Guarding against pitfalls

IT was a hard decision for President Pervez Musharraf to assure cooperation to the Americans in their war against terrorism but needless to say it was under the circumstances the only viable course of action available to Pakistan. For little wonder he has been able to sell to the people the rationale for an otherwise unpopular choice. Siding with the Americans in any cause invokes instant suspicion among the people of Pakistan. The way we have been treated in the past by our erstwhile benefactor is a good enough reason for the people to suspect that perhaps we are once again being taken for a ride.

Nonetheless, saner elements could fully comprehend the consequence of ‘showing a red rag to the bull’, and the government was able to effectively put across the message that it was a question of safeguarding Pakistan’s national security. Why should we incur the wrath of an angry and furious superpower itching for revenge by acting brave was convincing logic.

Much water has flowed down the Indus since we were served with the ultimatum: ‘you are either with us or against us’. Pakistan has now been rehabilitated in the community of ‘civilized nations’. Its insolence to defy the nuclear non-proliferation regime has been condoned, and the seizure of power by the military is no longer an irritant. George Bush has been showering praises on Gen. Pervez Musharraf as a man of wisdom and courage whose regime, he says, should be strengthened and stabilized. Long-standing sanctions against Pakistan have been lifted and the remaining ones too are on their way out.

Taking their cue from Washington, America’s western allies have made haste to renew offers of friendship, cooperation and assistance to Pakistan. Ironically, British Prime Minister Tony Blair had no qualms about changing his opinion about a Pakistan under military rule. Last Friday he came calling and during his four-hour stay in Islamabad had dinner with President Musharraf even though Pakistan was still under military rule which had occasioned its expulsion from the Commonwealth two years ago.

The dramatic change in Pakistan’s isolation seems too good to be true. A section of the ruling elite in Islamabad is thrilled. The ‘godfather’ is pleased with us and quite prepared to generously reward us is how they look at the evolving situation. Needless to say, there is a sizable number of people in positions of authority and influence in the country who yearn for a return to the golden days of US patronage and benevolence.

They see no harm in complying with whatever demands the Americans may make on Pakistan in the context of the anti-terrorism drive. There is no half-way house in an alliance with the superpower, they argue. Fence-sitters will neither be here nor there. We will have to go along with the Americans all the way to establish our bonafides as a trustworthy friend and ally. The upshot of it all is that we should make virtue out of necessity, use our bargaining potential to the optimum, and join the American camp without any reservations.

There is indeed a ‘more royal than the king’ category of apologists for supporting the US, some of whom call it a moral duty to join the American-led crusade against terrorism. However, the most moderates among the opponents of cooperation with the Americans warn against going too far for too little. We should never lose sight of the fact that we may be getting into something we had not bargained for. The American designs, they argue, are not limited to capturing Osama bin Laden or neutralizing the forces which have been harbouring him and his Arab brigade.

It is a war against the ‘culture of resistance’ across the entire Muslim world. Any country or entity that refuses to fall in line with the US-ordained New World Order and subscribes to a different world view could come to grief. It could be Hizbollah, Hamas, or the regimes in Iraq, Libya, Sudan or Iran. From all accounts, the Americans will not be content with limited action against one or two sources of trouble. They seem poised to go the whole hog to sort out all the ‘irritants’.

On the face of it Pakistan has not given a carte blanche to the Americans. On the contrary, Islamabad has been exercising a moderating influence, counselling restraint to the Americans as well as the Taliban and making a last-ditch effort to avert military action against Afghanistan. It has not followed the Saudi lead to sever diplomatic relations with Kabul in order to keep a window open for communication and interaction with the Taliban. Nonetheless, things may change once the operation begins and Pakistan is required to fulfil its obligations as a component of the anti-terrorism coalition.

A US military delegation was recently in Islamabad to work out the modalities of promised logistic support for the US air operation. However, in whatever manner we facilitate the US military action we will have little opportunity to distance ourselves from what the Americans do to settle scores with the Taliban. And as the operation gets going the Americans are likely to be more and more demanding. It is therefore not surprising that many opinion leaders in the country are sceptical, fearing that Pakistan may eventually have to pay a very high price for joining the US-led coalition. The US has yet to clearly identify who and where bin Laden’s collaborators are. It may not be deemed necessary to establish their linkage with the September 11 terrorist attacks to indict them for practising terrorism as an instrument of political action and therefore guilty of the crime against which the US has taken up the cudgels.

At some stage Pakistan’s ‘jihadi groups’ could also come under fire. They are religious extremists, advocate crusade against the enemies of Islam in all parts of the world, and by and large are supportive of bin Laden as a role model. Islamabad may in due course be asked to crack down on them, more so if they are seen using the street power in opposing the US action against Afghanistan. Few will shed tears if the jihadi outfits were reined in, as it would largely be seen as a long overdue action against forces of bigotry, fanaticism and violence. The liberal elements in the country, haunted by the fear of Pakistan’s ‘Talibanization’, would welcome the opportunity as a blessing in disguise.

The best hope is that Pakistan will not compromise its sovereign right to deal with its internal problems as it sees fit without any dictation or undue prodding from any quarter. It would indeed be a dicey game to let the Americans meddle in this business. Let it not be forgotten that the Americans and their western allies have never been supportive of the armed struggle in occupied Kashmir. Although they have so far refrained from endorsing the Indian charge that Kashmiri freedom fighters were ‘terrorists’, trained, armed and funded by Pakistan, there is no guarantee that, in the new context, they will not, at some stage, turn their guns against the militant groups fighting in Kashmir.

The Indians have of late been focusing their propaganda on the so-called Islamic fundamentalist character of the resistance in Kashmir and its Afghan connection. The Indians may not have succeeded in gate-crashing into the coalition against terrorism, but they continue to nurse the hope that the US-led offensive will inevitably come into conflict with the votaries of jihad in Kashmir.

Incidentally, a British minister defending his government’s volte face with regard to Pakistan’s military regime charged the previous governments in Islamabad with failure to bring an end to ‘terrorism’ across the Line of Control in Kashmir. It would be naive on our part to infer from the rush of western support and help for Pakistan that New Delhi has finally failed to influence the course of the US-led campaign against terrorism. The Americans are not likely to dump their potential strategic partner for the sake of an expedient arrangement. The Americans are quite capable of turning their back on Pakistan once they have accomplished the mission for which they now require its cooperation. President Pervez Musharraf, it seems, is acutely conscious of the delicate balancing act he is required to perform in order to keep the Americans in good humour as well as save the country from the stigma of playing second fiddle to the US in the region. Needless to say, the imperative of safeguarding national security is not a licence for compromising national honour or country’s long-term interests. That Pakistan will not be party to an invasion of Afghanistan or a design to instal a puppet regime in Kabul is a categorical assurance given by the government.

Gen. Musharraf may be well advised not to lose sight of some crucial ‘do’s and don’ts’ in his dealings with the Americans. We should neither fully trust the vows of friendship by Washington, nor rely on its support for a just deal for Pakistan. We should consider our participation in the coalition a temporary, tactical arrangement, and not a long-term strategic relationship with the US.

Avoiding Bin Laden’s trap

THE war America is engaged in after the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon is a war for the hearts and minds of average Muslims around the world. Osama bin Laden, if indeed he is the mastermind behind the attacks, has set a trap for the US into which it must not fall.

By attacking the US as part of a jihad (“a holy war”), Bin Laden is in fact claiming to Muslims to represent their grievances and to represent real Islam. He is in effect saying: “Muslims, I share your grievances unlike your corrupt and authoritarian governments; I am the only one doing something about it. I have destroyed the symbols of American capitalism and stopped the heartbeat of world finance which the US dominates.”

The US as well as moderate Muslims the world over must unite and deny him this symbolic victory and must not accept to engage him in combat on these terms. We should not let him define the terms of our intellectual and symbolic battle. As a professor of Islamic law I have researched the law of jihad and can state unequivocally that the war Bin Laden has engaged us in cannot be labelled a jihad.

Furthermore, I believe a strong case can be made that he has acted contrary to the tenets of Islam and can be ostracized from the community of believing Muslims. Moderate Muslims will agree with me, certainly, as they are horrified by the Sept 11 attacks and are desperate to have these disassociated from their religion. The West must provide moderate Muslims a way out of Bin Laden’s trap.

According to Islamic law there are at least six reasons why Bin Laden’s barbaric violence cannot fall under the rubric of jihad: 1) Individuals and organizations cannot declare a jihad, only states can; 2) One cannot kill innocent women and children when conducting a jihad; 3) One cannot kill Muslims in a jihad; 4) One cannot fight a jihad against a country in which Muslims can freely practise their religion and proselytize Islam; 5) Prominent Muslim jurists around the world have condemned these attacks and their condemnation forms a juristic consensus (ijma’) against Bin Laden’s actions (This consensus renders his actions un-Islamic); 6) The welfare and interest of the Muslim community (maslaha) is being harmed by Bin Laden’s actions and this equally makes them un-Islamic.

Americans have been baffled by reports that Muslims do not like, and even hate the US. Muslims do not hate America. As proof of this we have: seven million Muslims living in the US; foreign Muslims, like many others around the world, clamour to obtain US immigration visas; Muslims consume American products and emulate American fashions (intellectual, social and sartorial); Muslims place the bulk of their money in US financial institutions; the list goes on and on. What many Muslims undeniably resent about America, however, are American foreign policies towards Iraq, Iran, Israel/Palestine and a complicit policy of supporting corrupt and authoritarian regimes all over the Muslim world.

Yet despite this resentment only 4,000 Muslims actively seek to destroy America. These 4,000 Muslims are Bin Laden’s foot soldiers. Let us remember that in 20 years of recruitment Bin Laden has only been able to recruit 4,000 men.

This group, otherwise known as the Arab-Afghans, have theological and legal beliefs that are at odds with the remaining one billion-plus Muslims in the world today. They are also at odds with those of their supporters, the Taliban, who, for their part, are fanatical Hanafis of the Deoband school. Surely, 4,000 men do not represent the entirety of the Islamic peoples — and we should hammer this point home continually. We should also deny Bin Laden the opportunity of feeding off Muslim resentment and his claim to represent them.

There are practical steps the US government can take that will take the wind out of Bin Laden’s sails and sidestep the trap he has laid. I will begin with the most obvious measures. They are:

1. The US or western troops and special forces should not be sent into Afghanistan with the aim of arresting or killing Bin Laden. He has thought about this scenario and desires it. A military attack on him would provide a double victory: if he is killed he dies a martyr and symbol of resistance to western domination; he also gets to kill a number of US soldiers and tarnishes the image of America in the minds of ordinary Muslims.

Afghanistan is the most backward and probably the poorest country in the Islamic world; the image of the most powerful nation stomping on it will be a public relations disaster and will destabilize Arab regimes.

The best course is to encourage Muslim countries to lead the fight against Bin Laden, to support the Northern Alliance who have 15,000 troops in Afghanistan and to work on the Pakistani moderates to get involved in the fight. If retribution, as seems to be the case, has to take place and America must feel it is the prime agent in the pursuit of justice, then no military action can afford not to involve moderate Muslim forces and their cooperation. This is not a plea for war, far from it: there is too much bellicose rhetoric as it is.

2. It is important to stop using inflammatory language, such as President Bush’s statement that this is a crusade. Such a word evokes monstrous historical memories in the minds of Muslims, namely barbaric Europeans rampaging through the Eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, Crusade connotes Christianity versus Islam and this is not the right message. The infelicity of this locution has presumably been brought to the attention of President Bush.

3. Washington must publish a list of all the Muslims — men, women and children — who died in the WTC attack, since Islamic law categorically prohibits the murder of such innocents.

4. We in the US must engage our own Muslim community leaders here in the US, and, particularly, send the respected ones among them with these facts to the Middle East and South Asia to meet impartial and respected Islamic legal scholars, people who are respected by the man on the street and who are clearly not in the employ of their respective governments.

Scholars in Makkah, Madina and Riyadh will be central in this regard, as will scholars in India and Pakistan. These scholars must be convinced to issue fatwas (legal opinions) declaring Bin Laden’s teachings and actions illegal. Because it is prohibited by mainstream Islam, they cannot declare Bin Laden an infidel (a practice called takfir) and we should not expect this of them. These opinions will help bolster the consensus mentioned above and may convince the Taliban that they need to hand Bin Laden over for trial to for his alleged role in New York, Washington and other terrorist attacks.

I think if we take the steps outlined above we may be able to ostracize Bin Laden from the Muslim community and energize moderate Muslims to take centre stage again. America will win the war as will the vast majority of Muslims.

Memories of Jinnah: PRIVATE VIEW

K.H. KHURSHID died travelling in a public bus to Lahore on a rainy night in 1988. What surprised everyone was not the accident that had killed him at a crucial point in Kashmir struggle for dignity and recognition but that the man who had been the Quaid-i-Azam’s hand-picked private secretary through the history-making years 1944 to 1947 was travelling, not in a black chauffeured limousine but in an ordinary bus with the same ordinary people who had made Pakistan possible.

In a way, it was a befitting place for him to die because he was the most modest of men and never spoke about his years with the Quaid and the intimacy he had enjoyed or the trust the Father of the Nation had reposed in him. Nor did he ever mention the great affection which the normally harsh Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah bore him. It was she who insisted, for instance, that he go to London to do law and she paid for it. Khurshid had no money then, and he had no money later. The fact was that he was not interested in such things. Lack of money or the absence of a home of his own did not matter to him.

Khurshid sailed through life keeping a low profile and never bragging about the historic events to which he had not only been a witness but in which he had also played a small part perhaps. The Quaid is once believed to have said that Pakistan was made by him, his private secretary and his typewriter. That private secretary was Khurshid whom the Quaid had picked up in Srinagar when he was barely twenty and who had never travelled outside Kashmir except once for a debate in Lahore and to attend the annual session of the Punjab Muslim Students Federation in Jullandhar as a representative of Kashmiri students.

The Quaid had inaugurated the session and that was the first time Khurshid had set eyes on the man who was to change his life and the life of the Muslims of India. As for the typewriter, when Khurshid joined the Quaid in Bombay, he did not know how to type. But he managed to deal with the Quaid’s personal and official correspondence with his two-finger method. It need not be stressed that the perfectionist that Mr Jinnah was, everything had to be letter perfect. One can go on wondering how the Quaid was able to achieve so much with so little.

Khurshid not only did not speak about his time with the Quaid but he did not even write about him. Once, when pressed, he said, he would write the truth about the Quaid when others stopped printing lies about him. He obviously had in mind Gen. Zia-ul-Haq’s strange claim that a hitherto unknown diary of the Quaid had been discovered which proved that he did not believe in parliamentary democracy.

All Khurshid said in a statement was: the Quaid did not keep a diary. The man who ruled Jinnah’s Pakistan for 11 years did not repeat the claim again. Once when in order to prove that he was the Quaid’s secretary, Sharifuddin Pirzada had a picture printed that showed his popped up head behind the Quaid and Gandhi, Khurshid remarked, “He can also use this evidence to prove that he was Gandhi’s secretary.”

After Khurshid died, the family came upon a couple of notebooks and papers in which he had recorded some of his memories of the Quaid and conversations about the Quaid with those who had known him well. Though the material was in the nature of a fragment, rather than a sustained account, it