IT'S NOT often that the window of opportunity for a settlement in Kashmir is open even a few inches. All the more reason to force it wider while we have the chance.

This long-jammed window opened briefly in 1989 when Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi met in Islamabad and came close to an understanding over the vexing Siachin Glacier. Unfortunately, India soon backed out and the following year Benazir Bhutto's government was toppled with army support. Around the same time, the decade-long Kashmiri resistance began. Ten years and 30,000 lives later, the window opened again when the prime ministers of the two countries met in Lahore to try and sort out the festering conflict that has kept relations between the two countries at flashpoint. Within weeks of this historic meeting, the Kargil misadventure was launched with disastrous consequences. One of the casualties of that ill-conceived military action was Nawaz Sharif's government.

The recent announcement from New Delhi regarding a ceasefire during Ramazan was soon matched by a Pakistani decision to exercise 'maximum restraint' on the Line of Control dividing the two armies in Kashmir. There has been talk in India about extending this ceasefire after Ramazan. Predictably, suspicion has been voiced on both sides, but the fact that this initiative has been launched and reciprocated is to be welcomed, and, if possible, used as a stepping-stone to a more durable peace.

One problem that has prevented the right kind of atmospherics from being created is the knee-jerk reaction to any suggestion of an amicable solution to the Kashmir crisis on both sides. A Pakistani diplomat will start intoning the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir in his sleep, while his Indian counterpart will launch into a long catalogue of the wrongs Pakistan has committed, and how Kashmir is 'an integral part' of India. While both viewpoints may have a certain validity, neither is very helpful in moving the debate forward.

The armed forces and intelligence services on both sides have a vested interest in keeping the conflict on the boil, and neither has permitted a resolution of the conflict. However, the recent straws in the wind suggest that there is some rethinking in both capitals, and this has led to a certain amount of guarded optimism in pacifists like me who believe that this country can only come out of its slump by sorting out the Kashmir imbroglio. The dictates of both economics and geography demand that we improve ties with India.

I have often suggested that India's insistence that it would only talk to an elected government missed the point that in Pakistan, it is the army that has traditionally called the shots on Kashmir. It follows that now is the best time for New Delhi to talk to Islamabad. One reason why both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif fell foul of the army was that both of them, at one time or another, attempted to come to terms with reality and improve ties with India. But with the army in the saddle, now is the time to reach an understanding. Just as it took Nixon, a Republican, right-wing politician, to recognize Communist China, it will take a general to reach an understanding with India.

Some elements in and out of the military government have voiced disappointment over India's refusal to agree to tripartite talks with the Kashmiri groups and Pakistan. The point to remember here is that the Simla Agreement calls for bilateral talks between the two countries to resolve disputes. Initially, India and Pakistan could start talks, and once some progress has been made on setting the broad outlines on how they are to proceed, separate discussions can be held with Kashmiri representatives.

The fact is that the latter do not (yet) speak for a sovereign entity, and therefore should not demand to be treated as such. While Kashmir is the bone of contention, we cannot allow the tail to wag the dog, to mix a metaphor. The dispute has gone on too long and too many lives have been lost to surrender once more to posturing and pride.

One possible formula that has been discussed for years calls for India to keep the parts of Jammu and Kashmir that have a Buddhist/Hindu majority; Azad Kashmir with its Muslim majority would stay with Pakistan; and the Valley would become independent. Open borders, the withdrawal of all troops and the disarmament of independent jihadi outfits would be part of the deal. This way, each of the three parties would get something and have to surrender a part of their initial demand. This is the essence of negotiating a settlement of a long-standing problem. Indians might argue that they stand to lose more than they gain. But with open borders, their tourists and traders would be able to enter the Valley at will.

Another standing Indian objection is that a change in the status quo could mean an end to the Indian Union as well as the secular character of the state. Give me a break. Everybody knows that the Kashmiri problem is unique, and has no bearing on secessionist struggles in other parts of India. The separate character of Kashmir is enshrined in the Indian constitution. If we are to break free from yesterday's mantras and make a new beginning, everybody concerned needs to stop repeating tired old cliches and get real.Similarly, Pakistanis have to come to terms with the fact that violence will not win them Kashmir. We have fought two-and-a-half wars with India over the disputed territory, and now with the induction of nuclear weapons, war is no longer a sane option, if it ever was one. The current low-intensity proxy battle being waged has been devastating for the very Kashmiris whose cause we are espousing, and has gained us international condemnation to boot. The simple truth is that the current lethal stalemate is a no-win situation for all three parties to the dispute. Kashmiri jihadi groups will have to face the fact that their struggle is now counter-productive: the rest of the world is not going to lean on India to walk out of the Valley.

These truths may be unpalatable to many people, but they have to be faced if we want peace in the subcontinent. Another factor that needs to be kept in mind is that many of the actors in open and backdoor negotiations have lost all credibility on both sides. Perhaps it would be better to initiate a quiet exploratory dialogue out of the limelight between a small group of individuals who hold no official positions and are respected on both sides. They could see how much flexibility there is in each other's position without having to repeat familiar, official positions.

Whatever the modality the two sides choose, they must seize the moment.