August 19, 2008	Tuesday	Sha’aban 16, 1429

Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf’s departure from the Presidency may have brought smiles to many faces but his exit has also kicked off a debate whether Pakistan would continue its policy of fighting militancy or change course.

For nearly nine years, as the sole architect of Pakistan’s anti-terror policy following his now famous volte-face on the policy of supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11, Musharraf continued to call the shots and at times, say some who have worked with him, single-mindedly. And quite understandably so. As president of Pakistan and chief of the army staff, he didn’t need approval from anyone else.

In the process he won laurels from his friends in the West, but at home he created hordes of deadly enemies always looking for an opportunity to get even with him.

Gen (retd) Musharraf may have umpteen arguments to defend his policy of backing the US-led global war on terrorism, there is no dearth of critics who believe that his seemingly ambivalent approach of using strongarm tactics and striking peace deals with militants brought nothing but suicide bombings and growing insecurity.

For him, the U-turn on Taliban, a regime he wanted the West to recognise as a ground reality until 9/11, may have been dictated by a sense of pragmatism and in Pakistan’s interests, but there are those who saw him as someone buckling under US pressure and following George W. Bush’s war policy hook, line and sinker.

But as political players jostle for the new position, the bigger question that is being asked and is boggling many a mind is that what would happen to the war on terror now that Musharraf – the punching bag of all and sundry – has made an exit.

Indications are that it will continue with some fine-tuning here and there. If the past five and a half months are anything to go by, nothing much has changed, political rhetoric notwithstanding.

Those who have worked with him until his last day in office acknowledge that Musharraf had all but lost interest in Fata – an area Americans believe is infested with and is a safe haven of Al Qaeda – and the war on terror.

The last such meeting he had held on the issue was before the February 18 election and there too, according to his erstwhile associates, the issue was discussed only in generalities. “He had withdrawn himself”, recalled a former associate. “Why? I really have no idea”, he said.

The appointment of a full-time chief of the army staff, albeit after some vacillation, may also have dampened Musharraf’s spirits to direct the war on terror policy.

It took Gen Kayani some time to find his moorings but the changed political environment after the February elections, changed the power equation and shifted the power centre from the Presidency to the Prime Minister’s House.

Briefings were arranged and meetings held with the new political leadership to discuss the security situation in the country, attended by the army chief and heads of the intelligence agencies, ostensibly to take the coalition partners on board and create a sense of political ownership.

There are some who believe that the exit of the ‘punching bag’ may have some sobering effect on the Musharraf-haters who are fighting the state and state agencies. Little wonder then that the Taliban spokesman immediately welcomed his departure.

But some security analysts warn that this ‘sobering’ phase may not last long, particularly when the military is going full throttle against militants in Bajaur and Swat. “Sooner than later, Musharraf would be replaced by another punching bag that would be perceived as another American stooge,” remarked a senior security analyst.

Military and security analysts agree that while there may be some tactical changes, the overall policy of fighting militancy in the tribal borderlands and other areas will continue.

“There may be a debate in parliament and a committee may be formed to examine and evolve a consensus on the war on terror, but I don’t think there will be any major change. The optics may change but the policy will continue,” said a senior security analyst.

But there are worries. Now that the issue of whether or not Musharraf would leave has been resolved, the question is what happens next.

There are problems that continue to haunt the policy on the war on terror. There is still no institutional mechanism to ensure consultation and decision at the highest level that would include the political and military leadership not just at the federal level but also at the provincial level. That apparently was one reason why the June 23 meeting in Islamabad presided over by Prime Minister Gilani and attended by, besides the heads of the coalition parties, the army chief, decided to leave the option of military operations to the military. And this explains the launch of military operations in Bajaur and Swat although the political leadership was taken on board.

“The president didn’t figure at all,” said one of Musharraf’s former associates.

But this decision alone may not solve the problem. The whole issue of political ownership persists, given ambivalent and at times divergent views by the two major coalition partners – the PPP and the PML-N on how to handle militancy in the country. The operation in Bara is a case in point. It was opposed by the PML-N despite the fact that the ANP-led NWFP government and the PPP supported it.

The problem of lack of coordination both at the top and at the tactical level, between various state agencies, also persists, primarily due to the absence of an institutional mechanism that often leads to confusion and at times embarrassment. The 72-hour ultimatum given by Adviser to the Prime Minister on Interior Rehman Malik to warring factions in Kurram is a classic case, wherein the military appears to have not been consulted.

Analysts agree that while it is imperative to have an institutional platform incorporating political and military leadership, including those at the helm in the NWFP with a mandate to discuss and decide matters relating to fighting militancy and terrorism with some parliamentary oversight, there is also a dire need for a comprehensive counter-insurgency plan.

“There was a consensus at the June 23 meeting that what Pakistan was facing was an insurgency,” recalled one participant. “But the problem is that we continue to fight it with conventional means. There has to be a change in tactic if we want to succeed and I just hope the political leadership would now find time to sit down and start taking the internal security situation more seriously now that their nemesis, Gen Musharraf is gone,” he said.

“We have a situation and the sooner we realise the better it would be.”