THE expanse of the Pakistani brand of religious militancy has repeatedly been brought out in frequent complaints and accusations by the outside world. To the growing pile of documents furnished will now be added a video released by a militant organisation operating in Iraq. The video shows training activity in a militant camp dedicated to the memory of Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, one of the two brothers who took centre-stage during the Lal Masjid standoff in July 2007. Ghazi was killed in the raid on the mosque and now lives in the ‘jihadi’ hall of fame. The video captures the intensity of the sentiment by condemning the Pakistan government and the army for carrying out the Lal Masjid operation and the mosque incident’s link with global jihad is established when Osama bin Laden is quoted praising Ghazi as a hero.

There have been reports how Ghazi’s example has inspired the followers of his cause in Pakistan. His brother Abdul Aziz has risen tall in the eyes of the militants, a reconfirmation of which came when he was nominated as a member of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan’s committee for talks with the government. But despite all this evidence about the Lal Masjid clerics’ significance to the ‘jihadi’ campaign in Pakistan, the naming of a camp after Abdul Rasheed Ghazi by a group fighting in the Middle East will come as a shock for many, especially those in the habit of describing everything that points a finger at Pakistan as a conspiracy theory. It will make it that much harder to feign ignorance of Pakistanis’ involvement in the horizontal enlargement of the ‘jihadi’ campaign. And this horizontal growth should first and foremost be visible to the minders of the Pakistani state who have this fetish of imagining that the problem is confined to one area or region. The message of the video, it has been pointed out, ‘reveals’ for the umpteenth time that the linkages of the international ‘jihadis’ in Pakistan go much beyond the Pakhtun areas.

The convenience with which the Pakistan government has been trying to confine domestic and international militancy to Pakhtun areas is an attempt at self-deception, with horrifying possible consequences. There are going to be even louder calls than before sternly questioning Pakistan’s explanation which blames foreign fighters with their imported philosophy for the country’s militancy-related troubles in recent times. The counter-theory that draws on instances of terrorism around the world to highlight that Pakistan was not only a source of soldiers and not just a venue for their training but actually a provider of ideology, will be tough to answer. The question will only be addressed in full by acceptance of reality and steps against the factors that spawn this reality.