With all the grim inevitability of a Greek tragedy and the stale humour of an oft-repeated farce, political events in Pakistan are reaching their preordained conclusion. And if the two genres of theatre appear contradictory, this is inherent in the nature of things in Pakistan.

At the centre of the gathering storm is Musharraf, a protagonist once seemingly cast in the heroic mould. However, on closer examination, his clay feet peep out from beneath his Caesarean robes. Indeed, there were many people who, in the aftermath of his ill-fated and unnecessary referendum, were overheard saying that the emperor wore no clothes. But if our hero is much diminished of late, it is largely due to his own misguided steps.

Musharraf's finest hour came when he took the hard decisions post-September 11: even though he had few options, he did not waver from his chosen path, despite the carping he faced. His nadir came when he fell into the legitimacy trap and decided to seek public approval through the dodgy route of a referendum. In the event, a predictably low turnout was further marred by reports of massive rigging, something even Musharraf was forced to acknowledge. Now the Chief Election Commissioner, the mastermind of the flawed exercise, will oversee the general elections scheduled for October, a prospect that does not bode well for democracy in Pakistan.

This sense of foreboding is reinforced by the plethora of constitutional amendments pouring forth from the presidency: aimed only to ensure the domination of one man, they are in fact subverting our on-again, off-again parliamentary system and replacing it with a presidential one. And since a two-thirds majority will be needed in parliament to rubber-stamp these massive amendments, the entire state apparatus is currently doing its utmost to eliminate politicians and parties that might cause problems for Musharraf.

None of this is a very edifying sight; indeed, few elections in Pakistan have been designed with the squeamish in mind. But Election 2002 promises to dwarf previous elections in the sheer scale of the manipulating and rigging that will take place, and even then the outcome cannot be taken for granted. The lack of support the King's Party in the shape of the Q rump of the Muslim League enjoys became abundantly clear when these nonentities were unable to muster up a credible turnout in the referendum. To expect these ambitious hacks to do any better in October against the combined might of Nawaz Sharif's League and the PPP is asking for the moon.

By personalizing his differences with Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to the extent that he has, Musharraf has virtually thrown away his political options. The fact is that if he wants the forthcoming elections as well as the structure they produce to have any credibility at all, he cannot get away from the reality, unpleasant though it might be to him, that Pakistan has a two-party system, and any transparent and clean election is bound to return one or the other of them to power. Like a character in a cartoon, Musharaf keeps stubbing his toe against this rock time after time. Instead of accepting reality and trying to cut a deal with one or the other of his political adversaries, he has united them through his determination to keep them both out.

Many times in his political pronouncements, Musharraf has referred to military strategy, forgetting the first lesson that a general should not open too many fronts simultaneously. It takes political genius of a high order to bring sworn enemies like Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto together, and this is exactly what this government has achieved. By trying to eliminate both of them through his ruling that neither can rule again by virtue of having served two terms, Musharraf has left them with no option but to unite against him. It goes without saying that there is no limit to how long he can rule himself. Indeed, the longevity of our military dictators is an object of envy among our political classes, but then they do not command a political force as powerful as the army.

These self-created difficulties assume even greater magnitude when viewed against the backdrop of the situation in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and the fallout in Pakistan. This is clearly no time to play ducks and drakes with whatever remains of our political system. When he took over and was given three years by the Supreme Court (which probably recalled that not imposing a clear deadline on Zia had led to a decade of malign military rule), it must have seemed a long time. But suddenly with October looming on the horizon, there is a growing urgency to invent the formula that will allow Musharraf to hang on. The reason being given is the need to protect his 'reforms', but the power and perks of being head of state and government are heady intoxicants not easily put aside.

But even at this late date, there is time for Musharraf to step back from the brink. Generals are prone to talk about the 'national interest' at the drop of a hat, arrogating to themselves the right to define and interpret it according to their institutional and class loyalties and interests. However, the larger national interest calls for good governance, institution-building, finding a peaceful solution to the Kashmir problem, and achieving economic prosperity. The fact is that these are all areas in which the army has not exactly shone in the past, and there is no reason to suppose our current crop of generals are better at it than their predecessors were. To be fair, Musharraf and his team did stabilize a dicey economic situation three years ago, but they can hardly take credit for the largesse that flooded in post-September 11.

So how can Musharraf escape from the corner into which he has painted himself? Clearly, the way forward is to open a dialogue with Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. The outline of an understanding may be blurred, but when the junta and the two political heavyweights both want something from each other, surely the basis for any deal is already present. The initial contacts could be discreet and away from the glare of publicity, but if Musharraf wants to avoid a period of turbulence and instability, he will realize that flying solo is all very well for a short period, but for the long haul you need consensus and cooperation.