THE election of Iran’s ‘moderate’ President Hassan Rouhani was a pleasant surprise for the West. His ‘charm offensive’, which evoked a positive response from the US and Western capitals, has raised global expectations of a possible resolution to the 30-year confrontation between Iran and the US.

These expectations were on display as the UN General Assembly opened its annual session with the congregation of world leaders in New York.

However, this week’s events at the UN session have revealed the gap between hope and reality. The presidential addresses from the US and Iran, though tempered in tone and language, did not yield much on the substance of their respective positions. There were no grand gestures from either side.

The Iranians felt it was too ‘complicated’ to arrange for Rouhani’s handshake with President Obama. Israel’s prime minister continued to hew to his ‘threaten and punish’ Iran option. Meanwhile, new legislation was initiated in both Houses of the US Congress to impose additional sanctions on Iran.

The positive statements and softer tone from both Iran and the US, and the renewal of serious talks through a ministerial meeting between Iran and the P5+1, are essential steps to resolve their epic confrontation. Both sides seem to feel that there is a positive atmosphere and momentum for a solution to the nuclear issue. But the challenge ahead cannot be minimised.

There are difficult political and technical issues that will need to be addressed, and internal challenges that will have to be overcome on both sides to resolve the nuclear stand-off and restore normal relations between Tehran and the West.

The central US objective is to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Washington believes this would pose an unacceptable threat to Israel and its Gulf allies and propel further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

Iran asserts that it has no intention to develop nuclear weapons and its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes. Ayatollah Khamanei has declared that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic. But Iran says, correctly, that under the NPT, it has the right to develop the full nuclear cycle, including nuclear enrichment.

The US and its allies point out that the size of Iran’s enrichment programme is well beyond what may be required to fuel its sole reactor. This, and the furtive manner in which the programme was initiated, as well as reports that Iran ‘cold tested’ a nuclear trigger device, have been cited as grounds for scepticism about Iran’s protestations that its programme is solely for peaceful purposes.

During the term of the previous ‘moderate’ president Khatami; Iran cooperated with the US to replace the Taliban in Afghanistan. As a goodwill gesture, it temporarily suspended nuclear enrichment. In 2002, Iran proposed a “grand bargain” to the US encompassing a solution to the nuclear issue and political cooperation on regional issues. Nevertheless, Iran was included in the “axis of evil” by former President Bush.

The US-Iran confrontation escalated sharply after Bush’s axis of evil speech. The UN Security Council decreed that Iran should halt nuclear enrichment and open itself to “anywhere, anytime” UN inspections. While allowing UN inspections within the NPT framework, Iran rejected Security Council demands.

Following President Ahmedinejad’s election, the Security Council imposed additional sanctions; and more significant US and Western sanctions were imposed unilaterally, including on Iran’s oil and banking sectors. This has had an obviously deleterious impact on Iran’s economy and the daily lives of ordinary Iranians.

The confrontation has extended further — in Iraq, Afghanistan and parts of the Gulf. The US has escalated support for some of Iran’s domestic insurgencies; waged electronic warfare to damage the Iranian enrichment program and threatened aerial strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.

A resolution of the nuclear issue is now further complicated because Iran has built additional enrichment facilities and achieved enrichment levels over 20pc from where weapons grade uranium can be quickly produced. The difficulties in resolving the nuclear issue are greater also due to internal differences on objectives and strategy within the US and Iran.

In the context of the polarisation within the US, the Republican Party will be loath to facilitate a diplomatic victory for President Obama. Without Congressional cooperation, he may be unable to lift many US sanctions against Iran.

President Obama has recognised that Iran would have to be allowed some level of enrichment activity under international safeguards. Hardliners within the Republican Party — like Israel — want to prevent Iran not only from developing nuclear weapons but also the capability to do so. This will be virtually impossible to achieve, given Iran’s size, resources and technological level.

In Iran too, the hardliners, many of whom are close to the Supreme Leader, are opposed to concede on Iran’s ‘right’ to enrichment and will be reluctant to make other concessions so long as Iran remains under sanctions.

If the newly renewed talks are not to hit the shoals, both the US and Iran will need to evolve negotiating strategies that are realistic, flexible and imaginative. Three guideposts could serve them well.

First, a focus by each side on its ‘core’ minimum objectives. For the US, the core objective is a credible and verifiable commitment from Iran that it is not developing and will not develop nuclear weapons. For Iran, it is the ‘recognition’ of its right to enrichment, even if under stringent international safeguards and the lifting of sanctions.

Second, a sequencing of mutual concessions to move the two sides towards their respective core objectives. Thus, partial lifting of sanctions could be accompanied by the transfer or international control of Iran’s Highly Enriched Uranium.

Third, a series of confidence building measures which could serve to break down the wall of mutual mistrust and hostility.

If managed well, this process of normalisation between the US and Iran can serve not only the interests of the two countries but also contribute to resolving some major problems facing the region, especially the sectarian divisions at the heart of the turbulence in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain. If unchecked these could engulf other countries in the neighbourhood.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.