Two governments or one?
By Mohammad Waseem
FROM April onwards Pakistan will be ruled by two governments, one representing the majority in the National Assembly led by Prime Minister Gilani and the other representing the supra-parliamentary forces led by President Musharraf.
The former will be effective in terms of the operational dynamics of day-to-day governance. The latter will be overwhelming in terms of the structural dynamics of the prevalent institutional-constitutional framework.
Both are struggling to meet the challenge of cohabitation. During the 1990s, the diarchic pattern of power-sharing between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forces tremendously weakened the political parties. Assembly after assembly was dissolved. Prime minister after prime minister was dismissed. Finally, ‘constitutional rule’ was replaced by overtly unconstitutional rule in 1999. A Bonaparte had struck again, for the fourth time in Pakistan’s history.
Can Pakistan live under two governments at the same time? The newly elected government of the PPP, PML-N and ANP is being held hostage by Article 58-2(b) and, in theory, the National Assembly can be dissolved at any time. That brings in the issue of parliamentary sovereignty, which was destroyed under the 17th Amendment. It is not surprising that politicians feel extremely insecure and want to do away with the controversial article as soon as possible.
But the president also has powers to appoint judges of the higher courts, as well as chiefs of the armed services. The anomaly of the situation is crystal clear: the nation elected a coalition of forces to govern the country, but the chief executive of the new administration will have no powers pertaining to top-level appointments in the judiciary or the armed forces. The nation gave a clear mandate against President Musharraf by voting his anointed party out of office. But the power he potentially still wields is enormous.
Related to the issue of the anomalous presidential powers is that of the restoration of judges. In early November 2007, a Supreme Court bench was hearing a case about the bona fides of Gen Musharraf’s election as president. The latter changed the composition of the court, which then approved his election. Justice, Pakistan-style, came into full play. Judges became pawns in the hands of the COAS, who suspended the constitution for the second time within a decade. One institution violated the other.
The president wants to stay on. If the judiciary is restored, and the case concerning the presidential election held on Oct 6, 2007 is reopened, it might mean Musharraf’s exit from office. If the 17th Amendment is modified, it would leave him a lame-duck president. If there is a move for his impeachment, he would be publicly discredited. All this means that prospects for the president are not very bright.
Yusuf Raza Gilani’s government seems to tread very cautiously. It enjoys a huge following in the National Assembly and may therefore make a move for restoring parliamentary sovereignty. At one end, it doesn’t seem that the lawyers’ movement will stop any time soon without the restoration of judges. At the other, though he has lost his moral and political authority, the president is technically still equipped with various legal powers.
Will the Gilani government dissolve NAB and the political wing of the ISI, the two institutions that attracted criticism for their perceived role against the political class? A party in government is usually less sensitive than the opposition about the potential of state institutions to harm the political leadership. But considerations about the possibility of sitting in opposition even sooner than expected can prevail over the government at this juncture in Pakistan’s history. This would mean that extra-parliamentary input into the political process would be contained.
Political forces have been wary of the perceived symbol of military intervention in the government in the form of the National Security Council (NSC). Will the Gilani government move to scrap it any time soon? Does a similar fate await the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), which represents intellectual input in the business of the state at the behest of extra-parliamentary forces?
The ruling coalition has its share of teething problems. Nawaz Sharif has openly espoused popular causes, ranging from the judges issue to the demand for Musharraf’s exit from power. Asfandyar Wali wants Pakhtunkhwa for the NWFP. Asif Zardari needs Fazlur Rehman in Balochistan to form the government. He also wants to accommodate the MQM in Sindh as a safety valve, even as his coalition partners would shy from such association given that party’s role as Musharraf’s protégé for several years.
How far can the new government go against the system of local bodies, with the nazim at its apex? The system was generally condemned for its role in support of President Musharraf during and between elections. An elected district officer, the nazim remains the most progressive characteristic of the present system. The political government will be ill-advised to turn the wheel of history backwards. Instead, there is need to move forward in the direction of party-based elections for local bodies that can turn the system into a nursery for political leadership at higher levels.
The new government faces a formidable agenda in the form of the ongoing military operations in Waziristan and Swat, and the fast deteriorating law and order situation. Washington’s envoys rushed to Islamabad on the eve of government formation to ensure a pro-US transition process. At home, the ongoing mini-operation against Baloch nationalists portends a political crisis.
Can the prime minister and president coexist in this grim situation, inasmuch as the latter has the potential to do away with the whole parliamentary framework? The two-government formula did not work before and is not likely to work in future. Outside Pakistan, the powers to dissolve the parliament lie neither with the president in India nor with Queen Elizabeth in the UK, nor with the governor general in Australia nor with any head of state in any parliamentary system.
In the past, such lofty phrases as balance of power between the prime minister and president have been employed to rob parliament of its sovereignty. The principle of balance of power between the executive, legislature and judiciary was thus manipulated for the purpose of putting a split executive in place. In this context, the president’s house emerged as a rival centre of power. No elected government was able or willing to take it lying low.
The ultimate security of the PPP-led government in Islamabad lies in parliamentary sovereignty. Only one government at one time can represent the nation.

