WHILE predictability hardly features in the unfolding of historical events, there is nevertheless considerable truth to the adage that history repeats itself, first as a tragedy and then as a farce.

In the case of Pakistan, it is difficult to discern the difference. Just over a year ago, there was genuine pride and excitement when general elections far exceeded expectations. Sadly, the latter appear to have gone sour.

In addition to the economic meltdown and rapidly disappearing writ of the state, challenges on the external front have assumed alarming proportions. On the eve of the US invasion of Afghanistan, Gen Musharraf had predicted that US action would be quick and focused and that our support for the US would secure Pakistan’s nuclear assets and promote the Kashmir cause. Instead, the global war on terror has brought us neither security nor development.

The US and its allies are still struggling to contain the Taliban-led insurgency. Credible analysts are expressing the fear that the war in Afghanistan may prove un-winnable and that the proposed induction of additional troops could land the US into a Vietnam-like situation.

What then can we expect from a “thinking” person in the White House? For one, he has demonstrated conviction and courage in charting new courses. Its first tangible evidence has been his decision to pull out forces from Iraq and devote America’s resources to defeating Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, while promoting peace in South Asia.

At the time of writing, details of the exchanges of Richard Holbrooke, Mr Obama’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, during his “orientation and exploratory trip” to Pakistan had not emerged fully, but important aspects of the administration’s thinking are already discernible. One is that the administration’s primary focus will be Afghanistan, and by extension, Pakistan, because as Joe Biden emphasised recently, “no strategy for Afghanistan can succeed without Pakistan”.

US officials confirm that Afghanistan and Pakistan are closely inter-linked and an unstable Afghanistan would continue to have a destabilising influence on its nuclear neighbour. In a TV interview, President Obama emphasised that Washington recognised that “Afghanistan has to be stabilised to ensure the stability of Pakistan”. It confirms the viewpoint that the primary source of the problem rests in Afghanistan and that extremism has to be fought in that country to stabilise Pakistan’s tribal belt. But it also means that Washington is now establishing an “umbilical cord” relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, henceforth holding us accountable for US setbacks in that country.

At the same time, Washington wishes to set “clear and achievable goals for Afghanistan in a comprehensive strategy for which Washington expects its allies to take major responsibility”. This means greater pressure on European allies to be more forthcoming on their commitments in Afghanistan.

Washington insiders claim that President Obama is willing to consider sending additional troops, but wants the defence chiefs to review their strategy and respond to: “what is the mission and endgame”? There are also reports that the joint chiefs propose to advise the administration to “squeeze Taliban and Al Qaeda sanctuaries inside neighbouring Pakistan, while de-emphasising longer terms goals for bolstering democracy” in Afghanistan.

Hopefully, the Pakistani leadership would have emphasised that notwithstanding the stigma attached to the Taliban, the reality is that there can be no military solution to the problem in Afghanistan. In fact, the larger the foreign presence, the greater the hostility. European countries appear to have recognised this, though Washington still believes that a surge could turn the tide.

Secondly, the Taliban represent members of the majority community, i.e. the Pakhtuns, and if they can be persuaded, with promises of political support and economic assistance, to soften their extremist views they could become key interlocutors in any political settlement in Afghanistan.

It is also hoped that Holbrooke would have been told that while the drone attacks may satisfy the “macho streak” and may occasionally net a high-value target, its overall impact is seriously detrimental to our anti-terror campaign. It is seen as a continuation of Bush’s doctrine of pre-emption that has created intense anti-US sentiments, weakened our democratic set-up and questioned the credibility of Pak-US ties.

Our leaders would also have urged that the broader strategic view of the region is not abandoned, and keep in mind Obama’s reference to the importance of promoting the Indo-Pakistan normalisation process and ensuring a satisfactory resolution of the Kashmir problem. This represented a fundamental change from the usual single-item agenda approach of his predecessor and a remarkable grasp of an extremely complex issue.

India reacted to this initiative with unbecoming haste, claiming that it would reintroduce the “zero sum game” in US relations with Pakistan and India. Some Indian commentators have begun to see merit in the regional approach. India must also recognise that it cannot have it both ways, seeking Washington’s help to put pressure on Pakistan and at the same time losing its cool even at the mere mention of the ‘K’ word, by the international community.

That a country the size and strength of India should suffer from such poor appreciation of its abilities is amazing. The reality is that the US lacks both the political will and leverage to make India grant concessions on Kashmir. In fact, with US blessings, Delhi may extract a steeper price from Pakistan. In the process, the US would increase its clout in both countries, but the advantage for Islamabad in any American “mediation” on Kashmir, would lie in the establishment’s enhanced ability to sell such a deal.

The coming months are likely to be critical, with little hope of relief. At a time when efforts are on to galvanise the final phase of the struggle for the restoration of democratic institutions, Islamabad faces the formidable challenge represented by a resurgent Al Qaeda, a hostile India and a determined America that is no longer willing to countenance our transgressions.

A FOREIGN observer who claims to know us well said Pakistan had strange rulers. ‘A’ did not know what ‘B’ was saying and ‘B’ did not know what ‘A’ was saying. A local wag came out with a correction: neither ‘A’ nor ‘B’ himself knew what he was saying. Period.

Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said the government was innocent in the matter of the end of the restrictions on Dr A.Q. Khan. It was a court that had ruled in his favour. He did, however, add that the nuclear network was finished. The people were left to wonder that if the ‘father of the bomb’ had been restrained only until the elimination of the nuclear network, why was it necessary to wait for a court order? What was the ‘nuclear network’ anyway?

Defence Minister Ahmad Mukhtar was categorical in his assertion that Dr Khan’s release was the result of an agreement concluded between the government and the court in a judge’s chamber. He was not concerned who was harmed more by the disclosure — the government or the court. Nor did he clarify whether the agreement preceded the end of the nuclear network or whether it followed the happy event.

Dr A.Q. Khan seemed keen to give credit where it was due. According to him, the PPP-led government had at last discovered that he had been a favourite of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He also publicly acknowledged the greetings of interior adviser Rehman Malik. Despite some kind of a directive to cabinet members that they refrain from being extravagant with words, those in positions of authority have yet to discover the value of silence.

It is assumed in several quarters that a many-tongued authority has great tactical advantage over its adversaries. The latter are unable to correctly read its mind and cannot come to a decision on what it is likely to do next. This theory is still to be confirmed. But what has already been established is the inability of holders of elective offices in Pakistan to find an activity other than talking to fill their time.

Ministerial portfolios have shrunk to one-third or one-fourth of what they once were. There was a time when ministers had so much to do that they hardly had any time to lead cavalcades to their villages to attend weddings of distant cousins. They certainly had no time to inform the media about what other ministries were or were not doing.

But now ministers have so little to do in their offices that they keep travelling from one rest house to another. They are surrounded by the media at the start of their journey and again at the destination. How can they avoid talking when microphones are virtually thrust into their mouths? Trouble is that the fast-expanding media troops are trained to report only what those in power say. Even when somebody does not wish to make a statement, TV anchors won’t let him remain quiet.

Anyone who knows his cell number will force him to say something about the latest man-bites-dog event. One has to say something in response to a question because ministers are not supposed to be ignorant about anything.

Talking to newspaper reporters used to be less hazardous. One could deny whatever was attributed to him and the PROs could persuade news editors to leave out the juiciest utterances. Nothing of that kind is possible now. How can you deny or delete something from your speech when your words are carried to audiences across the globe, in your own voice, before your PA has time to pull at the hem of your jacket?

Relax. You will learn to enjoy the variety of music coming out of the menagerie.

Incidentally, the first ones who rushed to congratulate Dr A. Q. Khan the other day included some knights in shining armour who have gained in stature by denouncing the corrupt among their fellow-travellers, especially those who owe a new lease of life in politics to the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). Incredible Pakistan!

After its trail-blazing experiments in controlled democracy, basic democracy, presidential rule through parliamentary system and constitutional democracy without a constitution, Pakistan is offering the world a new lesson in the craft of democratic management — how the losers can grab it all.

Everybody thought following last year’s elections that the bubble known as PML-Q had burst beyond repair — in the short run at any rate. They were wrong. In Punjab at least, and that for all practical purposes is counted as the ‘real Pakistan’, the Q League is in the driving seat. The losers in the general election are being wooed by both the parties that were believed to have won the general election.

Bookmakers are having a field day in Lahore. Long odds are being offered on horses that are going to bolt from this political stable or that, or are going to be pulled up by their jockeys in the feature event, and also on the possibility of a dark horse galloping first past the stands.

Those who are believed to be planning a regime change in Punjab cannot succeed without the support of the entire Q bloc, and the incumbents are confident of their ability to ride out the storm so long as the Q bloc minus the Chaudhries is with them. We seem to be back in the early days of Pakistan when an unknown Punjab legislator from the Shujabad tehsil of Multan wrote his name in history books by being in both the Muslim League factions that were vying for the chief minister’s post.

Regardless of what the Q bloc’s latest dreams come to, its nobles are already relishing immunity from inquiries into what they did for themselves and to the people for five long years and how they did it. The parties that won the polls are at each other’s throat while the losers are free to enjoy their pile. It seems that this could happen only in Pakistan.

Finally, there may be nothing incredible in the re-emergence of Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada as a minister in yet another government. After all, whosoever is the temporary lord of the manor the establishment does need professional plumbers, fixers of fuses, choir leaders and drum-beaters. That is proof of stability.

What may appear to be strange is that a party winning a general election under the slogan of democracy, rule of law and people’s power should within a year need professional hewers of laws and drawers of constitutional elixir from dry wells. But then these are the joys of living in Incredible Pakistan!

IN his memoir, Secrets, Daniel Ellsberg describes how he decided to risk years in prison by leaking the Pentagon Papers, the top-secret record of American decision-making on Vietnam, to the New York Times.

Hoping that his wife, Patricia, would help him make up his mind, Ellsberg showed her a few memos on bombing strategies crafted by his former superiors at the Pentagon. She was horrified by some of the phrases in the documents: “a need to reach the threshold of pain”; “salami-slice bombing campaign”; “the objective of persuading the enemy”; “ratchet”; “one more turn of the screw”. “This is the language of torturers,” she told Ellsberg. “These have to be exposed.”

I recalled this scene while reading about Israel’s objectives in its assault on Gaza, as defined by the country’s political and military leaders and its western supporters. Speaking to a delegation from the Israeli lobby Aipac, President Shimon Peres confirmed that “Israel’s aim was to provide a strong blow to the people of Gaza so that they would lose their appetite for shooting at Israel”.

Perhaps it is no longer shocking that elected leaders and mainstream journalists in democracies seem to borrow their tone and vocabulary from Ayman al-Zawahiri and Hassan Nasrallah — after all, the war on terror, now officially declared a “mistake”, unhinged some of our best writers and thinkers. What is more bewildering and dispiriting than the moral deviancy of our political elites is its tacit endorsement by large democratic majorities.

Democracy, loudly upheld as a cure for much of the ailing world, has proved no guarantor of political wisdom, even if it remains the least bad form of government. In 2006 the Palestinians voted for Hamas, whose doctrinal commitment to the destruction of Israel makes peace in the Middle East even less likely. Given the chance, majorities in many Muslim countries would elect similarly intransigent Islamist parties to high office.

But majority opinion in older and presumably more mature democracies often doesn’t seem much more sensible: the violence approved by it makes much of the devastation caused by terrorists and dictators seem minor by comparison. Initially, at least, Americans overwhelmingly supported George Bush’s catastrophic forays in the Middle East.

Operation Cast Lead was blessed by a remarkably high proportion of Israelis, who since 1977 have freely elected a series of leaders — Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Ariel Sharon —tainted by involvement in terrorist groups and war crimes, and appear ready to extend their imprimatur to the obstreperously racist Avigdor Lieberman.

When last week in Ha’aretz the Israeli historian Tom Segev judged Israeli “apathy” towards the massacre in Gaza as “chilling and shameful” he brought on deja vu among Indians. In 2002 the Hindu nationalist government of Gujarat supervised the killing of more than 2,000 Muslims. The state’s chief minister, Narendra Modi, who green-lighted the mass murder, seemed a monstrous figure to many Indians; they then watched aghast as the citizens of Gujarat — better-educated and more prosperous than most Indians — re-elected Modi by a landslide after the pogrom.

In 2007, a few months after the magazine Tehelka taped Hindu nationalists in Gujarat boasting how they raped and dismembered Muslims, Modi again won elections with contemptuous ease. Though prohibited from entering the US, Modi is now courted by corporate groups, including Tata, and frequently hailed as India’s next prime minister.

As the Israeli right looks likely to be the latest electoral beneficiary of state terror, it is time to ask: can the institutions of electoral democracy, liberal capitalism and the nation-state be relied upon to do our moral thinking for us? “Trust in the majority,” they seem to say, but more often than not the majority proves itself incapable of even common sense.

It is true that thoughtlessness and apathy rather than malicious intent on the part of majorities helps their representatives to perpetrate or cover up such atrocities as Gujarat, the blockade of Gaza, or the occupation of Kashmir — forms of extreme violence less obvious or written about than 9/11, Saddam Hussein’s regime, and the recent terrorist attacks on Mumbai. But this doesn’t make thoughtlessness and apathy less destructive in actuality than the malevolence of despots and terrorists.

Hannah Arendt’s phrase “banality of evil” refers precisely to how a generalised moral numbness among educated, even cultured, people makes them commit or passively condone acts of extreme violence. Arendt marvelled at “the phenomenon of evil deeds, committed on a gigantic scale, which could not be traced to any particularity of wickedness, pathology or ideological conviction in the doer, whose only personal distinction was a perhaps extraordinary shallowness”.

— The Guardian, London