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The deposed prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had started canvassing for votes again but the recently-released Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) leaders began a propaganda campaign alleging that the PPP would boycott the coming elections.
Bhutto and his associates dispelled that notion in a meeting of the PPP’s Central Executive Committee (CEC) on Aug 3, which reaffirmed the party’s intention to fully participate in the October polls. Thereafter, Bhutto began a country-wide tour, meeting with party workers and leaders alike. On Aug 6, he headed to Multan to meet his workers; the thousands who had come broke all security barriers to see and to listen to Bhutto. On Aug 11, party workers in Peshawar became unruly, forcing the police to use tear gas and baton charges.
This was a warning for the Zia government; Bhutto was back.
As Bhutto toured various towns and cities, General Ziaul Haq formed an “Election Cell” on Aug 8. This body was to meet political leaders, assess their views on the political situation in the country vis-à-vis the military government, and weigh the popularity of each party. The Cell was also to determine the party position of both the PPP and the PNA in the event of elections actually being held as scheduled.
With much hinging on the findings of the Election Cell, Gen Zia handed the task to his trusted confidante, General Faiz Ali Chishti. General Farman Ali, General Jamal Syed Mian and General Ahsanul Haq were to assist him. The Election Cell began interviewing leaders on Aug 21, both individually and in groups.
But no invitations were extended to any politician; the Cell was open to all those who wanted to discuss election-related issues. The first to meet with the Cell were members of the PPP’s coalition partner, Pakistan Muslim League-Qayyum: former interior minister, Khan Abdul Qayyum, and former fuel, power and natural resources minister, Yousuf Khattak.
Next up, on Aug 23, were Asghar Khan of Tehrik-i-Istaqlal (TI), followed by eminent lawyer S.M. Zafar and then Professor Ghafoor Ahmad of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI).
Asghar Khan told the Cell that the PNA was an unnatural alliance, and if the army wanted to keep running it as an alliance, then it should be prepared for another martial law. He argued that after Bhutto’s ouster, the PNA had become worthless.
The TI would not merge with any other party, said Asghar Khan, nor would it turn into a party of mullahs. Criticising the PNA leadership, he said the “soulless” PNA leadership did not even know the meaning of Nizam-i-Mustafa. “They only know amputation of hands and stoning to death,” he claimed, arguing that were they supported in their quest for power, an ugly situation would arise.
Khan flatly opposed holding elections per schedule. His position was that a situation be created which concludes with the PPP boycotting the polls. With the PPP out of the way, went the argument, the PNA would break up and the military government would get its desired results.
But if they wanted to hold elections in the present situation, the government would go in the hands of regional parties as the national parties would only observe from the sidelines. And if they aimed at keeping the PPP at bay, Khan requested the government to tell him so that he could make arrangements to face the new situation.
The TI chief also demanded that Bhutto be arrested, since he and his party workers were involved in many illegal acts and needed to be held accountable. As per Khan, the military council should not be afraid of arresting Bhutto, rather they should only keep an eye on his goons.
Meanwhile, eminent lawyer S.M. Zafar proposed a very simple formula. He thought that “discredited” politicians should be disqualified through Ayub Khan’s instrument, the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO), which authorised special tribunals to try former politicians. Zafar argued that power should be transferred to a strong party and that Bhutto could not be written off through court cases.
The third to call on the Election Cell was Prof Ghafoor Ahmad. He argued that martial law authorities were strengthening Bhutto’s position through their acts.
And there was Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the erstwhile pride of the PPP in Punjab, who met with the Cell on Aug 25, alongside Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, according to journalist-author Azhar Sohail. During the meeting at Gen Chishti’s office, Khar emphasised the need to sideline PPP’s hardcore leadership,and insisted on forming a group of right-leaning leaders within the party who could assume the responsibility of leading the civilian government.
The former Punjab governor also pointedly suggested that the situation be so maneuvered that the PPP ended up boycotting the elections. Were this to be case, he argued, the military government should allow them (himself and Jatoi) to form a right-leaning group that could play a “positive role” in whatever future setup was instituted.
During the meeting, both leaders proposed that the Cell should arrange a grand meeting with PPP and PNA leaders and extract a decision from them to support a constitutional role for the army. The argument was that the arrangement, much like Turkey, would allow the army to take over in case a possible political vacuum was ever created.
Jatoi had some apprehensions. He contended that Bhutto could not be trusted as an individual, and that they should invite only PPP leaders whom they relied upon. Jatoi agreed with Khar on creating a right-wing bloc within the PPP; he said that if Bhutto was removed from the scene, both Khar and he could garner the support of rightist elements in the party and assist the military government in its endeavours.
Khar also told General Chishti that they should try to oust Bhutto. This would then pave the way for the formation of a grand alliance between the PPP, National Democratic Party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, and Muslim League. The Tehrik Istiqalal was welcome too. Jatoi would become prime minister and run the show, insisted Khar.
After the meetings with politicians and with much to chew on, Gen Chishti reminded other members of the Election Cell that the Chief Martial Law administrator wanted to hold elections on schedule. The army did not want to hang on for longer periods, he explained, as it would create a credibility gap.
History would prove otherwise.
Next week: Gen Zia breaks the poll pledge
