The big hotels are suave at the PR trade. Judge for yourselves. Someone of passing importance has only to step into one of these establishments for his picture, with the general manager greeting him and smoothly pumping his hand, to be in the papers the next day, or the day after.

Nothing wrong with the handshaking and the greeting of dignitaries (for so they prefer to be styled in these parts) because that goes with the job. But how on earth do the big hotels always - yes, always - manage to get the pics into the papers? And why do newspapers, even those priding themselves on their sterling professionalism, oblige them? I haven't the foggiest but there it is. The big hotels are good at this sort of thing.

These days, however, another entity seems almost on the verge of beating the hotels at this game: the National Defence College in Islamabad, one of the leading white elephants in a city abounding in this species.

On the subject of white elephants first. Just as a great place of worship--a famous mosque, church or temple--inspires awe and a sense of devoutness (or should) even among those not naturally devout, a school or college building, if the architect knows his business, should inspire respect for learning. On entering such a place or even viewing it from a distance even a lout should be suitably impressed. If only for a moment he should be reduced to silence.

The NDC building, alas, doesn't quite manage to deliver this effect. Far from inspiring feelings of intellectual reverence, one look at it, and thinking of the money that must have been splashed, you want to say: there the military go again.

Who's the architect? But no point in fouling up the architect who, or so one assumes, must have been following directions. The military's sense of the grandiose, there's no competing with that.

The bungalow-style architecture favoured by the British was suitably stark and austere, as things military should be. It could also be very impressive as in some of the old British messes--Baloch, Piffers, etc. The atmosphere of these messes was very military.

But the same cannot be said of some of the messes constructed by the army in recent years. Second-grade interior designing, that's what you see in them. I've dined in the ISI mess in Islamabad: a showcase of positively depressing Duco-painted furniture. If this reflects the ISI's sense of aesthetics, it is more cause for alarm than anything else in the ISI's armoury.

And what about the ISI building itself, in Aabpara? The Capital Development Authority next to it, and the Islamabad Fire Brigade further down the same avenue look just the same. Well, not quite but all three buildings seem to be informed by the same artistic vision.

In fact, Islamabad is redeemed only by its hills. (Its natural streams, flowing from the Margallas into the Soan river, we took care of long ago through systematic pollution). Islamabad's buildings as a whole seem just a slightly higher version of the architecture favoured in smaller towns by the Public Works Department.

Some of the new buildings like the Saudi-Pak Tower are a break from this tradition. But the buildings constructed when Islamabad was first colonized--these including the Presidency, the Prime Minister's House and the Parliament building--probably account to some degree for the politics produced in this city. In such a setting what can you expect?

But to return to the NDC, not a day goes by--no, this is an exaggeration. Not a week goes by without a picture splashed on the front pages of the NDC commandant welcoming or bidding farewell to some paladin or the other.

One day it is the naval chief, the next the air chief or the vice chief of the army staff, sometimes all three together. General Musharraf has been to the NDC before. He was there this week again speaking to something called a 'national security workshop' and saying that the NDC had played a pivotal role in grooming senior civil and military officers. Seeing some of the civil and military talent on show in the country it is easy to see what he means.

Granted that it is the business of a war college to interact (Gen Musharraf's favourite verb) with senior military figures. If not them, then who? Quite right except that it is the promotional flair accompanying this necessary task which commands attention. Open any newspaper and chances are you'll run smack into the NDC commandment, looking very grave and intellectual (as indeed befits the head of a famous war college) as he conducts his visitors.

To give him his due, the commandant, Lt Gen Javed Hasan, brings a rich background of experience to his job, he being commander of the troops--sorry, mujahideen--who became cannon fodder for the Kargil adventure. While others played a part behind the lines, the man on the spot, right next to the 'mujahideen', was Hasan.

Apart from Lt Gen Mahmood, the then commander 10 Corps and later ISI chief, all the heroes of Kargil are still around in various capacities. (Even Mahmood after a stint in the cold is chairman, Fauji Fertilizer, which gives us some idea of why soldiers in Pakistan don't fade away.)

Aziz, then Chief of the General Staff, now Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Javed Hasan, commander of the northern 'mujahideen', perpetually-visible commandant of the National Defence College. Tauqir Zia, then Director-General, Military Operations, now commissar of cricket, no doubt bringing to cricket the same flawless planning which marked the Kargil adventure.

As for the chief of them all, he continues to guide the nation's destiny. No more can be asked of any man.

One canard, however, deserves to be nailed to the mast. The Kargil incursion was not a trick pulled on Mian Nawaz Sharif's government by the then military leadership. Nothing is more absurd than the frequently heard charge that the prime minister was unaware of this adventure and that when the full extent of the disaster started to unfold he put his own reputation on the line by dashing to Washington to seek safe passage for the Pakistani forces involved.

Smart politics though it may be, this story-line is not very good history. The civilian government was in on Kargil right from the start. Only after its okay, and this after a detailed briefing, did the operation begin. Indeed, the mood in Islamabad in the first month or so of fighting--that is, before the tide began to turn--was very gung-ho, with Pakistan Television very much in the van of the propaganda march.

It is the business of generals to be hawkish, to be purveyors of schemes which are often outlandish, Kargil being a prime example of this genre. General staffs do this all the time. But with an elected prime minister around, it is he who must decide questions of war and peace. If he doesn't, he's not doing his duty.

The buck now stops at Musharraf's desk. If he plays the role of American puppet, if he is foolish enough to send troops to Iraq, he has to own up to these decisions and not blame the stars if anything goes wrong. When Nawaz Sharif was prime minister the buck stopped at his desk. He knew about Kargil. That's a fact. If he didn't and if he didn't rein in his army chief and rap his knuckles, he didn't deserve to be prime minister.

In truth (and there are enough sources around to attest to this), Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf never quarrelled about Kargil. Their differences had nothing to do with this adventure. It was only later over one or two minor issues that the two fell apart, the catalyst being the sacking of Lt Gen Tariq Pervaiz, then corps commander, Quetta. Musharraf never felt comfortable with Tariq and asked Nawaz Sharif to remove him. Even though Tariq was a cousin of one of Nawaz Sharif's ministers, Nawaz Sharif readily agreed. Tariq was sacked.

But a day or two later a small news report in the little-read Frontier Post said that Tariq had been sacked because he had met the prime minister.

In a more rational dispensation no one should have bothered with such a news item. In the intrigue-laden atmosphere of Islamabad it was hyped up into a big thing. Nawaz Sharif wanted the ISPR to issue a clarification or denial. The ISPR wanted the go-ahead from Musharraf who by then was on a visit to Colombo. The defence ministry then issued a clarification but Nawaz Sharif's annoyance was not mitigated.

He felt that while he had played ball with Musharraf, Musharraf was being difficult with him. The usual intriguers did their own bit, playing on the fears of both sides, and putting the worst construction on everything.

It was in this inflamed atmosphere, when reason took a backseat to passion, that Nawaz Sharif decided to sack Musharraf. The rest is history. But none of this had anything to do with Kargil.