PAKISTAN’S outwardly complex politics lends itself to one-dimensional simplification: it is all about individuals.

Take out Asif Zardari, Nawaz Sharif, Altaf Hussain, Asfandyar Wali and Maulana Fazlur Rehman and the amorphous mob of ministers and legislators left behind wouldn’t know where and which way to go.

Some other individuals — Pir Pagara, Asghar Khan, Imran Khan, Mustafa Khar, Mumtaz Bhutto, to name just a few — command influence but cannot change the course of events. Nor can Qazi Hussain Ahmed despite the backing, unlike others, of a nationwide and well-knit, though denominational, party. The Chaudhries of the Q-League having ruled the roost for seven years now lie in ambush.

It cannot be either a democratic or a secure power structure in which a few individuals preside over, or tinker with, the destiny of a country which has suffered the indignity of defeat and disintegration once and now stands at the centre of a storm which might again land it in a similar catastrophe.

Pakistan is an important country — and not for reason of its current geopolitical crisis alone. In terms of population it is the sixth largest in the world with an increasingly assertive civil society, a powerful army and a civil service which, though much diminished, can still deliver only if the dead hand of politics were to be lifted.

The bane of the country has been a faltering political culture which empowers individuals rather than institutions. Authoritarian leaders, because of their incompetence or corruption or arrogance — all three combining in some — have been paving the way for army chiefs to take over at intervals and oust the politicians to the relief of the common man.

Every military coup sets in motion a cycle of revenge. The one through which we are now passing is the longest and most acrimonious. The outcome is yet uncertain but could be disastrous. But this much is certain: the independence of the judiciary, though the courts have always been giving legal cover to coups, has suffered permanent damage. That would be the worst of the institutional setbacks caused by a series of past military coups and presidential dismissals.

More disquieting, however, is the behaviour of the politicians. They learn no lessons. Instead of giving full support to President Musharraf’s electoral process some dithered, others laid down conditions, still others altogether boycotted. Since a reasonably successful conclusion of the process, the spotlight has been all on individuals rather than on legislative and administrative institutions and on economic development.

The chiefs of the two largest political parties, the PPP and PML-N, have set their strategies to pursue not national reconciliation — the note on which they had started — but their personal ambitions. Nawaz Sharif sees his best chance for public acclamation and national leadership in the honourable reinstatement of Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry as chief justice and the humiliating exit of President Musharraf. Asif Zardari, on the other hand, seemingly senses a threat to his amnesty if Mr Chaudhry were to come back as chief justice and if Musharraf is forced out.

The public postures both of Nawaz Sharif and Asif Zardari thus have an underlying personal interest. The degradation that the judiciary suffered at the hands of Nawaz Sharif when he was the prime minister and his confrontation with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan are still fresh in the public mind. His desire to have a chief justice who feels indebted to him and a president who is another Rafiq Tarar is thus perfectly understandable.

Asif Zardari’s interest runs in the opposite direction. Chief Justice Dogar is unlikely to question the pardon he has received, the come-back Chaudhry surely will. Beholden to Zardari for resisting demands for his removal, Musharraf continuing as president is unlikely to revoke his amnesty. Zardari surely knows he would be defending his assets, rather than ruling the country, if the National Reconciliation Ordinance were to be struck down by the Supreme Court.

Whatever the other stipulations in Musharraf’s undisclosed agreement with Benazir Bhutto, his departure through impeachment couldn’t be the one. In any case a heavy responsibility rests on Nawaz Sharif and Asif Zardari not to let conciliation degenerate into conflict between them or bring about a situation which draws the army into the fray. The intervening commanders may not be in the mould of Wahid Kakar or Jehangir Karamat.

As the political stalemate persists, the existence of the government is marked by a budget that has only added to the economic hardships of the people.

After reasonably fair polls and the readiness shown by the leaders of the two principal parties to form a coalition, hopes arose of a stable and functional government coming into being. That hope is yet to materialise but their past misrule is casting a long shadow. The common man still does not expect justice from them despite Shahbaz Sharif’s impassioned reminder to members of the Punjab Assembly of what Hazrat Ali had to say: an un-Islamic government may last for some time but not an unjust government.

The first test of the government being fair and going by the rule book will arise when recruitment begins. On that count the rumours and press reports both are disquieting. All the available jobs in the federal and provincial governments and allied organisations (the total number is said to be about a quarter of a million), it is being reported, will be assigned to the parties in the coalition and further distributed through ministers, senators, MNAs and MPAs.This is hard to believe but it has indeed happened in the past. Even if the reports are not wholly true it calls for a suo motu direction from the Supreme Court to the central and provincial governments and their corporate bodies to fill all jobs by following the statutory rules and procedure of recruitment.

Shortly before February’s “posthumous polls”, The Economist noted that Pakistan’s political leadership was tainted by corruption and brutishness. The journal concluded its comment thus: “to believe in Pakistani democracy, you have to believe in redemption.” That dim view expressed at a time of hope is widely shared today.

kunwaridris@hotmail.com

IT has been strangely quiet on the political front with no report of any significant development, except that the government may be toying with the idea of launching an ‘operation’ against militants.

More worrisome is the fact that not much is even being said. Asif Zardari and Asfandyar Wali Khan may be believers in silence being golden. Nawaz Sharif, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Mushahid Hussain were all known for their loquaciousness, but they too seem to have taken to taciturnity. It may be that they have chosen to be non-committal on the overriding issue facing the country (dealing with militants).

A few sparks have, however, flown out of an otherwise cool pile of ash. Amin Fahim, still a vice-chairman of the PPP, said recently that the ruling PPP was not the old and real PPP but a new one (new presumably because it is now directed by Mr Zardari), and that he had nothing to do with its governance. On July 3 Mr Zardari removed Abdul Qadir Shaheen, a veteran party worker and devotee of Benazir Bhutto, from his post as head of the PPP’s labour bureau.

Mr Shaheen had committed the indiscretion of attending a function in honour of Ms Bhutto, organised by Naheed Khan, a confidant of Ms Bhutto and her secretary for many years, whom the party’s new leadership has left out in the cold. Amin Fahim was the guest of honour at this function and other participants included Aitzaz Ahsan, Senator Safdar Abbasi, Senator Enver Baig and many other party loyalists disaffected with Zardari and company.

A PML-N spokesman stated on July 2 that his party had not been consulted about the operation launched in Fata. The party is also said to have distanced itself from the PPP government’s decision to raise oil and gas prices. Its differences with the PPP over the reinstatement of deposed judges and the president’s impeachment persist. These facts have led some observers to wonder if these two parties are really in a coalition arrangement and, if they are, why don’t they reach agreement on major policy issues.

The nature of their coalition merits scrutiny. It was initially made to form governments at the centre and in Punjab. Further, it was predicated on the assumption that the partners would get the National Assembly to pass a resolution calling for the reinstatement of deposed judges by April 30 (Bhurban Declaration) or, at the latest, by May 12, 2008. The PPP, being the leading partner, was to initiate this move. It went back on its promise, whereupon the PML-N withdrew its ministers from the central government. But it said it would not join the ranks of the opposition, and would support the PPP government in all situations where it was doing the right thing. The coalition in Punjab continued to function.

It may then be said that there is no coalition between the PPP and PML-N in the central government. The relationship between them consists only of a one-sided declaration of intent that the PML-N made voluntarily. The party, however, is not bound to support the government on measures which it considers to be wrong or which are otherwise liable to lower its standing in public esteem.

It follows also that the PPP government at the centre is under no obligation to consult the PML-N, an outsider, on issues with which it may be dealing. What do we then make of the PML-N statement that it was not consulted about the Fata operation? I interpret it not as a grievance but as a statement of fact intended to dissociate the party from a potentially troublesome move.

The Sharifs may have figured that the PPP, being the recipient of the rewards of power, should be the one to bear the responsibility (and blame) for an operation which, howsoever necessary it might have been, was bound to invite strong disapproval from several quarters, especially the Islamic parties and like-minded others.

The reinstatement of judges was a matter of honour for the PML-N leadership. The PPP’s unwillingness to do anything about it could have been reason enough for the PML-N to move to the opposition benches in the National Assembly. That it has not done. If it did so, the PPP would not be able to form a viable government, and the president would have to dissolve the assembly and order new elections.

This turn of events would not be welcome to the PML-N or the PPP. Apart from the fact that a new election will cost a lot of money and effort, it may not produce significantly better results for either of them. There is still another consideration to be noted. If the PML-N deserts the PPP at the centre, the latter may desert the PML-N government in Punjab and bring it down. The Sharifs would then do all they can to keep the PPP on board in Punjab.

Unlike the PML-N, the JUI-F, Awami National Party and the MQM are partners in the coalition government at the centre, and it may be said that they are therefore entitled to be consulted on issues under consideration. Maulana Fazlur Rehman recently said (on July 5) that his party had not been consulted regarding the Fata operation and that the PPP is making decisions unilaterally which, he thought, would cause trouble. It is known that the ANP has reservations about the government’s Fata move, meaning that the PPP has not taken this party on board either.

The argument for consulting partners is valid but its mode may be moot. Mr Gilani should not have to be running to heads of parties in the coalition every time an issue is to be settled or a move made. If consultation means securing of concurrence, the party heads will each have a veto they can use to paralyse the government. Another way has to be found.

The normal procedure in democracies is to take the business at hand to the cabinet, which includes nominees of the coalition partners, and get it settled there. These nominees can present their respective parties’ views which will be considered as the discussion proceeds. If the majority in the cabinet does not accept their positions, they should let its decision prevail or, if they can’t live with it, resign. That is the way a cabinet government works.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts.

anwarsyed@cox.net

WHY are our ‘Islamic’ fanatics burning girls’ schools, or taking them over and renaming them Jamia Hafsa? In examining this question, we gain not only interesting insights into the mindset that does such things as well as the message it wants to convey through such acts.

We also gain a perspective on the wider context, i.e. the society in which the perpetration of such deeds for their symbolic value becomes possible in the first place.

Until 2006, there were reports of girls’ schools being set ablaze by the Taliban in Afghanistan. The phenomenon hit Pakistan in the aftermath of the army action against Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa in July last year, and has recently become the preferred method for Mullah Fazlullah and his ilk to signal dissatisfaction with the federal government. Targeting girls’ schools is, then, a kind of revenge act for what the army did to Jamia Hafsa.

Now, no one would claim that the Taliban, Al Qaeda and whoever is on the same wavelength stand out for their devotion to women’s emancipation the way it is understood today, that is equality in all walks of life. They consider this un-Islamic and themselves to be good Muslims. So in view of the fact that they are fighting western forces in Afghanistan and associate ‘secular’ education for girls with the (Christian) West, girls’ schools become legitimate targets. They have taken care to explain that girls do not receive ‘Islamic’ education in the institutions they burn. So what is their concept of what good Muslim girls should learn?

Here it is enlightening to refer to an excellent piece of investigative journalism by Aliya Salahuddin called ‘Rendezvous with the ‘Others’’, based on her meeting with the inmates of Jamia Hafsa in February 2007. The picture that emerges is that of young, impressionable girls, often orphans or children of poor families, who, after being lured into joining the Jamia, are brainwashed and indoctrinated with fanatical notions of virtue and vice.

What use are their computer training and their claims of fighting the exploitation of women if they are capable of asserting that the stick-wielding, burqa-clad beings were actually angels, and that they were getting orders to terrorise the citizens of Islamabad directly from the Prophet? They themselves are being exploited by the men who use them for their own ends. This, then, is the farcical and violent ‘education’ our extremists deem appropriate for girls, and explains why schools seized by them are renamed Jamia Hafsa.

The reason why females are selected for victimisation is directly linked to the prevalence of a male-dominated culture. While this is unfortunately the case in varying degrees in all four corners of the world, one has to admit that the potency it receives from the belief that Islam ordains it lends it a powerful institutionalised legitimacy in Muslim countries. Since our Taliban, etc believe they have a monopoly on interpreting Islam and that means restrictions of all kinds on women, girls and women become the obvious victims.

People like the Taliban and those who share their beliefs are the extreme symptoms of what is wrong with Muslim societies. Sadly the more intolerant and anti-female interpretations of Islam have, for obvious reasons in a male-dominated world, found more acceptance than the progressive ones. Consequently, both the vast majority of Muslims as well as non-Muslims believe that Islam is incompatible with the notion of equal rights for women, which is then seen as a hallmark of western, Christian or secular societies. When, therefore, people like the Taliban seek to express opposition to the West and all that it represents, it makes sense for them to burn girls’ schools, as they are seen as imparting ‘un-Islamic’ education. This of course leads to a very pertinent issue today, that of interpreting Islam, of which more another time.

What a tragedy that people are becoming such mental and moral dwarves in the country created by a leader of such progressive views as M.A. Jinnah. We could do with a good dose of both his and Iqbal’s enlightened and modern grasp of Islam, mistakenly understood as ‘westernised’. Dismayingly, a generation of misled young people believes that a ‘different’ kind of leadership is required for Pakistan today. Beware, Pakistanis, this is exactly what Pakistan doesn’t need, because it doesn’t make sense to shoot oneself in the foot by countering western neo-imperialism with pseudo-Muslim neo-barbarism. This only reinforces misconceptions about Islam. Those who burn girls’ schools should find no sympathy in Pakistan.

The writer is a Cambridge-educated analyst based in Hamburg.

p_v_hassell@t-online.de