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WELL, there he is, back at work. Reading a report he’d rather not read. Chairing a meeting he’d rather not chair. Talking about stuff he’d rather not talk about.
An agenda long derailed.
Nawaz is still interested in foreign policy, for reasons political and strategic. Politically because he knows the world needs to know he’s not some anti-US/anti-West loon — the shelf life of civilians tainted as such being pretty short.
It’s on Afghanistan that Raheel has invested a great deal of time and energy. And it’s on Afghanistan that he’s made his big bet — twice.
Strategically because, well, he gets it: Pakistan needs to trade and do business with its neighbours. Which means India and Afghanistan — the China connection being one no one needs any convincing on. (Iran is a distant if.)
Basically, the opposite of what Nawaz has been dragged into this week.
On India, he was vetoed early enough. Then again after Pathankot. And while few would see opportunity on India right now, no one else is Nawaz: he’s just swept AJK; he’s got a line to Modi; and Modi may need to distract from the troubles in Kashmir.
Maybe only the faintest flicker of opportunity, but this is a man who made Lahore happen nine months after the nuclear tests. You can bet he’d love to have another go.
On Afghanistan, too, Nawaz was nudged aside relatively soon. The civilian line to Kabul was disrupted and now it’s all about Raheel’s vision, border management and military priorities.
And then there’s the forum itself: the National Security Committee. You’d have to search far and wide before you’d find another forum Nawaz dislikes as much.
Yet, there he was, feigning interest while the others pretended he was in charge, at least while the cameras were around.
But we don’t have to pretend.
This is Raheel’s agenda and it’s time to check in with what he’s doing.
India may have dominated the headlines after the NSC meeting, but India has not been Raheel’s primary concern, at least in the sense of where his policy energy has been directed.
On India, it’s been more of a strategic and military approach — see the long-term threats emerging from India and adjust our military response and China relationship to deal with those threats.
And, of course, keep an eye on Nawaz and make sure he doesn’t do something wild and woolly on the peace front.
It’s on Afghanistan that Raheel has invested a great deal of time and energy. And it’s on Afghanistan that he’s made his big bet — twice.
The first time he lost. And now he’s making the same bet again, with the same uncertain consequences.
Let’s start with the first time. With Karzai gone and Nawaz muscled aside, Raheel made what was a bold promise to the newly installed Ghani: we’ll deliver the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table.
It didn’t work, but Raheel got lucky. The first time talks blew up, it was blamed on the Afghans leaking the death of Mullah Omar; the second time talks collapsed, the US drone strike that took out Mullah Mansour took all the heat.
Inside Pakistan, though, some have asked: did the boys agree with the big bet Raheel had made, that the time had come to put some distance between us and the Afghan Taliban and get them to cut a deal with the Afghan government?
The question has only been whispered because of its implication. It is an article of faith here that once the chief makes a decision, his commanders will implement it.
But in the real world there is friction when a policy is seen as unwise or hasty or not fully thought through.
Past chiefs have known this: don’t issue an order that you think will face resistance. Or, before you issue an order that may face resistance, make sure you have the people in place who will do as you command.
On Afghanistan, there has long been a suspicion that there are different camps and not all camps agree with what needs to be done. Within the ISI, between the Afghan and Pakistan desks. And across the army, too, with camps of hawks and more pragmatic sorts.
Raheel, in his first big bet on Afghanistan, became the leader of the pragmatic sorts. Now, he’s betting again by indicating that he’s willing to squeeze the space the Afghan Taliban have inside Pakistan.
It is a carefully crafted message, wrapped up in this business of border management and cross-border terrorism, and it seems more sophisticated than his first bet, which essentially relied on the ISI coaxing the Afghan Taliban.
But in directly addressing border commanders and giving them the flexibility to take on militants crossing over into Afghanistan, Raheel has unmistakeably upped the ante.
It is, however, a circuitous route and avoids answering the original question: did Raheel fail the first time he made his big Afghan bet because not everyone around him was convinced about what he was doing?
Bluntly, even if Raheel tries to improve his odds of success by using a wider set of tools to coax the Afghan Taliban this time round, has he won over the the core ISI and Afghan policymaking brain trust?
Between now and November, Raheel does have one big move left to make: a change at the top of the ISI and the installation of a new ally who is on board with Raheel’s big Afghan bet.
The chatter has been persistent and we may find out soon enough. Raheel’s agenda, his big Afghan bet, may get one big, final boost.
The writer is a member of staff.
Twitter: @cyalm
Published in Dawn, July 24th, 2016
