The changed battlefield
By Javed Hussain
FROM Nov 26 to 29, 2008 the world witnessed 10 lightly armed men holding the elite elements of India’s security establishment at bay for 60 hours, paralysing Mumbai, and in the process, killing nearly 200 people.
The world wondered why India, which sees itself as a superpower in the making, was unable to prevent the physical and psychological damage that the 10 men inflicted on the country.
‘Incredible’ India, ‘Shining’ India should have pre-empted the attack, since it had already experienced the brutalities of terrorist attacks in the past. That is why it is incomprehensible why its state agencies were found wanting, and that is why their competence is being called into question. On the other hand, if certain other countries had encountered a similar situation, their special forces, including Pakistan’s SSG, would have ended the crisis before the dawn of Nov 27.
The Indian people are clearly angry. So is their media. They are smarting from the humiliation inflicted by the 10. In various talk shows on their television channels they vented their anger on their political leadership. When on one of these it was suggested that the politicians should be handed over to Pakistan, better still to the terrorists, there was deafening applause. The media and the people are clamouring for revenge. They are beating the war drums.
The Indian government has thus been placed in a dilemma. Elections to the Lok Sabha are coming up. If it fails to act before that, it will lose face, and perhaps the elections too. And if it acts to initiate military action, it could lead to war, and since war develops its own momentum, it could quickly get out of control. They have a decision to make, and quickly too, before time overtakes them.
In 2004, the Indian army announced the development of a new limited war doctrine to respond to what they call proxy wars by Pakistan. They call it Cold Start. The need for this was felt after Operation Parakram (Operation Victory) was terminated after a 10-month stand-off following the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001.
The essence of this doctrine, according to Walter C. Ludwig III, a doctoral candidate in International Relations at Oxford University, is re-organising the army’s offensive power from the three strike corps, each of which is built around an armoured division, into eight combined arms divisions, out of which three to five divisional teams would be launched into Pakistan along different axes within 72 to 96 hours from the time the mobilisation order is issued.
In Operation Parakram it had taken three strike corps nearly three weeks to reach their wartime locations. Cold Start thus envisages rapid deployments and high-speed operations.
Limited war is a conflict short of general war in which the political objectives and the means employed to achieve it are limited. It was relevant during the Cold War in the context of the two superpowers. In the context of Pakistan, the dimensions of time and space assume paramount importance, because it lacks territorial depth, is opposed by a larger adversary, and lacks the resources to fight a protracted war.Therefore it is a compulsion on Pakistan to adopt the strategy of pre-emption, in the same way it was a compulsion on Israel prior to its creation of ‘strategic depth’ during the Six-Day war in 1967. But due to poor strategic thought and the defeatist minds of Pakistan’s earlier war directors, this compulsion was lost on them as they persisted with their flawed concept of trading space with time, prior to releasing their counter-offensive which never was.
Since then the 21st century Indo-Pak battlefield has undergone a radical transformation. Whereas previously, pre-emption by Pakistan entailed fire and manoeuvre undertaken more or less simultaneously, now it would have to be first with fire to neutralise the adversary’s superiority in the conventional field, then by manoeuvre .
Pre-emption by fire would entail targeting the adversary’s strike corps’ or their Cold Start divisional teams with small battlefield non-conventional warheads in their assembly areas. And should the adversary respond in a similar way that would be a portent of escalation, and inevitably, disaster for both.
The Indian army nevertheless is entitled to have recurrent dreams. In one of these they see their newly created South Western Command securing the triangle formed by Kashmore/Guddu Barrage-Reti-Rahimyar Khan, and splitting Pakistan in two; their Western Command securing Marala Headworks on River Chenab northwest of Sialkot in conjunction with a thrust in Chenab-Jhelum corridor to threaten Gujrat-Kharian; their Northern Command securing Kotli in Azad Kashmir and advancing on Mirpur to threaten Mangla.
But dreams aside, under the circumstances, the most that the Indian government can be expected to do to save face is to launch simultaneous strikes against Lashkar-i-Taiba facilities which they believe to be in Punjab and Azad Kashmir, and mount a commando raid on their facility in Bahawalpur to seize Masood Azhar and his associates, assuming they are there. Since all these are risky undertakings they ought to be wary of the fact that should these fail, they would end up losing face even more.
In the changed battlefield environment there is no scope whatsoever for a limited or general war between India and Pakistan. Therefore, it is to be hoped that, for the sake of their country, more than anything else, the Indian government would arrive at a prudent decision. n
The writer is a former brigadier of the Pakistan Army.


Obama’s damaging silence
By Simon Tisdall
BARACK Obama’s chances of making a fresh start in United States’ relations with the Muslim world, and the Middle East in particular, appear to diminish with each new wave of Israeli attacks on Palestinian targets in Gaza.
That seems hardly fair, given that he does not take office until Jan 20. But foreign wars don’t wait for Washington inaugurations. Obama has remained wholly silent during the Gaza crisis.
His aides say he is following established protocol that the US has only one president at a time. Hillary Clinton, his designated secretary of state, and Joe Biden, the vice-president-elect and foreign policy expert, have also been uncharacteristically taciturn on the subject.
But evidence is mounting that Obama is already losing ground among key Arab and Muslim audiences who cannot understand why, given his promise of change, he has not spoken out. Arab commentators and editorialists say there is growing disappointment at Obama’s detachment — and that his failure to distance himself from George Bush’s pro-Israeli stance is encouraging the belief that he either shares Bush’s bias or simply does not care.
The al-Jazeera satellite television station recently broadcast footage of Obama on holiday in Hawaii, wearing shorts and playing golf, juxtaposed with scenes of bloodshed and mayhem in Gaza. Its report criticising “the deafening silence from the Obama team” suggested Obama is losing a battle of perceptions among Muslims that he may not realise has even begun.
Regional critics claim Obama is happy to break his pre-inauguration “no comment” rule on international issues when it suits him. They note his swift condemnation of November’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Obama has also made frequent policy statements on the global credit crunch.
Obama’s absence from the fray is also allowing hostile voices to exploit the vacuum. “It would appear that the president-elect has no intention of getting involved in the Gaza crisis,” Iran’s Resalat newspaper commented sourly. “His stances and viewpoints suggest he will follow the path taken by previous American presidents ... Obama, too, will pursue policies that support the Zionist aggressions.”
Whether Obama, when he does eventually engage, can successfully elucidate an Israel-Palestine policy that is substantively different from that of Bush-Cheney is wholly uncertain at present.
Maintaining the hardline US posture of placing the blame for all current troubles squarely on Hamas, to the extent of repeatedly blocking limited UN security council ceasefire moves, would end all realistic hopes of winning back Arab opinion — and could have negative, knock-on consequences for US interests in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf. Yet if Obama were to take a tougher — some would say more balanced — line with Israel, for example by demanding a permanent end to its blockade of Gaza, or by opening a path to talks with Hamas, he risks provoking a rightwing backlash in Israel, giving encouragement to Israel’s enemies, and losing support at home for little political advantage. n
—The Guardian, London


