AFTER a second spate of conflict a few months ago, Pakistan’s political leaders announced they had reached a consensus over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It was a great relief for architects of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) project in Beijing. CPEC is not just a flagship project for the Chinese to incentivise other regions for similar projects, it’s also a test case for them to intervene in and acclimatise to the politico-economic and administrative structures, and business cultures of partnering nations.

South Asia is probably the toughest region for the Chinese because of its varying democratic and economic environments, which despite looking similar have fundamentally different structures. Inter- and intra-state conflicts and tensions are another challenge facing China, which would prefer to achieve its ambitions without getting involved in any conflict or confrontation. China knows that the successful implementation of OBOR cannot be possible without peace and stability in the region the project would traverse.

Apparently, China is trying to please stakeholder nations through the ‘normalisation approach’, which requires no strategic or economic cost or compromises, but rather diplomacy, to make ways for broader cooperation. Recent warm exchanges between China and India are one example. Chinese diplomacy is moving forward pragmatically; the Chinese authorities are cognisant of apportioning stature and importance to nations in accordance with the latter’s stakes in OBOR initiatives. China is focusing on the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor to link the Yunan province in south-western China with South Asia, which is not only geo-economically significant (extracting the maximum potential of South Asian markets), but is also strategically important (in the context of the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific region).

Much has been said about the geostrategic impact of OBOR, but the real challenge for Chinese diplomacy will be to keep the project sailing amidst intra-state tensions in the regions of its implementation. Particularly, it will be interesting to see how China will deal with an escalation of tensions within the South Asian region in a post-OBOR scenario. This is not just a matter of potential conflict between India and Pakistan; small South Asian nations are also not comfortable with India’s hegemonic approach towards them, particularly Sri Lanka and Nepal. The recent blockade of landlocked Nepal by India put some pressure on Beijing, and the demand of a China-Nepal-India corridor has echoed again.

The real challenge for China will be to keep the project sailing amidst inter- and intra-state tensions.

The stability and security of South Asia is a Chinese priority, but not at the cost of its geo-economic interests in the region. As far as OBOR is concerned, it is an evolving concept which China will review and amend given changing geostrategic requirements. The ‘scientific approach’ is a new phrase that Chinese policy and business circles often use when discussing the project’s timeline and how different projects linked with OBOR would become functional.

The timeline is important; China is facing an ‘over-capacity’ challenge, and its investors are eagerly looking for immediate avenues, where they can best utilise their labour power, skills and other logistical potential. If found that the initiative is not feasible within their time frame, the preference would be to amend or alter it entirely. This is perhaps why China has avoided entering into any formal treaties with stakeholder nations ie to avoid obligations.

The Chinese position on South Asia’s internal tensions and conflicts is clear: China believes that security is primarily the South Asian nations’ responsibility. It is more concerned about the security of the corridors and linked economic zones. China has no intention to mediate or intervene in tensions among South Asian countries, nor would it like direct involvement in the security measures for these corridors. The strategic community in Beijing believes that OBOR has put a huge responsibility on China’s shoulders, and feel that they must use their ‘moral support’ more circumspectly when arbitrating on tensions among OBOR stakeholders.

The strategy will be to put in the minimum effort required for stability of the region — as has been their limited, reconciliatory role in the Afghan peace process — while at the same time ensuring that tensions do not escalate to the extent that they threaten Chinese interests.

Experts believe that China’s involvement in Afghanistan’s peace process resulted not just due to its Istanbul Process commitments, but that internal security issues in Xinjiang province also compelled China to seek cooperation from Afghanistan against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement militants (who are based in Afghanistan). CPEC also requires a stable Afghanistan in order to be realised — particularly in northern parts of the country, where insurgency has been strengthening in recent years.

While this is a challenge, experts believe that China can do the trick. It is interesting that China wants Saarc to become a functional regional-cooperation forum, and an effective trade and business body (like Asean), so that it can maximise the benefits of OBOR. Nonetheless, China will avoid urging South Asian nations too forcefully.

The real enemy of South Asia is poverty, which influences peace and stability, and hurts connectivity among nations. However, strategic communities would prefer to prioritise strategic objectives because of the nature of challenges and ambitions. While Pakistan’s strategic challenges are real, the question is whether its economy can bear the burden of these challenges. In such cases, pressure falls on political governments and the state of a poor economy mired in corruption, rather than putting things in their real contexts, and addressing structural issues.

China is not concerned with the socio-political and economic structural issues of Pakistan. It is concerned with CPEC as its flagship project — and the Chinese want to see it realised as a successful initiative within a limited time frame. Still, their concerns are intrinsically linked with Pakistan’s internal security and political stability. Both factors are crucial for the timely completion of this project, however, it is apparent that should things go wrong, China will prefer not to interfere in Pakistan’s internal affairs. Frustrations sometimes reach levels where the Chinese compromise on their diplomatic objectives. Often, this trick works.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, April 24th, 2016