May 05, 2008	Monday	Rabi-us-Sani 28, 1429

WASHINGTON, May 4: The victory of moderate political parties in the February elections will help convince the West that their fears of an extremist takeover of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are unfounded, Pakistani officials say.

Officials from the Pakistani defence establishment and the Foreign Office told a seminar in Washington that there never was a real threat of an extremist takeover.But they acknowledged that the global community appeared to be unconvinced of the fortitude of their nuclear security system, the reliability of their personnel, and their commitment to non-proliferation goals.

Although the seminar was not open to the media, the organisers released its proceedings over the weekend, highlighting various issues raised by American and Pakistani participants.

Besides Pakistani and US officials, speakers from several US think-tanks also participated in the seminar which was the first opportunity for many to hear directly from serving Pakistani officials how they intended to protect their nuclear weapons.

The participants identified five core reasons that caused policymakers, journalists, and the non-proliferation experts to express concern over Pakistan’s nuclear activities.

First is the A.Q. Khan legacy. Pakistani participants conceded that despite being a seemingly isolated incident, Dr Khan’s nuclear-proliferation-for-profit enterprise had made “an indelible blemish” on Pakistan’s nuclear history.

Second, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is in a growth mode. Pakistan’s production of fissile materials and its nuclear arsenal are increasing.

Third, Pakistan’s use of grey, and possibly black, markets to import nuclear-related equipment that are denied under export control laws is inconsistent with international norms.

Fourth, Pakistan’s pattern of government volatility concerns those who worry about who may come to power and how that would effect the nuclear security apparatus. While religious extremists taking control of the government does not seem a likely scenario at present, there is a pattern of political volatility.

Finally, the insurgencies active in Pakistan are an indication that security threats continue. Extremists operating in western regions of Pakistan had expanded beyond the tribal regions to urban territories and had targeted government figures, vehicles and buildings, the participants noted.

Pakistani participants conceded that all of these challenges existed; however, they were confident that the steps their country had taken, and would continue to take, to safeguard its nuclear assets were commensurate with the threats they faced.

They pointed out that the victories of moderate political parties and the smooth transfer of authority to the elected representatives were recent signs of stabilisation in Pakistani politics.

The Pakistani participants noted that their country was being unfairly singled out and demonised as a nuclear security risk in the international media. Expressing his dismay, one Pakistani panellist asserted that Pakistan could not be a target and partner in the global non-proliferation community at the same time.

The participants noted that a significant source of frustration for Pakistan was the inability of the country to engage in normal nuclear trade and cooperation with the international community.

In particular, they pointed out, that blanket embargos prevented their country’s acquisition of vital nuclear safety and security equipment and restrained their ability to be better informed about procedures and practices.

Stressing the need for better integration of Pakistan into the mainstream of modern nuclear nations, participants suggested a revitalisation of the formerly open and friendly relationship that Pakistan had with the US and international nuclear community prior to the mid-1970s.

In particular, they viewed the supply of safety equipment and information to Pakistan’s safeguarded facilities as a possible confidence building first step, one that had been approved by the IAEA.

This also is an area where a precedent favouring cooperation may be set if the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement goes into effect. However, the Pakistani participants made clear that they were not asking for any assistance with unsafeguarded facilities.

While legal barriers make it difficult for Pakistan to receive nuclear cooperation from the international community at present, according to one US participant, the following forms of cooperation may be legally permissible, though they are highly dependent on policy decisions:

• Providing “assistance for the protection or safety of nuclear weapons that is limited to multi-purpose physical security equipment or measures, training in material accountancy and control, procedures for personnel vetting and exchanges on best practices.”

• Exporting some dual-use items for physical security and safety reasons for safeguarded facilities, though these could not contribute to the nuclear weapons programme.

• Cooperating generally to protect radiological sources, including spent fuel.

• Offering humanitarian and technical assistance at a nuclear facility in the event of a radiological incident resulting from an accident or sabotage.