THE happenings in the Muslim League are nothing new. They are based on a script as old as the history of authoritarianism in Pakistan. Every incoming Caesar has needed a Muslim League. The Muslim League has always played an obliging hand and to every Caesar - be he Ayub or Zia - has provided a ready platform.

The Convention Muslim League was Field Marshal Ayub Khan's political handmaiden. The Pakistan Muslim League, born of the National Assembly of 1985 and headed by Muhammad Khan Junejo, was the civilian face of the Zia regime. When Zia, miffed by Junejo's growing independence, axed the National Assembly and sent the Junejo premiership packing, the Muslim League split into two factions, the one in the wilderness still headed by Junejo, the one which closed ranks behind General Zia under the command of his most loyal protege, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.

The meeting in which this split was sealed was held at the Islamabad Hotel. No speeches were made, no discussions held. Instead, the opposing factions hurled abuses and spoons at each other. All perfectly in character because the climate of the sub-continent does not favour the polite exchange of views. It is more conducive to platform oratory, slogan-shouting and even fisticuffs when tempers run high. Look at the politics of Bangladesh where Hasina Wajed and Khalida Zia are engaged in a never-ending conflict. Look at Indian politics where the sound of shouting rises above any whispered attempts at calm debate. Look at Pakistani politics the essence of which is mirrored in the politics of the Muslim League.

In 1988 at the Islamabad Hotel the wounded democrat was Muhammad Khan Junejo and his adversary Nawaz Sharif. This time the prophet in chains is Nawaz Sharif and the King's Party is headed by the Gujrat Chaudries, Mian Azhar, Ejazul Haq (Zia's son), etc. As on the earlier occasion, rowdyism took the lead over gentle persuasion, the only difference being that whereas in 1988 distinguished parliamentarians went for each other's throats, this time 'workers' were bused in from Lahore and Gujrat to assault the Muslim League Secretariat. The more things change...

Let it be noted in passing that while the culture of being unprincipled and siding with authority has a long tradition in the Muslim League, the culture of violence was largely absent from the party, factionalism in the League being conducted mostly along civilized lines. The use of strong-arm tactics took root when Nawaz Sharif as chief minister of Punjab was locked in a confrontation with Benazir Bhutto at the centre.

In any event, the Kashmiris of Lahore, who count the Sharifs as their most famous sons, are known for two things: good eating and muscle-flexing (the storming of the Supreme Court in 1998 being not so much an aberration as an instinctive reaction from the new Muslim League shaped in the image of the Sharifs). That the same tactics have now been applied to them is a minor irony which I suspect would be lost on them.

There is, however, one vital difference between king's factions past and the king's faction now taking shape within the Muslim League (and which no doubt will soon claim the mantle of legitimacy for itself by saying that it is the genuine article). The Convention League in Ayub Khan's time and the Muslim League in Zia's time were the B teams of powerful centres of authority. Ayub was a strong ruler and so was Zia. In both dispensations it paid to be a collaborator of the military and those who sided with those autocrats enjoyed long political innings.

Ayub's martial law destroyed the pre-1958 political order and replaced it with a new class (its most famous alumnus being Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) which enjoyed a long stint in power. In much the same manner, the Zia regime, while not succeeding in demolishing the PPP or Bhuttoism, gave birth to a countervailing force in the form of a revived Muslim League which sat in the assemblies for close to 15 years, 1985-99, a record in Pakistani politics.

It is different this time round. The gun is with General Musharraf and although it is hard to argue with that, the evidence of the past 12 months suggests that there is little which is impressive or durable about the dispensation he commands. How then to weigh the fruits of collaboration with him?

Guided by better political sense the military could have split the Muslim League, and ensured the isolation and eclipse of Nawaz Sharif, soon after October 12, 2000 - that is, in those balmy days when military interventionism basked in the warm glow of public approbation. No wonder the generals rode the wind, thinking they would conquer the moon and set everything right (how precisely was never very clear, but that is beside the point). The necessity of garnering broader political support (a necessity not dismissed out of hand by patriarchs stronger than them) did not cross their minds. Or was not high on their agenda. So that golden moment was allowed to pass.

Now times are different. After experiencing the performance of the past 12 months the public is in a bitter mood, unhappy with how things are and increasingly nostalgic about the way things were. Thanks to this state of affairs, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto are well advanced on the road to public rehabilitation. In Nawaz Sharif's case it has to be admitted that his resurgent image owes itself in no small measure to his defiance of military rule.

In the summer of 1977 Bhutto was a discredited figure. When after his ouster he stood up to Zia, his popularity once again soared. Dissimilar in other respects, Bhutto and Sharif can be compared in their standing up to military rule. When Bhutto went to the gallows the PPP's cause looked hopeless. But it was not many years later when his daughter gathered the rewards of his courage. When this military chapter comes to a close, as in the nature of things sooner or later it must, it requires no clairvoyant to see as to who will still be riding the tide of public approval. That it should be Pakistan's destiny to remain in thrall to flawed and limited heroes is of course a different matter.

But to return to our subject, the past seldom repeats itself in a mechanical manner. Ayub, Yahya and Zia were all military patriarchs but each faced a different set of challenges and each left a different set of problems in his wake. Ayub's legacy came to fruition in the form of Pakistan's breakup. Poor Yahya only came in at the finishing line, the dragon's teeth having been sown earlier, that too by the military-bureaucratic complex in West Pakistan. Zia in turn faced a different situation and left behind a legacy sordid and squalid in most respects. In between came the civilian tribune, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had a great opportunity before him and blew it because of his boundless lust for power.

The situation today is wholly different. Once again we have a military government but different from its predecessors. The Musharraf regime has so much going against it, and so little in its favour, that it will take a brave man to bet on its longevity. What is more, the last thing that remained in Pakistan was the mystique of the uniform - that when the going got too rough the bugles would sound and the cavalry come charging in, to set wrongs right and put goodness on its throne. Now even this mystique is lost, the emperor close to being seen without his clothes.

What new political order will arise from this shambles? How will collaboration flourish in this unpromising climate? The much-touted devolution plan, and the local elections, are increasingly taking on aspects of the bizarre and macabre. Judging by the groundwork laid, the success of these mighty enterprises looks as likely as that of the tax survey and documentation drive carried out earlier this summer. In other words, more trophies in the pantheon of failure.

For the sake of the king's followers (Cavaliers as they were called in the English Civil War) I hope they are on to something, for some of them are earnest souls. But looking at the weather and the state of the heavens, I fear they have hitched their wagon to a waning star. (Not that I can fault the Chaudries for their smart move, long-standing investments always counting for more than shooting stars.)