SADLY, there is no escape for Pakistanis from the political turmoil currently engulfing their homeland, though during my recent visit to Washington, I tried to remain focused on a most exciting US presidential campaign.

Admittedly, there are multiple centres of power in the US and no policy initiative is successful unless it enjoys broad support of various institutions. The president, nevertheless, remains the most influential and effective voice on the formulation and execution of foreign policy. My primary interest therefore was in ascertaining how the two nominees would conduct their foreign policies.

If most of us reflect our lifetime experiences, then McCain and Obama’s attitudes can best be discerned from their writings. McCain was born into a family of distinguished military officers, with his father leading the US invasion of the Dominican Republic that installed a fascist ruler. Not surprisingly, he extols his father’s admiration for the British Raj, a position that his foreign policy adviser Niall Ferguson believes should be emulated by the US. Though held a prisoner in Vietnam for five years, McCain has been critical of what he calls the “utterly illogical restraints on the use of American power”.

Obama’s background and experience could not be more different. Son of a Kenyan goatherd, he was able to move to the US and marry a white girl from Kansas. Though abandoned by his father when only two, Obama was able to derive from the latter’s experience a disdain for ‘imperial cultures’ and a rejection of ‘unthinking application of force’. No two persons could therefore be more different than McCain and Obama.

The Bush Administration’s departure is likely to be welcomed in the expectation that US foreign policy would become more balanced and less abrasive. But McCain represents, to a large degree, a continuation of the Bush policies. For example, on Iraq, which remains the most polarising issue in the US, McCain is not only proud of his vote in favour of the invasion but has advocated that, if need be, the US should be prepared to remain engaged in it for the next 100 years! Obama, on the other hand, has always viewed the invasion as wrong and inadvisable and has called for a swift disengagement as essential for domestic reconciliation and for restoration of American image and credibility abroad.

Both are opposed to Iran’s nuclear programme, but have radically differing views on how to resolve the issue. While McCain would not hesitate to approve use of force against the Islamic regime, Obama favours a more nuanced approach, with an initial effort focused on diplomatic dialogue with Tehran. The Republicans have exploited this as evidence of his inexperience and naïveté, but Obama has remained undeterred in advocating negotiations as essential for political resolution to problems.

On the Middle East, McCain has been totally supportive of Israel, as all American politicians are wont to do. Not surprisingly, he enjoys support of the powerful Jewish lobby. Given his origin, Obama, has however faced serious questions about his commitment to Israel, a fact that has been exploited by the McCain camp to sow doubts in the minds of the powerful Jewish lobby. To counter this, Obama has had to reaffirm his strong commitment to the security and well-being of Israel, going to the extent of recently declaring that Jerusalem was the one and undivided capital of Israel. Nevertheless, the expectation is that his administration would take greater interest in the peace process.

As regards India, McCain is likely to build on Bush’s policy of forging strategic ties with New Delhi. Obama has also spoken of a ‘close strategic partnership’ with India but he was one of the few in the Senate who had serious reservations about the US-India civilian nuclear deal. Although he eventually voted for the Hyde Amendment, Obama also extended support to non-proliferation groups. Moreover, some of his advisers believe that Bush made far too many concessions and that a more ‘balanced’ approach was required. His administration is also likely to press India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as well as the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, two agreements that were far removed from Bush’s radar screen. While McCain favours renewing the nuclear offer to India, Obama is opposed to it.

But it is Obama’s view on Kashmir — an issue which Bush refrained from raising with the Indians — that has surprised Delhi. Writing in the Foreign Affairs, Obama declared that he will “join with our allies in insisting — not simply requesting — that Pakistan crackdown on the Taliban, pursue bin Laden and his lieutenants and end its relationship with all terrorist groups. At the same time, I will encourage dialogue between Pakistan and India to work towards resolving their dispute over Kashmir and between Afghanistan and Pakistan to resolve their differences and develop the Pashtun border region. If Pakistan can look towards the east (India) with confidence, it will be less likely to believe its interests are best advanced through cooperation with the Taliban”.

One of Obama’s foreign policy advisers pointed out to me that this may well be the first instance of an American presidential candidate offering his views on Kashmir, this early and with such clarity. There is, thus, some anxiety in Delhi that Obama may be offering Pakistan diplomatic activism on Kashmir in return for Islamabad’s cooperation in fighting Al-Qaeda. Undoubtedly, Indo-US relations have over the years acquired a strategic character, primarily because of the initiatives taken by Bush. Obama may however be more sensitive to non-proliferation issues and therefore not in favour of making exceptions to the international regime to cater to New Delhi’s wishes.

On the flip side for Pakistan, Obama is likely to be even tougher than Bush on the issue of Islamabad’s cooperation on the war on terror and less tolerant of our ‘duplicitous policy’ on this issue. In fact, he would be quite willing to consider beefing up American military presence on our borders with troops that would be released from Iraq. He is also likely to be less tolerant of any effort by us to ‘assist’ the militants in occupied Kashmir and also more sympathetic to our democratic aspirations.

What the US thinks and does matters to all of us, especially at a time when it is facing tremendous challenges, both at home and abroad. An intelligent, moderate and sensitive White House occupant would therefore be a most welcome change.

ON the whole, the lawyers-sponsored long march on Islamabad was a wholesome experience, as all activities that can reassure the people of their potential to effect a change always are.

Regardless of the motivation, the suspension of the bureaucratic canon that all non-religious political gatherings in Islamabad must be forcibly prevented should be welcomed. In a capital where even small groups of protesters have often been hounded and beaten up by truncheon- wielding goons in uniform, authorities’ wooing of a large congregation was an unintended benefit of the long march. One should like to hope that this break from an ugly practice marks the beginning of a new tradition of tolerance of dissent.

The debate on what was actually achieved by the lawyers and what they could not achieve is unlikely to end soon. But there is little room for controversy on some harsh messages the event has sent to the federal authority, specifically to the People’s Party high command.

First, it has become abundantly clear that no diversionary manoeuvre or subterfuge can help the government in bypassing the issue of the judges’ restoration. Any further delay in resolving this matter will not only affect the authorities’ ability to address issues on the people’s list of priorities, it will also accelerate the politicisation of the judges’ role and thus do serious harm to the cause of the judiciary’s independence.

Secondly, the protest rallies provided ample proof, if any were needed, that the People’s Party is losing its standing with the people because of a growing perception that it is dragging its feet on the judges issue not only because of its own reservations on the independence of the judiciary but also because of its subjective appreciation of the post-election power structure. Unless the party can arrest the alienation of the common citizens with something better than the game of bluff and bluster started by some of its trouble-shooters, it will become dangerously vulnerable. The party has already created problems for itself by pandering to cronyism and it should know better than taking all its supporters for granted.

Thirdly, and more important than anything else, the rush among fortune-seekers of many different hues to play godfather to the lawyers’ movement has exposed a game plan to revive the pattern of governance devised by Gen Ziaul Haq. In that design the scope for democratic politics will be minimal.

While the mainstay of Gen Zia’s rule was his command over the armed forces, he did craft civilian support columns. He strengthened the conservative religious lobby with economic incentives, employment opportunities, and by helping it to fill its coffers and build up arsenals of modern weapons. He also allowed the business a free rein and pacified landlords by ensuring deletion of land reforms from political discourse. After initial jolts, he allowed the civilian bureaucracy the illusion of partnership with their more privileged counterparts from the military. Through purges under the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) of 1981 he created a docile judiciary that became a willing tool for creating a theocracy. Finally, he laid claims to immortality by acquiring nuclear weapons. It was this formidable coalition of vested interests that sustained Gen Zia’s anti-democratic rule.

This state model easily survived some infirm tinkering by two PPP governments and the second PML-N government deemed it prudent to make it even stronger. Gen Musharraf stumbled into a manner of governance that led to the collapse of the edifice Gen Zia had so laboriously raised. While following Gen Zia’s example in demonising and demolishing the predecessors in power (PML-N in Gen Musharraf’s case and PPP in Gen Zia’s case) he alienated the big business and then squeezed the civil bureaucracy out of decision-making.

He had no problem with the conservative clerics to begin with but after 9/11 it became impossible for him to pamper them. His ham-handed drive against terrorism did not allow the public to realise that this war was being fought in Pakistan’s interest and an overwhelming majority, especially in areas bordering Afghanistan, came to believe that Islamabad was fighting America’s war. By ostracising the architect of the bomb he alienated the nuclear hawks. Thus by the end of 2006 the general had knocked down all the props of his power except for the judiciary.

His 2007 decision to break with the judiciary is likely to be written down as one of the most intriguing acts of hara-kiri in the annals of totalitarian rule. Finding himself isolated and under a multi-dimensional pressure to hold a general election, and to allow some fairplay, Gen Musharraf had no option but to fish for support in political parties other than the one he had dethroned in 1999. His failure in keeping the latter out was inevitable in the crude manoeuvre.

The lawyers’ movement and the apparent lack of intra-coalition cohesion seem to have reactivated the lovers of the Zia model. Quite obviously they believe the present coalition, disliked by the religious parties, big businesses and even by the permanent establishment, should give way to an IJI-like alliance backed by the interest groups mentioned above. The sudden emergence of some of the veteran coup-makers as champions of democracy can only be explained in this context.

It is no secret that quite a few powerful elements have already started suggesting a fresh election within a few months and the traditional power-brokers, who should never be considered as having retired, are busy painting scenarios that can tempt any politician.

No elaborate argument is needed to prove that Pakistan cannot afford a return to the 1980s. The Zia model envisages an anti-democratic and obscurantist regime that can never appreciate the demands of a federal state, nor can it do justice to the teeming millions — women, peasants, workers and the minority communities. All those working for a revival of the Zia legacy are thus, consciously or unwittingly, paving the way to an ultimate disaster.

This increases the responsibility of the coalition leaders for completing the transition to democracy. A total break with the authoritarian tradition, everybody knows what that means, will only be the first step towards the establishment of democratic government. The need for speed is manifest. Nobody should entertain the illusion that the window of opportunity opened to the politicians bearing civilian badges will remain open for ever.

This should be taken not as a call for blind support to the wobbly coalition because it must learn to earn people’s goodwill but it is necessary to urge the coalition partners to look beyond their narrow party interests (easier said than done) at least over the period required to put a democratic apparatus in place.

All coalitions are temporary arrangements and must sooner or later break down. In Pakistan’s present situation, any effort aimed at hastening the inevitable will impose on the people costs they cannot bear. Thus, the tendency visible in each major coalition partner’s camp that the other side is under some unavoidable compulsion to stay in tandem needs to be resisted. Successful management of a coalition is an art that can only be acquired through diligent striving towards agreed goals. It is time the learning process was earnestly begun.

AFTER five years trying to make his dream of a new life in Spain work, Briton Neil Dorrington is preparing to say adios. “I have had 18 jobs and it has been a long struggle. I think things will be easier in the UK,” said the 24-year-old IT worker.

Dorrington lives with his fiancee in Elviria, a small village popular with British expatriates on the Costa del Sol, south eastern Spain. But his hopes of a better life in Spain appear to be over. “There are just no jobs coming in at the moment. This property crisis has had a big impact. People are really nervous.”

He is typical of a growing number of immigrants, who make up 10 per cent of the country’s population, and have found themselves struggling as Spain’s economic crisis deepens. “Lots of people I know have decided to go home. It may not be so good in Britain either, but you probably have a better chance to get a job,” he said.

After years of record growth, when the Spanish economy outstripped its European neighbours, the country now finds itself staring at a grim future. A report last week by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development predicted that Spanish growth will fall by more than half to 1.6 per cent this year, dropping to 1.1 per cent in 2009.

Unemployment now stands at 9.7 per cent — above the eurozone average — and 2.3 million people are out of work.

Proportionally, the number of immigrants unemployed far outstrips that of Spaniards. According to government figures, 12.5 per cent of immigrants — 504,000 — are unemployed, while 8 per cent of Spaniards are without a job. Most worked in construction, which is experiencing a slowdown after the decade-long bubble finally burst.

Many Britons might be reluctant to leave behind the Spanish sun, but immigrants from Latin America, Africa or eastern Europe find themselves stuck between a rock and hard place. If they stay they may find themselves out of work, with little means of support. But heading home to Morocco, Ecuador or Romania means a life of low pay and the end of their dreams.

In March, the Romanian government tried to tempt home some of the 665,000 Romanian expatriates in Spain to fill half a million empty jobs. There were few takers.

Gelu Vlasin, of the Federation of Romanian Associations in Spain, said: “The jobs they were offering paid between EUR400 and EUR1,000 a month. Are people really going to go back for less than they make here? I doubt it.”

But others want to go home. Marisol Toapanta Loachamin, 32, a community worker, makes no secret of the fact she would like to be back in Ecuador after 13 years in Spain. “I look out of the window and think of the full moon you can often see in my country. But here in the city it is hard to see anything for all the pollution,” she said.

But economics prevent her from returning to her native Quito. With house prices falling, Toapanta, a married mother, would lose money if she sold her Madrid apartment now. She would also see her income fall from EUR1,150 a month to about EUR220 in Ecuador. Even allowing for a lower cost of living, she would be worse off.

Next month, Spain’s immigration minister, Celestino Corbacho, is to announce measures to help immigrants to return home.

Some have not waited around. Since 2003, more than 3,700 have taken advantage of an earlier government scheme to return to their countries.

Miguel Pajares, a doctor of social anthropology at Barcelona University, is compiling a report to be published next month for the Spanish government on immigration.

“I have heard of cases of Moroccan families where the wife and children have returned and the husband stays in Spain to earn the money and rents out the rooms of their house to pay the mortgage,” he said. “Those who have had the worst problems are the Romanians and Bulgarians and perhaps the Moroccans who were working in construction. Latin Americans have had fewer difficulties as they work mostly in tourism or services.”

But others doubt Spain will see a mass exodus. Juan Carlos Rois, president of the NGO America Spain Solidarity and Cooperation, which helps Latin Americans to return home said: “I don’t think we will see a large number returning. They may think about it, but the reality is they would be worse off in their own countries.”

—The Guardian, London