Pakistan’s trust deficit
By Kunwar Idris
PAKISTAN’S sovereign economic rating has fallen to a junk triple-C. Similarly rated, it would be lower for security and lower still for the institutions that handle the economy, security and every other matter of the state.
So high are the stakes in Pakistan that the world somehow may find even the $100bn that President Asif Zardari is seeking only if the donors were to trust the intentions of the people who are to spend the money — and are held accountable if they squander or embezzle it.
Foreign donors aside, such an assurance is not forthcoming even to our own people. The first burden that therefore falls on our political leaders is to establish the propriety of their own conduct and integrity of the state institutions in the eyes of the people and dispel many doubts that our allies and the world at large entertain on both counts.
The leaders now in the government or in the opposition have been alternating in that role for the past 20 years — some sticking to their parties, others switching loyalties and still others breaking away to form parties of their own. They have been bringing up charges of misconduct and corruption against each other till Gen Musharraf came on the scene to charge both.
The cases lingered for years before the Ehtesab Bureau established by Nawaz Sharif, and later before Musharraf’s NAB, but hardly any one was disqualified or otherwise punished. All that the bureaus had to show in the way of performance was the recovery of a fraction of the misappropriated amount through plea bargains till Musharraf brought a sweeping law to close all proceedings. It was an act of political expediency cloaked in national reconciliation. Who among those charged was guilty of corruption and who was being persecuted on personal or partisan grounds will never be known.
But that law should not put a premium on corruption nor instil a sense of immunity or give a licence to plunder with impunity. If the present lot of leaders wish to pull the country out of the morass of violence and despondency in which it is stuck, they must first establish their own moral credentials by opening their books and assets for scrutiny by an impartial tribunal with full opportunity provided to the people to question the veracity of the disclosures made.
The process of accountability has to be continuous, open and guided by public perception and not the rules of evidence applicable to criminal trials in which one is taken to be innocent unless proven guilty. The public leaders must be demonstrably above board.
The point to stress is that it is too much to expect of the masses to suffer privation or make sacrifices when their leaders live in luxury at home when in power, and in greater luxury abroad when they have to flee the country — who among them doesn’t have villas in Dubai or flats in London’s Park Lane? The destinies of the masses and the leaders are thus not intertwined in times good or bad.
In the current crisis centred in the tribal area but with trouble spilling all over, the normal institutions of the state — the presidency and parliament, the cabinet, bureaucracy and judiciary — have lost all relevance. Relevant only are the intelligence agencies. But the countries conducting the war on terror (who are also now being called upon to rescue our economy) consider these agencies to be “historically and institutionally complicit” in the Taliban insurgency that they are trying to quell.
Noteworthy for sarcasm in this backdrop is the comment of The Economist in last week’s issue: “Pakistan’s notorious military spooks deserve credit for the audacity of their covert support for the Taliban, the enemy of Pakistan’s greatest ally. But America’s patience with the ISI’s double-dealing is running thin”. The paper then goes on to cast doubts on the assurances of a “civilian with a dodgy past” (meaning our president) to tame the “Invisible Soldiers Inc”.
America, though our ally and best friend, is giving nuclear technology to India but denies it to Pakistan. This discrimination points towards yet another area where our allies and international community alike refuse to trust us. To most of us here, Dr. A.Q. Khan is the country’s ‘greatest benefactor’. The custodians of Pakistan’s ideology assembled in Lahore would rather see him as head of the Islamic state than a pathetic, ailing figure confined to the prison of his home.
To the world at large, however, he is the “single worst nuclear proliferator” who ran a “Wal-Mart to sell the country’s prized secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea making the world a more dangerous place”. These conflicting perceptions apart, an undeniable fact is that though Pakistan now has nuclear weapons and the people are close to eating grass, as Bhutto had then put it, yet we cannot buy nuclear technology for producing desperately needed power for our homes and factories.
Whether it was Dr Khan on his own or the government of the day that was involved in running the nuclear mart is for us to ponder. But we must make peace with the rest of the world by clearing doubts that hang over our conduct as a nation. The nuclear assets that Dr Khan helped create for warfare must not become a liability now that we need nuclear technology for a peaceful purpose.
Lastly, the world has reservations even about our legal system which not long ago was our strength. It is nothing short of bizarre that a struggle launched for greater independence and dignity of the judiciary should be ending in less of both. The accusations made against the chief justice were never investigated nor was the accusing lawyer tried for perjury nor was the president impeached. A constitutional issue carried to the streets forced Musharraf to resign but has sown seeds of division in the ranks of lawyers and judges alike. An unsafe Pakistan without impartial courts must rank low in the preference of investors. Lack of investment, in turn, adds to unemployment and unrest.
The answer to violence at home and doubts abroad lies in letting the institutions work. Individuals should owe allegiance to institutions, not the other way round. That sadly has been the trend long in evidence now reaching a climax in the person of Mr Asif Zardari. As promised, he should better shed his 17th Amendment powers without delay. The cult of his late lamented wife is enough to sustain him in office.
kunwaridris@hotmail.com


ANP and its antecedents
By Anwar Syed
THERE was once a political party named the Awami League, based largely in East Pakistan and headed by Maulana Bhashani. In February 1957 it split because of differences between him and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy over issues of foreign policy.
Bhashani and the leftist contingent in the party left and in July formed the National Awami Party (NAP).
It included a number of politicians from West Pakistan, notably Abdul Wali Khan, Mian Iftikharuddin, Abdul Majid Sindhi and Mahmudul Haq Osmani. It stood for full autonomy for both East and West Pakistan, non-alignment in foreign policy and parliamentary democracy. It remained united and moderately active in national politics for about 10 years, but then in November 1967 it split again. Abdul Wali Khan became the leader of a pro-Moscow faction while Maulana Bhashani headed a pro-Chinese group. In post-1971 Pakistan, Mr Bhutto’s government banned NAP. It re-emerged in 1986 with a slightly different name, that is the Awami National Party (ANP).
Abdul Wali Khan (d.2006), first president of the ANP, was a seasoned politician, widely respected for his candour and integrity. As he grew old and fragile, his wife Nasim directed the party for a few years, and his son Asfandyar Wali Khan has been its president since 1999. He appears to have inherited his father’s self-esteem, sense of personal honour, dedication to the Pakhtun identity and, presumably, his political ethic.
Born in February 1949 at Charsadda, Asfandyar Wali received his early education at Aitchison College in Lahore, a BA degree from the University of Peshawar, and somewhere along the line a master’s degree in business administration. Like his grandfather (Abdul Ghaffar Khan; d. 1988) and his father, he does not seem to have ever worked for a living. He may have inherited a good deal of property and wealth.
Asfandyar Wali was active in student politics, joined groups that opposed Ayub Khan and later Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He was arrested, along with several ANP politicians, tried and convicted by a special tribunal in Hyderabad jail, and sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years. Gen Ziaul Haq released him and some of the others in 1978. He was elected a member of the NWFP Assembly in 1990 and a member of the National Assembly three years later. He lost in 1997, but was elected senator in 2003 for a six-year term and, once again, an MNA in February 2008.
Asfandyar Wali regards all Pakhtuns, including those from Afghanistan who came and settled in the tribal areas on the Pakistani side, as one people. He and his party are dedicated to promoting their well-being. He wants the tribal belt to be politically integrated with the NWFP. The fact that the Taliban, who have been killing his people, are also Pakhtuns puts him in a difficult position.
Initially he advocated means other than military force for dealing with them. His attitude has radically changed following the recent suicide bombing at his own doorstep in Charsadda and an attack on Amir Haider Hoti’s home in Mardan. He now wants to make sure that the generals and the government in Islamabad are determined enough in their campaign to eradicate the Taliban.
The ANP has maintained a significant presence in the legislatures. Of the 80 seats in the NWFP assembly, it won ten in the 1988 election, 23 in 1990, 18 in 1993 and 32 in 1997. The number of seats in the assembly increased to 124 just before the 2002 election. It is well known that this election was rigged to the advantage of the ANP’s opponents, especially the Islamic parties, and the party ended up with only seven seats that year. It emerged as the largest party in the house following the elections of 2008 and formed the government in coalition with the PPP.
The party has all along shown a bias in favour of socialism, but more as political theory than as a controlling framework for policymaking. In any case it stands to the left of centre in its policy preferences. Note also that it has always been unambiguously secular-minded. It opposes Al Qaeda, the Taliban and all expressions of religious fundamentalism and extremism. It is Asfandyar Wali Khan’s and his party’s avowed mission to counter and defeat these movements which they fear are spreading to settled districts of the NWFP and parts of Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab.
The ANP claims to be, and I think it actually is, a liberal, progressive and modernising force in Pakistan. It is committed to democracy (holds regular internal party elections) and social justice. Being the ruling party in the NWFP at the present time (in coalition with the PPP), it will have the opportunity to improve the lives of the poor. Let us see what it does.
The party is well known for its espousal of provincial autonomy and the right of the various nationalities in the country to preserve and promote their languages and cultures. The matter of nationalities was associated with the ANP’s parent organisation, NAP, in the 1960s. Its proponents distinguished nationality from the nation state which, they said, is often composed of distinct linguistic and cultural groups, each with a historic identity that it cherishes and wants to preserve. This kind of thinking does not alarm us today but it was not well received by the centralising regimes in the 1960s.
The issue of provincial autonomy is as old as the state itself. Most of our political parties advocate it, albeit in varying measure. There is, however, no consensus on its dimensions. Some of the ‘nationalists’ in Sindh and Balochistan would allow the federation nothing more than partial charge of defence and foreign affairs, deny it revenue-raising authority and make it dependent on subventions from the provinces. This is an extreme position which most other parties would avoid. As far as I know, the ANP has never spelled out how much of provincial autonomy would be good enough.
It should be noted that, as in the case of many other parties in the subcontinent, a specific family’s predominance in the ANP’s affairs gives it a dynastic character. Abdul Wali Khan was its first president, then came his wife Begum Nasim who was followed by her son Asfandyar. The newly elected chief minister of the NWFP, Amir Haider Khan Hoti, is Asfandyar Wali’s nephew. He is a 36-year-old man whom the party’s executive committee chose in preference to Bashir Ahmed Bilour, a veteran politician and a long-time party stalwart.
The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts.
anwarsyed@cox.net


That October day & today
By Asha’ar Rehman
TOO bad the second Nawaz Sharif government was dismissed when it was dismissed. Newspapers on Oct 12, 1999, its last day in office, reported that the Sharif government was all poised to launch a deweaponisation programme in the country. There are no marks for guessing who was heading the offensive against the armed men. It was Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, the then interior minister.
Times have changed. The Chaudhry is no longer a minister — he is not even close to the Sharifs. More importantly, no one these days asks where the weapons are coming from and who is paying for them and who is holding them. They are just there, full stop. No talk of deweaponisation or of methods that could cut the militants’ supply lines. Simply state that it is impossible to block a determined suicide bomber strapped to an improvised explosive device and wait for your turn.
Weapons, the flour quota, politicians pulling the legs of politicians, a literacy programme soon to be launched and, yes, jihadis were pretty much our staple diet when Gen Pervez Musharraf outwitted Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif in a spine-chilling duel exactly nine years ago, on the evening of Oct 12, 1999. Nonetheless, a routine takeover by a general camouflaged the remaining issues. Even advice about money-making was submerged in the events that followed the coup; all it required us to do was to sell our nuclear technology on the foreign market.
The suggestion, according to newspaper files, came from Hafiz Saeed, then the amir of the Lashkar-i-Taiba as well as the Dawat Wal Irshad, who said nuclear exports could bring economic gains to, one presumes, a country in need of some revenue. This was his statement in the papers of Oct 12, 1999, even though Qazi Hussain Ahmed happened to have come up with a gem on the same day which, if someone had taken care to notice, should have elevated him to the place of a Nostradamus among politicians.
In its issue of Oct 12, 1999, Dawn reported his speech to the Jamaat-i-Islami shura in which Qazi sahib spoke about the deep wedge between the army and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, created of course by the prime minister. “Perpetuation in power of Mr Sharif could irreparably damage the country and its people,” roared the Jamaat amir and it can be guessed retrospectively that his audience included the coup-makers in waiting.
Had he been a journalist or a television channel, the Jamaat chief could easily lay claim to having been the one who broke the news of the coup that came later in the day. At the wrong end of the press he can best provide a cause for you and me to nostalgically reminisce about the days when it was possible for him to talk disparagingly of the PML-N leader. The two gentlemen haven’t been in serious disagreement for many years now, and having contested the 2002 election jointly are generally known among people as each other’s extension.
An equally significant difference between that October day and today relates to the change in the fortunes of the Pakistan People’s Party. Drubbed by the PML-N in the general election a couple of years earlier, the PPP appeared to be a mere spectator, limiting itself to convening a meeting of the tiny combined opposition. Compared to that, Nawabzada Nasrullah was doing much better in his customary role of the opposition. He was, as usual, threatening the government with a long march — a task that has since been placed on the shoulders of the lawyers.
The schoolgirls who had been promised free education were clamouring for the promised kits that had not been as yet delivered to them, which was far better than now when education has become a bloody jihad for them. Farmers were being booked after they clashed with a police determined not to allow them a protest against cotton prices. Traders, back then as well, were asking the government not to increase oil and gas prices while a very concerned World Bank was too occupied by its efforts to broker peace between Hubco and the Pakistan government to press Islamabad to end subsidies to energy consumers. The day’s biggest crime story was the murder of an ex-IGP in Peshawar which would in the days to follow emerge as one of the most dangerous areas in the country, especially for those working in uniform.
This is not to say that those times were better in all respects. This is to reconfirm how coups don’t solve problems and may aggravate them and how something that we regard as big conceals other horrifying details. By the end of the day, there were people celebrating a victory and people mourning another democratic journey cut short. The general was able to land safely, winning against a prime minister who had only wished for a chief of army staff of his choice.
Despite questions raised in books and replies given by the other side, the story of the schoolchildren and other passengers who remained suspended in the air for ages while the two claimants to power fought it out amongst themselves still remains only partially told. All we have been hearing about is the coup and the counter-coup and the likelihood of it happening again.


