Talking back to the state
By Haider K. Nizamani
THE state uses various lenses and methods to see, catalogue and control its citizens. These range from using routine data collection pertaining to their purchasing power and spending habits to resorting to force such as the controversial use of gun-ship helicopters to crush rebellions.
But our understanding of how people ‘talk back to the state’ is quite limited. In Pakistan, as in much of the Third World, resistance to the state mainly captures the attention of the urban intelligentsia and when it is expressed in organised ways it manifests itself in a confrontation between the state and its citizens.
The lawyers’ movement in Pakistan which began in March 2007 bears testimony to this. Resistance came to be associated with black-coats versus the law-enforcement agencies in uniform as well as in plainclothes. Alternatively, resistance surfaces in other ways as when it takes the form of violent reprisals, frequently expressed in suicide bombings.
Lost in the process is what James Scott calls ‘everyday resistance’ which takes the form of “foot-dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on”. Such resistance makes no headlines and is hardly analysed by scholars because most forms of this struggle stop well short of outright collective defiance.
Opinion surveys, if conducted with empathy and care, help us to some degree to disaggregate the notions that people have and identify how different people ‘talk back’ differently to the state. The coalition led by Yusuf Raza Gilani has pledged to interact with citizens in a qualitatively different manner than the previous government. It is too early to say if the Gilani government will be able to fulfil its pledges and sustain itself for the full term of parliament.
If public pledges are well-intended then having some idea about how the people have been seeing the state in the past eight years will come in handy in determining the manner in which the new government should seek to converse with the masses. Here is a little sampling of how ordinary people view their relationship with the Pakistani state.
While state authorities and the spin doctors associated with them have been portraying the state as the bearer of development and security for conflict-ridden and unstable regions of the country, the people living in those regions mainly see the state’s role as a problem and not a solution. Regular resort to coercive measures has contributed a great deal to the perception of the state as the harbinger of conflict rather than peace.
Discourse emanating mainly from Islamabad often reduces opposition to the state in areas like Dera Bugti to the handiwork of disgruntled and anti-development tribal leaders. But it is safe to assert that people trapped in such conflict zones do not necessarily share Islamabad’s perception.
In a survey conducted by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, it was found that the perception of 85 per cent of the people in Dera Bugti is that the law and order situation has worsened during the last five years. Close to half of those polled in Lahore hold a similar view. Now the new dispensation in the country has extended an olive branch to the Baloch population. General Ziaul Haq did the same by releasing incarcerated Baloch leaders when he assumed power in 1977.
But these gestures were not followed up by concrete steps to alleviate Balochistan’s psychological and economic grievances against Islamabad. We will have to wait and see if Islamabad seriously intends to turn over a new leaf this time.
The responsibility of providing protection to the people is the basis for the contract between the individual and the state. Individuals endow the state with the privilege of legally using force to maintain order. On this front too, the social contract between citizens and the state in Pakistan leaves much to be desired. In a majority of situations, when people think their safety and security is in danger, they will turn to non-state institutions either on account of fear of state institutions or the lack of access to them. Police are seen more as part of the problem than the solution.
In many instances, the state is simply absent or distant from ordinary people when they would like to turn to it to seek safety. Imagine a village in Sindh where a woman is subjected to constant spousal abuse. In the absence of social services and well-trained police authorities, the hapless woman is more likely to broach the subject with and seek safety and security from those members of her extended family whom she thinks will be sympathetic to her plight.
The vitality of the bond between the ruler and the ruled can be ascertained, at the very minimum, in terms of the level of satisfaction the latter feels for the national government. Pakistani governments usually suffer from satisfaction deficit. People in most parts of the country are not satisfied with their rulers in Islamabad. Only a quarter of respondents in Karachi and Lahore during our survey expressed satisfaction with the national government. The figure in Dera Bugti was a dismal five per cent on this count.
It is admirable to see leading politicians of the country coming together in a coalition government. Will this translate into a coalition between politicians in Islamabad and the majority of Pakistan’s 160 million people? It is a tough but not impossible task.
Thanks partly to past disenchantment with civilian politicians, ordinary people do not expect too much even from those they elected in the February elections. Once the euphoria over national coalition-building settles, the new administration’s actions will tell whether or not those at the helm have grown wiser over the last decade.
writer teaches at the School of International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Canada.
hnizamani@hotmail.com


