THE threats held out to Pakistan in the Indian Lok Sabha by Mr L. K. Advani, India's paramount hawk, are strictly in line with a tradition of sabre-rattling which has dogged the footsteps of both India and Pakistan these last fifty years.

Whatever the occasion, bellicosity and belligerence come more readily to us than any show of restraint or reason. This baleful legacy awaits a touch of grace or statesmanship before it will be banished.

No doubt the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament has been dangerous business, fraught with mischief. We have to thank subcontinental inefficiency - a tradition as rooted as sabre-rattling - that the terrorists involved botched their operation. What if they had entered the parliament building and held any number of MPs or even ministers hostage? That would have brought us dangerously close to war.

India has squarely blamed Jaish and Lashkar-i-Taiba and, by extension, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. Unless all the facts are in, and India is not being particularly helpful in allaying Pakistan's concerns in this regard, judgment on this score must be suspended. But one thing is for sure. Pakistan's intelligence outfits would have to be insane to be involved in any plot as irrational as this. It is not in Pakistan's interest to be accused of 'terrorism' or to do anything that compromises the on-going struggle in Kashmir. Why should Pakistan be involved? What does it gain by it?

Which is not to say Indian outrage is not understandable. Those of us in Pakistan who suggest that India itself could be behind this act in order to malign Pakistan are being unfair. It is a bit like saying that the Israeli secret service, Mossad, was behind the September 11 attacks on the US. There is nothing more absurd than conspiracy theories stretched beyond the limits of credulity. But this is the spirit of India-Pakistan relations: tending to believe the worst of each other.

The war of words we at have at present - with Mr Advani holding out the threat of hot pursuit across the Line of Control and President Musharraf saying that any Indian aggression will be met with force - is troubling and dangerous but unlikely to escalate into anything hotter because the last thing both countries want is another war. It is also noticeable that while Mr Vajpayee has said that India was keeping all options open, all in all he has taken a mellower line than his home minister (Advani).There is also the American reaction to consider. With other eggs to fry in its 'war on terrorism', the US is urging restraint on both sides. So it is a fair bet that while the histrionics will go on for some time, we are not looking at the opening stages of a fourth Indo-Pakistan war.

India will milk the Lok Sabha attack for all it is worth in a bid to convince the US that it should pressure Pakistan to put a stop to the 'jihadi' activities of Jaish and Lashkar-i-Taiba. Like other governments in such situations, the BJP's saffron leadership will also not be averse to drawing domestic mileage from showing a tough face to Pakistan. Jingoism plays well in all elections and with the UP elections in India coming up, the BJP has everything to gain by looking tough. All the same, it would be facile on Pakistan's part to reduce the Indian reaction to the Lok Sabha attack purely to electoral considerations. There is more at stake in the Indo-Pakistan equation than merely the number of seats the BJP is set to win or lose in the Lucknow assembly.

For India the US war on Afghanistan has been a deeply frustrating experience. It had hoped that with the US turning its guns on the Taliban, Pakistan as their chief foreign backer would be boxed into a corner. Even before the US asked India for anything, India had made every offer of assistance. Sadly for India, geography stood in its way because as a launching pad for a war on Afghanistan, India's usefulness was not half that of Pakistan's. The US did not spurn India's frantic offers of help. It just ignored them and took Pakistan on board. Indian protestations about Pakistan's involvement in 'terrorism' in occupied Kashmir fell on deaf ears in Washington. As India seethed with fury, Pakistan, far from being bracketed with the Taliban, became the linchpin of the strike on Afghanistan.

Now out of the blue comes the terrorist attack on the Lok Sabha. India would have to be more saint-like in its behaviour than states usually are not to exploit the situation to its advantage. It is perfectly understandable, therefore, if Pakistan once again finds itself in the Indian firing line. But perhaps it is important to understand that more than any attempt to intimidate Pakistan, India is playing to the international gallery in order to put indirect pressure on Pakistan. For what India wants above all is the death of militancy in occupied Kashmir. Anything to achieve that end, including the threat of war.

But not war itself. For all the talk from New Delhi of crossing the Line of Control, embarking on such a course is easier said than done. Pakistan is no pushover and entering Azad Kashmir by no stretch of the imagination is the same as Israel's incursions into Palestinian territory. In fact, it is hard to imagine anything more foolish or risky at the moment than an Indian military adventure against Pakistan. India is not strong enough, nor Pakistan weak enough, for such a venture to succeed. Moreover, American attention is absorbed elsewhere. The last thing the US wants is a subcontinental distraction.

So what is India up to? The continuation of politics by other means: the threat of war and the liberal use of propaganda, all aimed at isolating militancy in Kashmir, tarring it with the brush of terrorism and making it untenable for Pakistan to render any worthwhile assistance to the Kashmiri struggle for self-assertion.

From India's point of view these are worthy aims. But from the standpoint of the subcontinent's future they merely hark back to the politics of the last fifty years. The question is not what India or Pakistan can gain in the short-term but what they can do to turn their backs on the past and chart a long-term relationship that saves them from the expense of useless militarization.

Not for any abstract reason, or anything grounded in idealism, is this important but because, deny as much as the hawks on both sides may, history and geography condemn the destinies of both countries to be intertwined. This is no aspersion on India's size or economic clout, just an admission of reality. It is no more possible for Pakistan to think that it can look westward and close its eyes to India's existence than for India to presume that bigness and economic success place it beyond the necessity of coming to a rational understanding with Pakistan.

The logic of force has not worked in Kashmir. If it has been impossible for Pakistan to decide the issue by a clash of arms, it has been no more possible for India to crush the post-1989 resistance by a recourse to repression. The resulting stand-off has embittered the Kashmiri people, for whose presumed sake both countries have deployed their armies in Kashmir, and kept both countries locked in a futile conflict.

Point-scoring and sabre-rattling are games both countries can play. There is nothing new in this since this is what they have been doing since 1947. Anyone except unreconstructed hawks would think it was time to move on.

But two truths have to be accepted before any forward movement is possible: (1) that Kashmir, without any ifs and buts, is a problem awaiting a final solution; and (2) that while a miracle would be welcome, there is no immediate solution to this problem. Once understanding is achieved on these two points, the problem of militancy can be addressed.

If Pakistan at this stage expects anything more than an acceptable form of words regarding Kashmir, it will be guilty of a lack of realism. If India thinks it can attain the end of militancy without even making a verbal concession, it too will be living in a paradise of its own.

To unbiased observers this would look like a sensible trade-off. After all, the major concession would be coming from Pakistan and only a semantic one from India. But India's problem is different. It cannot abide any sort of concession, no matter how inconsequential, to Pakistan. For the thing it detests above all is to be hyphenated with Pakistan - as in "India-Pakistan relations" - and to be seen on a par, even if for a fleeting moment, with Pakistan. This is a psychological barrier which India alone can cross.