IN the 2006 Charter of Democracy, Pakistan’s two major and moderate political parties jointly committed themselves to “an independent judiciary, a neutral civil service and rule of law and merit”. It is a remarkable commitment.

The snag is that it was made in London at a time when their leaders were on the run, desperately needing the protection of the law administered by neutral civil servants and adjudicated by independent judges. Their own record on all three counts during their alternating stints in power spanning the decade of the 1990s, to say the least, was dismal.

Forgetting their conduct when in government and trusting their declaration in exile, the people have voted them back into power. Now doubts of all kinds and despondency have set in. The Charter’s three objectives already appear to be beyond reach.

The movement for an independent judiciary has degenerated into a struggle for power. It had to for it became identified solely with the reinstatement of the judges that Pervez Musharraf had sacked, and whom he had appointed. The looming fear now is that in this tussle the judiciary instead of becoming more independent might lose whatever little independence it had.

The rule of law cannot prevail while its custodians in parliament and in the superior courts are embroiled in a do-or-die debate and the driving forces in the background are political and personal. It appears to be a long haul.

No difference of opinion has arisen, not openly at least, between the parties to the London Charter on their commitment to a neutral civil service based on merit. Nor does any legal complication attend upon it as it does with reference to the judiciary. Yet, there is no sign of either neutrality or merit gaining recognition after the elections. To the contrary, rumours and press reports seem to suggest that neutrality and merit, long in recession, have taken a deeper plunge.Here is an illustration, instructive and amusing. A pilot described by his colleagues as ‘dynamic and aggressive’ has been appointed chief of the national airline. The press report goes on to let the cat out of the bag, perhaps unwittingly, by adding that “besides his professional credentials Captain Haroon is well known for his friendship with the PPP co-chairman Asif Ali Zardari and Sindh home minister Zulfiqar Mirza”.

One does not know what would help the troubled airline more — the dynamism of Captain Haroon or his friendship with Asif Zardari. But the fact to note is that every appointment being notified now has to it a ring of kinship or favouritism that negates both neutrality and merit. Not that it was any different during past regimes. But the commitment of the parties to the London Charter finds no fulfillment in their actions either.

The aims of the Charter are neither new nor unusual. They just reiterate the founding but forgotten principle on which Pakistan’s civil service rests. In the few months given to him after independence, Mr Jinnah found time to address the civil servants twice — at Chittagong in March 1948 and a month later in Peshawar — to tell them that they ‘must not to fall victim to any pressure’ nor support any particular political party or leader. At the same time, he warned ‘the leaders and politicians’ not to interfere with the duties of the civil service.

Jinnah’s successors showed much less commitment to the neutrality of the civil servants but the first to assail it, and also to depart from the principle of competitive merit, was Ayub Khan. He arbitrarily removed a score of them whom he considered defiant or incompetent. Ten years later, Yahya Khan dismissed a much larger number — 303. But neither Yahya nor Ayub disturbed the structure of the civil service. In the course of time, both of them, in fact, came to rely heavily on the civil servants.

It was left to Z.A. Bhutto to abolish not only the service cadres but also the constitutional safeguards of the civil servants after dismissing 1,400 of them through a hastily compiled haphazard list which included many retired or dead. He imagined neutrality was a myth and bureaucracy itself a powerful vested interest. Disregarding the rule of entry through competitive merit, Bhutto inducted a large number of people from all walks of life in all services at all levels. They came to owe loyalty not to any cadre or institution but to him alone.

Prodded by the supporters of his coup and guided by his own prejudices, Gen Musharraf delivered the last and fatal blow to merit and neutrality both. He first struck at the heart of the country’s administrative cadre and then went on to place the civil servants under the direct control of the politicians through his devolution plan. In a state of baffled impotence, the civil servants — each for himself — were left to find a role in a confrontational political environment. The country thus came full circle — from Jinnah’s concept of total separation of the administration from politics to their complete merger.

Interestingly enough, when Pakistan’s latter-day leaders and soldiers abolished the civil service considering it to be a legacy of colonial rule, the thinking of the Indian leaders was in line with our far-sighted founding father. This is what Sardar Patel had then to tell his partymen who wished the services to be local and answerable to them: “You will not have a united India if you do not have a good all-India service which has the independence to speak out its mind and which has a sense of security.… [It] … is the sine qua non of sound administration under a democratic regime, even more than under authoritarian rule.”

Manmohan Singh had similar thoughts when he took over as prime minister. India has stayed united and democratic despite many insurgencies, 35 squabbling states (provinces) and a variety of races and religions. Pakistan has a painfully different story to tell only because it abandoned all the principles of the state policy enunciated by its founder.

Authoritarian regimes could make do without an independent and secure civil service. A fragile democratic order cannot. Bhutto erred fatally. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif too had to pay a heavy price in their turn. Now that their parties have come together they should bring back an administrative service that is secure and committed enough to sustain the new democratic venture. It is of greater importance than an independent judiciary.

IT has become customary to assert that in its amended form the constitution invests the president with awesome authority and power in the country’s governance. I have read the constitution in its several versions and found this impression to be incorrect.

The president has the power to make certain appointments, some of them in his discretion and others in consultation with the prime minister or, in the case of judges, the chief justice. He can call for reconsideration of decisions the prime minister or the cabinet has made but must accept them as they are reported out after reconsideration. He can dissolve the National Assembly if he finds that the government of the federation cannot be carried on according to the constitution. That pretty much exhausts his authority.

It is true that he ruled the country even after the election of 2002, but he did so because of the force he commanded as the army chief. He lost this base of power after he gave up his army post. He had also been building a support base outside the armed forces. His agents seduced or intimidated politicians to desert their parties and came together in a new formation called Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q).

Relying on General Musharraf’s indulgence, its managers reaped the rewards of power even though they had never put seed in the ground. They avoided the toil of building rapport with the people and mass support for their organisation. The elections in 2002 were rigged to enable PML-Q to emerge as the dominant party in coalition governments at the centre and in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. By way of returning General Musharraf’s favours, the party leaders gave him unqualified obedience and applauded his policies and initiatives, both domestic and external.

As Musharraf’s standing declined, the PML-Q fell even lower in public esteem. Its gross neglect of the people’s needs and aspirations and its abject subservience to the army chief/president brought it humiliating defeat in the election of Feb 18, 2008. Thus, the great majority of voters repudiated both General Musharraf and the party he had put together.

One should have thought that having lost his base in both the army and national politics, the general would either go home in retirement or at least be quiescent. Two other parties, PPP and PML-N, well grounded in mass support, emerged from the election with the mandate to govern and they formed coalition governments. With these developments in mind, I had anticipated that if he chose to remain president, he would be content with the role of essentially a ceremonial head of state.

I mentioned this interpretation to political observers of my acquaintance, and most of them rejected it. They believed that having exercised virtually total power for eight years, he had become addicted to it, and that he was going to do what he could to undo the ground realities the elections had produced and destabilise the new government. Indications are that their interpretation may be closer to the truth than mine.

In parliamentary democracies, the head of state normally acts on the advice of the prime minister, not on his own initiative. General Musharraf went to China a few weeks ago and talked with some of its leaders in addition to sightseeing. The trip cost many millions of rupees. Did Prime Minister Gilani ask him to go and, if so, why? If some important business was to be transacted with the Chinese government, he could have gone himself or sent his foreign minister.

Mr Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, was in the country recently and he was reported to have negotiated a gas pipeline deal with General Musharraf. Once again it is not clear why Prime Minister Gilani did not talk things over with Ahmadinejad. The latter may be head of the executive in Iran, but the prime minister is head of the executive in Pakistan. It would have been in the fitness of things for the two of them to discuss matters of mutual interest.

I do not accept the proposition that General Musharraf is personally known to, and trusted by, world leaders, and that he is therefore uniquely positioned to guide and conduct this country’s foreign relations. We know that he has visited scores of countries as Pakistan’s spokesman but it is not known what he has brought back other than promises of cooperation in the war against terrorism, and free trade agreements, which flood our stores with foreign merchandise to the detriment of our own manufacturers.

It is surprising to hear the general say that he is willing to work with the present government. He does not seem to understand that he has no other option. The law requires him to do as told.

Political leaders in Pakistan have been clamouring for the supremacy of the constitution and that of parliament. The latter means that its designees (the prime minister and his cabinet) will govern and remain accountable to it for their conduct. It is said that the president is a part of parliament. That does not mean that he can replace the parliament’s designees as the ruling authority. It means that the country will be governed by laws made by parliament and not by presidential ordinances, and that issues of policy will be settled through discussion and debate in its Houses.

If the primacy of parliament is to materialise, the president must be confined to his constitutional role. It is not clear why the PPP leadership is letting him go beyond his assigned role and transgress the prime minister’s domain. And this despite the fact that he continues to treat PML-Q as his party and is trying to make it a counterpoise to the PPP and PML-N.

I am not willing to believe that Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani is letting Musharraf get away with his machinations and transgressions because he is timid. But we know also that he defers to Mr Zardari who at this time is acting as the power behind the throne, and he, for reasons which are not generally known, wants the general to be an activist president.

If the current pattern of their interaction continues, the historian of tomorrow may have to conclude that these two gentlemen had made a partnership to subvert the constitution of Pakistan.

The writer, professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, is a former visiting professor at the Lahore School of Economics.

anwarsyed@cox.net

CHINESE astrologers predicted last year that natural disasters would strike in 2008. The recent cyclone in Burma (Myanmar) and the massive earthquake in China seemed to tragically confirm their predictions about the Year of the Rat.

China’s last major earthquake was in 1976 when 240,000 died in the city of Tangshan. The Communist Party, then run by the Maoist Gang of Four, covered up the disaster and delayed relief efforts. This time, Beijing’s response was swift, efficient and remarkably open. Even public accusations of shoddy construction were permitted by the government. But Beijing also rebuffed most offers of aid from abroad, so far allowing in only a small number of foreign rescue teams.

Burma also refused aid from other nations, the UN, and international aid organisations, bringing a storm of worldwide condemnation against its isolated regime and threats from Western powers of forced humanitarian intervention. Why did Burma’s generals spurn foreign assistance and mount a half-hearted rescue campaign when up to two million of its wretched people were in grave distress and facing another lethal storm? First, pride. The fiercely nationalistic, xenophobic regimes that have ruled impoverished Burma, rejected all foreign influences and kept this nation isolated for nearly fifty years.

Second, Burma’s generals claim their 400,000-man army, known as the ‘Tatmadaw,’ is able to provide all necessary relief. The presence of foreign aid workers would insult the army’s honour, risk undermining its unquestioned authority, and recall the colonial era. China had similar feelings. Besides, charged the Burmese, who was Washington to talk after New Orleans?

Third, the Union of Burma created by British imperialism is an unstable South Asian version of Yugoslavia. A third of its 47 million people are ethnic minorities like Shan, Karen, Katchin, Mon, Wa, and Chin who have been battling the central government for independence since 1945. In recent years, a shaky truce has held between these minorities and the government.

Burma’s generals fear relaxing their iron grip will spark renewed demands for independence by the heavily-armed ethnic rebels. They also believe the western powers are determined to overthrow Burma’s government and seize the nation’s natural resources of timber, precious stones, gas, and, potentially, oil. The generals see offers of humanitarian aid as a thinly disguised attempt at ‘regime change.’

A loss of power by the military regime could cause Burma/Myanmar to fly apart and destabilise the entire region. That’s why Burma’s neighbours and allies, Thailand and China, quietly back the junta.

The generals, however callous and brutal, are not far wrong. ‘Humanitarian intervention’ may be coming to play the same role that ‘peacekeeping’ did in recent years – a way for foreign powers to insert their influence into Third World regions under the guise of good works. Potentially oil-rich Darfur is the latest example.

Burma is also wary of international aid organisations. Some, like the Red Cross, are apolitical and perform splendid humanitarian work. But others have hidden agendas, such as trying to promote evangelical Christianity or left-wing government. Neither Burma nor China wants any part of these professional disaster chasers who use calamities to raise money that funds their organisations. Christian missionaries have done much to stir up rebellion among Burma’s ethnic groups, particularly Baptist missionaries among the Karen. Finally, geopolitics. China is Burma’s closet ally. The US, its allies and particularly India are deeply alarmed by the opening of a Chinese-run port in Burma at Kayauk Phyu, its connection by planned rail and pipeline to Kunming in southwestern China, and by Chinese naval activity in the Coco Islands. Kayauk Phyu gives the Chinese Navy access for the first time to a port on the Bay of Bengal, hitherto the exclusive domain of the US 7th Fleet and Indian Navy.

While the US has laudably offered major humanitarian aid in this crisis, it also would like to oust Chinese influence from Burma. So would India, China’s Asian rival. The disaster in Burma offers an interesting opportunity to begin loosening the junta’s hold on power and asserting Western influence in a strategic, potentially resource-rich nation that has been in self-isolation from the world since the 1960’s.

Finally, neither China’s Communists nor Burma’s generals will risk losing face by admitting they need substantial outside help when both have large, capable armed forces. And particularly not to westerners.

—Copyright Eric S. Margolis 2008