The quest for recognition
By Jehanzeb Raja
IN close proximity to two emerging global powers Pakistan’s location has made its role important to the geopolitics of the region. Post 9/11 and during the Cold War, Pakistan chose to side with the US-led strategic vision, irrespective of the changing dynamics of the region.
The question is: did Pakistan’s quest for recognition bear fruit or did it damage its image and prestige as a nation? The answer is plain for all to see.
Emerging powers seek to attain recognition through economic strength, democratic values, equitable business practices and justice. Negative asymmetries to gain temporary influence and control may beckon in the short term but their use over the long term causes untold miseries. Pakistan’s (twice-failed) experiment in Afghanistan to win strategic depth may have resulted in short-term economic respite. But its actions here were myopic when considered in the light of national unity and cohesion as a federation. Siachen and Pakistan’s Kashmir policy to enervate Indian military strength and economy may have been the only option in the balance of power game. But when viewed in the light of our own attrition and economic collapse, most apparent now in the Fata operations and the Baloch unrest, these appear to have been disastrous to say the least.
The formulation of military strategy has to be in sync with the geopolitical and strategic environment and should take in all aspects of economic, diplomatic and internal factors to maximise potential. The military has always dominated other state organs to enforce its strategic vision on vacillating civilian governments, who took more of an interest in internal power struggles rather than concentrate on external factors. This has proved to be to the detriment of the country’s interests.
The military strategy in Indian-administered Kashmir was to sustain the insurgency at a low boil to keep Indian forces committed there. The logic of bleeding the Indian Army and the results of this effort have been flawed. India’s economy is booming and its budget many times our own. The might of the USSR collapsed when its military expenditures could not keep pace with relentless US military innovations and technology, resulting in the loss of power and prestige.In the 1990s, the country was again fed with exaggerated threats from India, in retaliation for Pakistan’s support to the Kashmir insurgency. The Kargil adventure was engineered to reverse our failing policy, to regenerate our clout and to influence outside players. The political leaders at the time lacked a true understanding of the repercussions of our failure to achieve objectives, even if there were any. To this day we do not know what our objectives were in Kargil and what we achieved as a consequence of this misadventure.
The environment was never conducive to such military action. We were in a precarious state of economic default, our support to the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan faced reverses as the West wanted its ouster. Post 9/11, what were seen as freedom struggles have been labelled as terrorist movements. Dr Qadeer Khan and his network have been exposed for indulging in nuclear technology proliferation involving rogue states accused of sponsoring terrorism. All this including the lack of coordination within the government apparatus and ostensibly the military has resulted in a state of affairs that has not only isolated Pakistan internationally, but propelled it to join the ranks of those believed to be sponsoring terrorism.
With the world seeing Pakistan as an irresponsible, failing state, one which could also flaunt its nuclear capability in a reckless manner to pursue the goals of influence and power, is it surprising that our international image should have suffered so much?
The sudden U-turn on the policy of support for the Taliban was the result of the dire economic crisis and the fallout of Kargil and other misadventures rather than a pragmatic, well-thought-out strategy by the last military-led government. The fact that Pakistan was yet again being bailed out by the US, despite its irresponsible nature, was more out of consideration for its use as a staging ground for the assault on Afghanistan, than its worth as a military partner. No doubt, Pakistan saw this as another opportunity to control and influence the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan, in order to regain its political clout and bargain for a share in the Karzai-led government. However, our so-called strategists had not bargained for the influence of the Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Fata and the NWFP, where the government lost authority as it accepted the growing Islamic influence. The negative fallout was the rise of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and homegrown insurgency.
It is tragic that the priority given to Pakistan’s defence needs has been at the cost of ignoring other organs of the state that could have been strengthened to achieve a more balanced and pragmatic vision, especially with regard to dispute resolution. The US has chalked out its own strategic vision with regard to the world in general and South Asia in particular. Pakistan needs to identify its core interests in its quest for survival vis-à-vis India in this unipolar world. It is about time that we reappraised our foreign and defence policy in more realistic terms to come closer to the objective of cohesion in national objectives.


