Sooner than expected, time is drawing near for offering condolences to the strong Bush camp in Pakistan, currently in charge of the nation's wayward destiny. Growing signs on the horizon suggest that next US president is going to be Senator John Kerry.

The Democratic nomination is almost his, the primaries, as I heard a BBC reporter say, more a coronation walk than a contest. Unless the American electorate is dumber than the world (alas, often correctly) takes it to be, the presidency will also be his.

Not because Kerry is fortune's child or exceptionally gifted. But because George Bush has set himself up to be punished for his Iraq misadventure. As one Will Hutton, writing in the Observer says, "In a democracy you pay for such fundamental misjudgments with your job and Bush will pay with his."

John Kerry's importance is derivative. The Democrats appear to be choosing him over his rivals not because of anything he stands for but because he seems to be the most 'electable' person to beat George Bush. Central to this US presidential election is Bush and his march to war in Iraq. Those voting for Kerry will not necessarily be for him. They'll be against George Bush.

If Bush is in trouble - as Tony Blair also, arguably, is - can his closest ally in this part of the world, General Pervez Musharraf, escape unhurt? The Bush White House has been godfather to the Musharraf dispensation, its support directed not so much at Pakistan as at Musharraf personally.

Musharraf all by himself 'delivered' Pakistan to the Americans after 9/11, at minimal cost. In return, the Americans have done everything in their power to buttress his personal position. This cosy and convenient arrangement looks threatened by the likely outcome of the US presidential election. If the Bushites lose, it takes no genius to figure out that Musharraf's position becomes that much more precarious.

In case of a Democratic victory, the familiar faces dealing with Pakistan - the Rumsfelds, Armitages, Christina Roccas - will no longer be there to provide support and solace. Although Afghanistan and Iraq will still be important, because, no matter who is president, the US can't simply extricate itself from this mess and walk away, the new players in Washington will lack the zest of the Bush administration in shoring up Pakistan's Saviour-General.

In fact, their attitude could even be hostile. Who should know better than Pakistan that when the US loses strategic interest in a country, it suddenly wakes up to such desirables as democracy and human rights? Democratic administrations have done this before. The incoming one could do it again, the more so as Kerry appointees are unlikely to start off with much affection for a leadership closely identified with the war plans of the Bush administration.

To make matters more complicated, change in Washington is set to coincide with Musharraf having to take the toughest decision of his presidency: naming a new army chief. Pledged to remove his uniform by end 2004, the guessing game is he may make an announcement sometime in October. But with friend George in growing trouble, this announcement may come after the US presidential election on November 4.

Army chiefs in Pakistan have been chosen more for political reliability than for professional competence. You can't blame Musharraf if he follows the same principle. Given Pakistan's accident-prone history and weak political institutions, whoever is army chief tends to become, in moments of crisis, the most powerful man in the country. What's more, army chiefs have also been known to manufacture crises and benefit from their outcome.

Which is why in Pakistan choosing a new army chief is a fraught exercise. General Musa Khan, Field Marshal Ayub Khan's c-in-c, was the archetype of the loyal commander. But after him Ayub appointed another favourite, Yahya Khan, at whose hands he came to grief. When Ayub's star dimmed Yahya intrigued against him to fulfil his political ambitions.

Not surprisingly, Yahya wore his uniform right until the end as did General Zia who, despite being ruler of Pakistan for eleven and a half years, trusted no one to head the army. Did Zia judge others by his own performance? Zulfikar Ali Bhutto picked him over the heads of six generals, convinced that he was the most loyal and pliable of them all. When the man who once snivelled before him sent him pitilessly to the gallows he had time enough to rue his mistake.

When Gen Jahangir Karamat stepped down as army chief in 1998, the senior most general was Ali Quli Khan. But Nawaz Sharif, the then prime minister, suspected him of the wrong tendencies or of being wired to the wrong quarters. So he picked someone else instead, the then Corps Commander, Mangla, one Lt Gen Pervez Musharraf. We must await Nawaz Sharif's memoirs to learn about his more rounded views on this subject.

So the decision awaiting the soldier-president later this year is not a light one. He'll still be a powerful president armed with powers to dismiss the National Assembly and appoint the service chiefs. But with someone else calling the shots in General Headquarters, a shift of sorts, call it profound or not, will occur.To this add the expected change in the White House, on which I at least am ready to bet, and it may not be all that far-fetched to suppose that by end 2004 the present leadership will be at its most vulnerable since seizing power in Oct 1999. Two of the president's most vital props will have gone: uniform, the symbol of political immortality in Pakistan, and hot link to the White House.

Musharraf is now a military figure dabbling in politics, his primary constituency being his corps commanders and the army's regular divisions. Come October, November or December he'll be a political figure deriving support and sustainability from parliament, the Q League, and such political figures as Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, etc. The mind boggles but that's how it is. A Musa Khan in GHQ will make his job easier. Someone not cut in the Musa Khan mould will be a problem. Don't take my word for it. Pakistani history leads to this conclusion.

Ayub Khan's political system was far stronger than the Q and LFO model erected haphazardly by the present dispensation. But when Ayub Khan fell, his system collapsed faster than a house of cards. While the evaporation of his party, the Convention League, the king's party of the time, took even doomsayers by surprise. Judge from this the likely fate of Musharraf's political model when the winds shift.

But if end 2004 is likely to be a vulnerable time for the present system it can be a moment of renewal for Pakistan. Remember the Chinese adage, "There is great disorder under the heavens and the situation is excellent." If the exiled leaders of Pakistani politics are thinking of planning their return to the country, that's the time they should be looking at. But only if they've repented and confessed, both the Sharifs and the Bhuttos carrying a heavy load of sin and folly on their shoulders.

Pakistan has excelled at moving in circles or revisiting the past, Musharraf's rule proving no exception to this trend. The people of Pakistan deserve a break. It's time they were allowed another option: to step into the future.