THE new government emerging from yesterday’s elections will face difficult domestic problems.

The external challenges it will confront are equally daunting. The most urgent foreign policy challenges could be summed up in three words: Afghanistan, America, India.

After a decade of inconclusive war, Afghanistan is in the midst of another troubled transition. Compelled by unachieved objectives, enormous costs and domestic opposition, the US and its more despondent Nato allies are in the process of withdrawing their military forces from Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the US hopes to retain a ‘friendly’ government in Kabul, a large US-financed and US-trained Afghan army and a US Special Forces contingent to support the Afghans and conduct counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and along the Pak-Afghan border.

Pakistan’s foremost objective is to neutralise the terrorist campaign being waged against the state by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The path of negotiations with the TTP, proposed by some of the potential new leaders, is unlikely to succeed.

The TTP’s political objective — a theological polity within and beyond Pakistan — is beyond the scope of the negotiable.

Elements of the TTP are foreigners or foreign-sponsored; the revived tensions with Kabul imply that the TTP will continue to have ‘safe havens’ in Afghanistan; and a compromise cannot be forged without the military option on the table — front and centre.

The best way to deal with the TTP is to target the most recalcitrant leaders; break the group’s loose unity and negotiate only with those prepared to accept Pakistan’s Constitution and its territorial integrity.

A second priority for the new government is to halt the US drone attacks on Pakistan’s territory. It will be difficult to convince the US to halt such strikes, if it is true that it got some Pakistani nods and winks.

The US will be even less disposed to accommodate the new government if it is seen as being ‘soft’ on terrorism and the Taliban. Shooting down drones will provoke a conflict with the US that can only end badly for Pakistan.

Halting the drone attacks can be achieved through well-considered diplomacy. If Pakistan means business, it should register a legal case opposing the use of drones against Pakistani territory and citizens without its permission.

This can be done in the Security Council, the Human Rights Council and the International Court of Justice. Pakistan could also make its agreement to ‘deliver’ the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table conditional on a US commitment to halt the drone strikes.

The new government’s third and larger objective in Afghanistan, no doubt, will be to ensure that the political and security structures the US leaves behind are not hostile to Pakistan’s interests.

Islamabad has a vested interest in promoting a negotiated peace in Afghanistan and using its influence to bring Mullah Omar, the Haqqanis and Hekmatyar to accept an equitable power-sharing agreement.

But some forces, evidently including Hamid Karzai, seem to be working against such an agreement. Kabul’s recently escalated rhetoric and the resulting border clashes are ominous signs. Cross-border conflicts could persist.

Pakistan’s new government will need to play an active role to build peace through resort to leverage and compromise with power players within and around Afghanistan.

America’s post-Afghan strategy could also embroil Pakistan in the confrontation with Iran on the nuclear issue. An open conflict between Iran and the Western powers would severely threaten Pakistan’s stability and security.

At the very least, Pakistan will need to keep out of the confrontation on this issue. At best, an active new government could play a positive role to promote a compromise between Iran and the ‘international community’.

Pakistan’s competitive and unpredictable relationship with India could confront the new government with a repeat of past challenges.

At present, Kashmir’s resistance to Indian rule is relatively dormant but still real. A particularly egregious act of Indian oppression could spark a major political eruption in Kashmir and reignite the armed struggle.

A new Pakistan government, composed of ‘nationalist’ parties, will be obliged to express its support for the Kashmiris, verbally and perhaps materially, inevitably sparking a crisis with India.

Conversely, given the deep-rooted grievances of the Kashmiris and other Muslim and minority groups in India, a major act of terrorism there seems almost inevitable, sooner or later.

Although New Delhi will know that Pakistan’s authorities are not involved, it is likely, as usual, to blame Islamabad, leading to another crisis in Pakistan-India relations.

To avoid such periodic but foreseeable problems, it would be wise for the Pakistan government to propose some ‘rules of the road’ on how the two governments should respond to such events in order to avoid unintended confrontation or conflict.

Another latent but potentially lethal danger arises from the absence for the past several years of an arms control and security dialogue between Pakistan and India.

Today, India is the largest purchaser of advanced weaponry, most of which — fighters, missiles, anti-ballistic missiles, aircraft carrier — are planned to be deployed against Pakistan. India’s nuclear weapons programme is also capable of open-ended expansion following its US-sponsored admission to the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.

Pakistan will be obliged to acquire or develop capabilities to neutralise the threat from the growing Indian arsenal.

It should be particularly disconcerting that this unequal arms race is taking place without mutual understanding of the adversary’s military or nuclear doctrines.

Given the danger of potential confrontations over Kashmir, terrorism and other outstanding issues, it in the vital interest of Pakistan and India to regulate and moderate their military competition. The new government cannot continue to turn a blind eye to the strategic danger in the subcontinent.

Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry has an imposing responsibility to propose sound policies to respond to these challenges. It must rise to the occasion.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.