Logic of decentralization

How very distressing that even after nearly fiftyseven years of independence none of the fundamental questions concerning the form, character, and purposes of our state has been settled. One of the more vexing of these unresolved issues relates to whether we will be fulfilled and happy in a centralized state, a federal union, or a confederation.

What is a confederation? The only noteworthy political system bearing that name in modern history was the "United States of America in Congress Assembled," established under the "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union," approved by the Continental Congress (a body of delegates from the thirteen states) on November 15, 1777. The Articles established not a government but a "firm league of friendship" among the member states for their common defence and general welfare. The "league" became effective on March 1, 1781, when Maryland, the last of the states to ratify, signed the document.

Following the Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776) the thirteen British colonies in America became sovereign states. On entering the confederation they did not surrender their sovereignty. They retained all of their powers except those they had specifically delegated to the "United States in Congress Assembled" (Article 2).

The powers so delegated related to the conduct of their common defence and foreign relations, transactions with the Indian tribes, regulation of the alloy and value of coins and currency, maintenance of post offices and post roads, and resolution of disputes between states in a prescribed manner (Article 9).

The states retained the authority to levy taxes on goods in foreign trade, and to prohibit the import or export of things as they might deem fit. Each of them remained free to issue coins and currency (in addition to those issued by Congress). The confederacy could borrow money but it was denied the authority to levy taxes. The Articles also denied it executive or judicial authority, police power, and the related organs. Its expenses were to be met out of the treasury to be supplied by the states through contributions requisitioned by Congress according to a given formula.

Congress made no laws; it only arrived at determinations with the concurring votes of at least nine of the thirteen states. A state could send as many as seven delegates to Congress but it would have only one vote regardless of their number.The confederacy did not work well. Its "determinations" were left to the states to enforce, which they were not always anxious to do.

They were negligent in paying their contributions, with the result that Congress often failed to pay salaries to the troops fighting the British, and in some cases they mutinied. It borrowed heavily both within the country and abroad, and printed paper money to buy weapons, ammunition, and other supplies.

This paper money, including the huge amounts printed by the states, became worthless. Creditors fled, and merchants closed their shops, to escape it. As the war ended (1783) and demobilization followed, the states were all seized by a severe economic depression. Farmers lost their land for non-payment of loans.

They resorted to rebellions in some states, the most notable of them being the Shay's rebellion in Massachusetts, during which the rebels shut down courts to prevent them from ordering attachment of the debtors' land and cattle.

Foreign governments became reluctant to do business with the United States as they realized that this was a country without a government. The inadequacy of the Articles created misery among the common people, uncertainty and scare among the wealthy, to a point where the states were persuaded to call a constitutional convention in 1787 to prepare a new constitution that would enable them to "form a more perfect Union."

The American states opted for a confederation, because they were wary of an overbearing central government (the one in London before their independence). The constituent units in the federation of Pakistan, other than Punjab, have felt the same way. But recall that even Punjab under Nawaz Sharif virtually revolted against the central government, led by Benazir Bhutto, in 1989.

It is not surprising then that models of a confederation, similar to the American Articles, have surfaced in our historical experience. The first and the most unsettling of them appeared in Shaikh Mujibur Rahman's "Six Points" for bringing East Pakistan's long but frustrated drive for autonomy to fruition.

The first point called for a "federation" as envisaged in the Muslim League's celebrated Lahore Resolution (March 23, 1940), which had contained the assurance that the constituent units in the proposed state of Pakistan "shall be autonomous and sovereign." The second point would allow the federal government the functions of defence and foreign affairs, reserving all others to the constituent units.

The third point demanded either two freely convertible currencies for the country's two wings or a single currency with safeguards against the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan.

Point four provided that all authority to levy taxes would vest in the federating units, and none of it with the centre, which would receive a fixed share of their collections. According to the fifth point, each of the country's two wings would have custody and control of its foreign exchange earnings, and would be free to conclude commercial treaties with foreign governments and establish trade missions abroad.

The foreign exchange needs of the centre would be met by contributions from the two wings. The sixth point provided for the establishment of a militia for East Pakistan.

Keeping in mind the fifth point, we see that Shaikh Mujibur Rahman's drive for autonomy went farther than that provided by the American Articles, which had specifically excluded the states from concluding trade agreements with foreign countries. In other words, the Six Points would allow the federal government only partial jurisdiction in the conduct of foreign relations.

Reflection will show that the Six Points (first unveiled in February 1966) were designed to leave Pakistan with an utterly incompetent and ineffective central government. Considering that a government without the authority to levy taxes and enforce its laws is no government at all, the formula would have brought about the country's disintegration sooner than later. That it did break up eventually is another matter, and we shall leave it alone for now.

One might have thought that with the secession of East Pakistan the Six Points would pass into the limbo of history. Not so; they are alive and well, claiming the allegiance of certain opposition politicians in Sindh and Balochistan. Sindhi "nationalists" harken back to the Lahore Resolution and its untenable and essentially expediential assurance that the constituent units in Pakistan would be "autonomous and sovereign." This assurance is in itself worthy of examination, but we will have to defer that task to another time.

We come now to Mr Ataullah Mengal's proposal for restructuring Pakistan. In an interview reported in this newspaper (March 5), he based his case for a confederation on the premise that a federal system could simply not protect the rights of its constituent units in a country where one "nationality" (Punjab) outnumbered all of the others put together. Mr Mengal would call a directly elected constituent assembly, with equal representation for all the four provinces, to frame a new constitution for a confederate Pakistan.

This constitution, he says, should vest all revenue raising authority in the provinces which in turn would contribute funds to the centre in proportion to their respective populations. Thus, Punjab, having 56 per cent of the country's population, would defray 56 per cent of the centre's expenses.

Mr Mengal would give the provinces all legislative and executive authority and allow the centre only a managerial role with regard to functions that they had agreed to place in its care. One may assume that he includes defence and foreign affairs among them. The centre would have nothing to do with the maintenance of public order and the enforcement of laws.

The provinces in the proposed confederation will have equal representation in any deliberative assembly that the centre might have. Mr Mengal also envisions their equal presence in the central services, if any, and the armed forces. Balochistan should not have to pay for anyone other than its own people serving in the army.

Not a confederation but the denial of equal rights to the provinces will wreck Pakistan, he says. "The country will definitely break up, but the responsibility will not be on our shoulders. It will be on the shoulders of those who deny us our rights."

Are these calls for a confederation merely voices in the wilderness to which our people in the smaller provinces pay no attention? It is hard to tell. When Mujibur Rahman announced his Six Points, hardly anyone among the elite in Punjab, or elsewhere in West Pakistan, took his programme seriously. Nor did any of them anticipate that within less than five years it would capture the hearts and minds of the East Pakistani people to the point of becoming inviolable and non-negotiable.

There can be little doubt that many of our Sindhi-speaking people are alienated from the present "federal" system and the civil and military elite (perceived as Punjabi) who operate it. Numerous groups in Balochistan think the way Mr Mengal does. Separatist pitch had subsided in the NWFP, but the generally authoritarian character of the present regime, its military operations in South Waziristan, and its acquiescence in the killing of Pukhtuns by the "coalition" forces across the border may combine to revive the "Pukhtunistan" slogan.

I am inclined to think that if some significant systemic change is not made fairly soon, the calls for a confederation may revive separatist movements. The current system is much too centralized, and the need for transferring functions and resources to the provinces is imperative. The nature and extent of these transfers will hopefully be the subject of our discussion next Sunday.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, US.

e-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net

Wanted: a new mandate

The more the ministers deny it the stronger grows the feeling that general elections will soon be held in the country. The incantation that the "assemblies will complete their term" fails to drive away the ghost of the elections that has cast a long shadow over Pakistan's political scene.

The government, the opposition and all those who stand in between, appear to have lost both the direction and the nerve to trudge on for three more years. Leadership fatigue is noticeable all around.

The elections of October 2002 inspired little enthusiasm or hope. Barely one-third of the registered voters turned up to vote despite the lowered voting age and enlarged legislatures. The interest that these two factors could have inspired was visibly offset by the many arbitrary restrictions that handicapped the mainstream parties and rendered many individuals ineligible to participate in the electoral process.

As a result, fewer people turned up to vote than they had in the four elections held in the preceding decade. These too had been marked by falling attendance. There was the overwhelming doubt whether the system emerging out of the elections would endure and deliver. All in all, it was a setback, and not a fillip, to democracy.

The representative credentials of the expanded assemblies were, thus, poor from the very beginning. The governments - both federal and provincial - they threw up could not but be poorer. It had to be that way for the ministers had contested neither from a common platform nor on the basis of an agreed programme.

Whatever the calibre of the individuals, their shared trait remained desertion from their parent parties owing to the lure of office or, worse, to escape accountability. Similar, though less lucrative, motives could be attributed to the diverse elements that have coalesced to oppose the government.

More than doubtful credentials, it is the environment in which the polling took place and the constitutional changes and political regrouping that followed which have made the assemblies and the governments not just unrepresentative but even irrelevant in the current situation. The issues of domestic and foreign policy that have since arisen cry for a fresh mandate from the people.

The president and his commanders continue to administer subjects and handle most problems only because the parliament and the cabinet have not been able assert their authority or demonstrate their ability or willingness to deal with them.

The defiant tribes of Waziristan should have been handled by the provincial and federal governments as they have always been. Both left it entirely to the president who made use of his commanders and troops rather than the political agent and tribal elders through whom he enforces his authority or the government's writ.

The political agent sometimes may have to call upon the scouts or militia to help but more out of the need for a show of force than its actual use. That is how even the current situation in the area ultimately seems to be resolving itself but only after loss of life and trust which have scarred the state's relations with its own tribes, while the threat of yet another military intervention lingers on.

The nervous flutter that Shahbaz Sharif's impending return has caused betrays the government's total reliance on its penal authority and none at all on its popularity. Almost every minister, including the prime minister himself, has spoken of deporting or imprisoning Sharif if he returns, all the time wishing he does not.

The ISI director-general is reported to have gone to Saudi Arabia to stop his return. Even the prime minister's statement that the red alert at Lahore airport was to prevent a hijacking attempt and not Sharif's landing has been cynically received.

The point to ponder is whether this government despite drawing support from numerous parties and with a military scaffolding around it would be able to lead the country for three and a half more years if it fidgets at the prospect of a single dissenting politician returning from exile. Surely the government could show more patience and courage - virtues that the prime minister claims to possess in abundance - in facing him.

Besides doubts pertaining to the popular standing of the government, some new and unfamiliar elements introduced into the system also need to be judged by the people who should be given an opportunity to say how democratic their institutions are after the 17th amendment.

First on this list is the district government which has radically altered the pattern of power and patronage in the provinces and their relationship with the centre. The parties and candidates will, quite naturally, campaign for or against the new system to confirm or rescind it. The politicians should also get an opportunity to choose either the district or the provincial government for their political career. Surely some among them will find the district nazim's job more alluring than being one of scores of ministers in a province.

Second, an indirectly elected Senate, it has been proved yet again, neither improves the quality of legislation nor checks the misuse of executive authority nor gives the smaller units a greater voice in the affairs of the federation. The present Senate's most pathetic moment came when it took but a few minutes to endorse the National Security Council Act as it was passed by the National Assembly. The senators went by the party and not the territory they represent which is the purpose of the Senate. The new election should provide for election of senators directly by the people.

Thirdly, the voting for the seats reserved for women should be by all the women of the country through territorial constituencies if they are to represent the cause of the women and not of the male leaders who nominate them.

Fresh elections will bring stability of tenure for the government only if the whole electoral process is free from official interference and polls are conducted fairly by an independent commission under a neutral caretaker administration. This will remain a vain expectation unless an assurance from all participating parties is forthcoming that the Constitution in its present form (with Musharraf as president) will stand until the new parliament votes to amend it through the normal procedure.

The prime minister and his ministers may keep assuring each other that this parliament will last until it completes its tenure in 2007, but the feelings and wishes of the people are manifestly to the contrary. So is the hunch of political soothsayers. The present state of affairs is troublesome for democratic and liberal minds.

Article 58(1) of the Constitution says: "The President shall dissolve the National Assembly if so advised by the Prime Minister, and the NA shall, unless sooner dissolved, stand dissolved at the expiration of forty-eight hours after the Prime Minister has so advised." Dissolution by the president is riddled with conditions and would create a crisis as it always has in the past.

This time it would also entrench the NSC in the constitutional system. Dissolution by Mr Jamali followed by free and fair polls would earn him a mention in history books. Trundling along for three more years will not.