THE subcontinent produced many great Islamic thinkers throughout the medieval period and even during the decline of the Mughals when Shah Waliullah stands out.

During the British rule two great thinkers came to prominence: Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Sir Syed belonged to the 19th century. Maulana Azad, on other hand, lived and worked during the 20th century (died 1958). Both were great Islamic thinkers. Sir Syed though known more for his establishment of the modern educational institution, the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College (MAO), which became Aligarh Muslim University in 1920, was also an Islamic thinker in his own right. Sir Syed’s services to the community in the field of education perhaps overshadowed his Islamic scholarship.

His scholarship was original. He wrote books in defence of Islam when some British and western orientalists found faults with it. His book, Essays on the Life of Muhammad, is an important work from the modernist point of view. More than that, his commentary of the Quran, which he could not complete because he was forced by orthodox ulema to abandon it, is quite significant.

Sir Syed was earlier influenced by the puritan Wahabi ideology; he later changed track and came under the influence of the Muttazila school of thought, arguing that it was closer to the rationalist point of view. His commentary on the Quran, published under the title of Tafsir al-Quran wa huwa al-huda wa al-Furqan is, to my mind, a milestone in the 19th century commentary literature which came into existence as a result of countering western, rational challenges.

Sir Syed’s commentary and scholarship could be compared with his Egyptian contemporary, Muhammad Abduh. Abduh was also influenced by western rationalism and adopted a modernist view on many aspects. He, like Sir Syed, devoted himself to spreading education among his people and shunned politics in his later years.

Under pressure from traditional ulema, Sir Syed gave up writing the commentary and began to spread modern education among Muslims, which he thought was more important than insisting on writing the commentary. He argued that if modern education took hold, Muslim could understand the Quran in a rational way. Unfortunately, that did not happen and the orthodox ulema continued to have sway over the Muslim mind.

Sir Syed’s commentary went out of print and no one was interested in reprinting it. Thanks to Khudabakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, it became available in India again about a decade ago.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad’s commentary on the Qur’an is equally significant. Azad was greatly influenced by Sir Syed in his earlier days though later he charted his own course. He too could not complete his commentary though for a different reason. He had written his commentary during his internment at Ranchi in the 1920s. Unlike Sir Syed, Azad was a freedom fighter and his political activities kept him so busy that he could not complete the commentary.

Azad’s commentary is somewhat different from Sir Syed’s, though similar in spirit. He tends to be more traditional. Unlike Sir Syed, he does not write under the influence of the Muttazila school, though his approach, too, is not orthodox. He claims in the introductory part that he went through all the available tafsir literature before writing his commentary. Thus, Azad was fully conscious of what was written in the past and without significant departure from the traditional line, he made his commentary much more relevant to modern times. Also, his prose style is much simpler than Sir Syed’s.

Azad’s commentary on Surah Fatihah, the very first chapter of the Quran, is unique and remains unbeatable by other commentators. Also, he devotes one volume of his tafsir to what he calls wahdat-i-deen (unity of religion), basing his view on the Quranic text. This is his unique contribution, and leaves one wondering at his knowledge of other religions and philosophies, like Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, etc.

Azad maintains that deen is one, though laws (sharia) differ from religion to religion. Differences in these laws are because of culture, customs and traditions, not because of principles and values. He supports his thesis by quoting extensively from the Quran and other religious texts. Though one finds the doctrine of wahdat-i-deen in tafsir literature before Azad also, like in Shah Waliyullah’s Hujjatillah al-Baligha, but one does not find here a scholarship of other religious texts. Maulana Azad’s tafsir is thus much more inclusive.

Both Sir Syed and Maulana Azad have made rich contributions to the tafsir literature in modern times which needs to be popularised.

The writer is an Islamic scholar and heads the Centre for Study Society and Secularism, Mumbai.

ON one side are eight navies, the world’s largest shipping companies, the rich Gulf states that need to get their oil to market, and the great powers whose commerce depends heavily on the shipping lanes around the Horn of Africa. On the other side are a few thousand Somali pirates in small boats with light weapons. So why are the pirates winning?

Not only are they winning, but the forces of law and order are almost completely paralysed. The pirates have seized dozen of ships, extracting ransoms that total about $30 million this year alone. Fourteen ships, including a Saudi Arabian super-tanker carrying two million barrels of oil, are still anchored off the Somali coast awaiting ransom.

Yet with the honourable exception of the Indians and the French, nobody has used force against the pirates of the Horn. The Danish navy arrested ten of them in September, but turned them loose again because the government believed that it did not have jurisdiction to prosecute them. The British Foreign Office has advised the Royal Navy not to detain pirates of certain nationalities (including Somali) as they might claim asylum in Britain under human rights laws.

As the boldness of the pirate attacks increases, the international response is to retreat. Major shipping companies that transport oil out of the Gulf have ordered their tankers to stop using the Suez Canal route, which takes them past the northern Somali coast. Instead, they are going all the way around southern Africa, adding two weeks to the voyage at a cost of $20,000-30,000 a day.

What to do? Most pundits declare that this problem cannot be solved at sea. Instead, it will only end when order has been restored in Somalia, the pirates’s base. Since Somalia is currently divided between three different governments, only one of which (Somaliland) exercises even a modest degree of control over its territory, that seems a tall order.

If we must wait for a central government with real authority to take charge in Somalia before the pirate threat in the seas around the Horn of Africa is brought under control, that happy event is unlikely to arrive before the 2020s. Why not solve the problem at sea, where clan militias and suicide bombers are not a problem? Why not just capture or kill enough of the pirates to persuade the others to choose a different career?

The problem is not the reluctance or incompetence of the navies. It is the whole body of international law and human rights legislation that has emerged in recent decades, which has made the traditional remedies for piracy very hard to apply. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, for example, requires a warship to send a boarding party led by an officer onto any suspected pirate vessel to confirm its criminal intent. Until that has been done, the warship may not open fire.

The colloquial term for the members of any such boarding party is “hostages.” Back in the early 18th century, when the pirates of the Caribbean — the real pirates of the Caribbean, not Johnny Depp and Keith Richards — were finally being eliminated by the navies of the major European powers, there was no such foolishness. Pirates were defined as “enemies of all mankind,” and there was a right of “universal jurisdiction” against them.

Any country could arrest pirates from any other country or countries and try them for their crimes. If they were captured in battle, they were even liable to summary execution. And while it is not the 18th century any more, a UN Security Council resolution decreeing universal jurisdiction would certainly transform the situation.

Suppose that such a declaration was made, and it was then announced that any non-military vessels carrying armed men within 500 kilometres (300 miles) of the Somali coast would be subject to arrest. If they did not submit when challenged, they would be sunk without further discussion. Do that a couple of times (as the Indian warship INS Tabar did last week), and the pirate threat drops away very fast.

— Copyright Gwynne Dyer