2002 when the MMA, of which the JI was a part, swept elections in the NWFP and succeeded in forming a government on its own. It is now also part of the Balochistan government, and its representation in the national assembly, the Senate and the four provincial assemblies has never been higher. It has done even better in municipal elections.

It was also under his stewardship that the party adopted a liberal attitude towards its youth wings - the Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba and Shabab-i-Milli. The party kept a distance from the latter and allowed it the use of music and the adoption of popular film tunes for conveying the party's message at mass rallies and traffic junctions on national days.

These policies and the mobilization of the youth away from the doctrinaire rigidity of the earlier days were not without their negative fallout, though, for it appeared to neutral observers that the party seemed to place greater emphasis on an agitational approach even if it meant giving the cadres a mindset that did not attach much importance to democratic norms.

That on a larger plane these policies did little to consolidate democracy and strengthen the state of Pakistan is an issue that does not seem to occupy a high position in Qazi sahib's priorities.

Anyone who takes a walk along Dr Ziauddin Ahmad Road opposite to a five-star hotel in Karachi will find a huge sign scrawled on the wall of the Government College of Commerce and Education. It's a quotation from Maulana Maudoodi: "Quran aur Sunnat ki davat laykar uttho aur dunya par chha jao". Loosely, it can be translated into English thus: "follow the Quran and Sunnah, and the world will be yours." No controversy there, for every Muslim believes in this.

The question is: (since it was written on a college wall), has the JI under the leadership of Qazi Hussain Ahmad interpreted this exhortation in the right spirit and in a way that should enable its student supporters to forge ahead in all fields of human endeavour? Are its student supporters, for instance, known for academic excellence, social service, obedience to law, and a distaste for violence of all sorts?

Could not the best way to follow that advice have been to tell JI's student supporters to excel in studies and spend their time and energies in class and libraries and laboratories rather than on rallies and processions? What is in the interest of the ummah - raucous young men in streets or students working quietly in libraries and labs to one day become outstanding scientists and inventors?

Ironically, in this very college, a couple of months back a student, Shahid Aziz, was killed in an exchange of fire with an ethnic party. Aziz belonged to the IJT, and the wall chalkings by those who mourned his death referred to him as "shaheed". Aziz died because a bullet hit him. This way, the IJT is the aggrieved party in this case. But has the JI always been the aggrieved party? Have not students belonging to other parties been killed as well on the campuses?

Who first began violence on the campuses during the Zia days is a question that deserves to be answered in all honesty. It is true that some other student parties left the IJT miles behind by taking violence and murder on campuses to new heights.

But the IJT in this process has lost the moral high ground which it once occupied in the period between the fifties and seventies when it was supposed to be a party of disciplined and responsible persons.

The IJT is not the only one to have gunmen in its ranks; virtually all political parties have student wings which resort to thuggery and coercion to assert themselves and retain their hold.

Come the admission season, and campuses turn into battlegrounds, making it appear as if the fate of particular political ideology or the rights of ethnic communities will be decided not by votes in elections but by gunbattles on the campuses.

Regretfully, the JI under Qazi Hussain Ahmad has done nothing to check this trend. In fact, under his stewardship, JI policies have been characterized by an extraordinary reliance on a display of street power and agitation and on methods that do not conform to the moral standards that the JI leaders uphold and indeed do practise in their private lives.

One must also recall here the anti-US protests during the American attack on Afghanistan. It goes without saying that the JI and other religious parties were not the only ones opposed to the American attack; large segments of political opinion and parties were also critical of the Bush administration's policy towards Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11.

But Qazi Hussain Ahmad's utterances - disregarding the violence that occurred in October 2002 in Pakistani cities, especially Karachi - were hardly of the kind that anyone interested in the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law would welcome.

Criticizing the government is one thing; striking at the fundamental disciplines of a state as precariously placed as Pakistan quite another. One can imagine what chances political stability, constitutionalism and democracy have in Pakistan if parties consider it their prerogative to ask the army to mutiny because of differences over policies.

This is a sword that cuts both ways, for one does not know what will be the fate of a JI-led government in some distant future if another political opponent gave a call for the army to revolt against the government. As it is the effect of Asghar Khan's call to the army to revolt against Bhutto - something the air marshal denies - are still with us.

Qazi Hussain Ahmad will be doing a great service to the ummah if during the next five years he contributes his bit towards moving this nation's mind away from violence. Every Pakistani crowd is violence-prone.

It becomes ferocious if religion is injected into the fracas. This has done enormous harm to this country, militated against Pakistan's long-overdue economic turnaround, and created instability in the Muslim ummah's only nuclear power.

Pakistan needs peace and stability. As a major actor on the political stage, Qazi Hussain Ahmad owes it to the nation to use his party's strength and influence to make Pakistan's social and political scene tranquil and development-oriented.