AN internal probe conducted by the US military into the events leading to the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in Mohmand Agency last month has concluded that Pakistani military officers were provided the wrong information on the basis of which they permitted US-led Nato forces to strike. Yet American officials have not apologised. It is a sad indictment of the state of Pakistan-US relations that an apology cannot be issued for the deaths of soldiers in a direct, though perhaps unintentional, attack. From a distance, it is difficult to discern the reason for the US reluctance. Perhaps struggles inside the Obama administration — the State Department vs Pentagon, hawks vs doves, generals vs civilians — based on arguments over the general approach towards Pakistan is the reason for the refusal to apologise. Or perhaps President Barack Obama doesn't want his administration to look weak as he enters the presidential election cycle with low ratings and a rabid Republican cohort attacking him any which way it can. Still, the Pakistani expectation that an apology be tendered is legitimate, and domestic US compulsions or squabbles ought not to override the demand for one.

From the comments made by Gen Stephen Clark tasked with leading the US investigation, it was evident how the deep distrust that exists between Pakistan and the US affects ties at even the operational level. Military standard operating procedures may prevent the full sharing of information with even the strongest of allies. But there is a sense that what transpired in the border coordination centre, where the wrong target information was allegedly shared with Pakistan, could have been avoided if the level of distrust had been less between the two countries. Perhaps the US and Pakistan will have to work out fresh ways to share information at the operational level and factor in their deteriorating relationship at the strategic level. That soldiers should die because the two states don't trust each other's intentions is surely something that can and must be avoided.

The bigger picture remains the deteriorating ties between the US and Pakistan — 2011 has been an annus horribilis in this context. If a worsening of relations is to be avoided in 2012 at least two things ought to happen. One, the US will need more clarity of purpose and a realistic direction in Afghanistan. Two, Pakistan will have to work with the international community, rather than against it, in determining a stable future for Afghanistan. If not, as happened in Mohmand, the real winner will be the Taliban, and that victory will be to Pakistan's detriment.