One would expect the liberation of Kashmir to make world headlines. But on March 3, the freedom of Kashmir that eclipsed all else on the Pakistani news channels was the release of Kashmir Singh, the Indian death-row prisoner convicted of espionage after being arrested in 1973 (the year we got a Constitution).

The event overshadowed another significant release that day, of Supreme Court Bar Association President Aitzaz Ahsan in Lahore. Also pushed into the background was yet another confrontation between the police and lawyers in Islamabad seeking the release of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry and other detained judges and lawyers.

Kashmir Singh spent 35 years in various Pakistani prisons before Ansar Burney, the caretaker minister of human rights, found him and obtained a presidential pardon. President Musharraf ordered Kashmir’s unilateral and unconditional release. This was a good deed that will be remembered. The media circus surrounding Kashmir’s release will also be remembered — for all the wrong reasons, including the inane blow by blow commentary —“there you see him eating”— and questions such as “And how did you spend your time?”

Tellingly, Mr Burney refused to comment on the issue of the detained judges, who ‘ceased to be judges’ according to caretaker law minister Afzal Haider who has been unable to find a legal definition for their status.

Mr Burney, however, acknowledged that Kashmir Singh’s freedom is part of the larger, ongoing issues of prison conditions and arrests by India and Pakistan of each other’s citizens, including young boys, for transgressions like over-staying a visa or straying across the border. Rightly or wrongly, many are accused of espionage or worse and end up spending years in prison.

A diplomat from the Indian High Commission told a TV reporter that Pakistan currently has 575 prisoners of Indian origin, besides the 25 Indian fishermen arrested recently, while India has 200 Pakistani prisoners, besides 18 fishermen. Independent estimates believe the actual numbers to be higher.

Then there is the case of the ‘forgotten 54’ Indian prisoners-of-war whose existence Pakistan has repeatedly denied. The issue was revived in September 2004 after a group of Pakistanis and Indians ran into the daughter of one of these POWs at a Delhi hotel. When a young Indian, Siddharth Dave, introduced himself to her as a Pakistani, she told him her father Major Sharanjitpal Singh Waraich of 15 Punjab (Patiala Regiment) was in Attock Fort along with the 30 others she hoped were still alive.

Her name was Simmi Waraich. She had written about this issue for the interactive online magazine Chowk with evidence that the missing men were in Pakistani custody, including a photograph in Time magazine and a letter sent from Karachi (‘The Forgotten 54 – When will the War Finish for Them?’ B. Waraich, Sept 3, 2004, www.chowk.com). Subsequently, some Pakistani newspapers published her letters of appeal to the president.

In January 2007, at a meeting with Indian External Affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee, Pervez Musharraf invited the missing Indians’ next of kin to visit the Pakistani prisons for themselves. Simmi Waraich was among the delegation that arrived in Pakistan in June 2007 with high hopes. After combing through several prisons and their records, facilitated by the authorities in every way, they had to leave without finding any trace of their loved ones but still convinced that they are here. This is because, as Simmi wrote in a series of articles at Chowk in June 2007, “apart from the evidence, Pakistan (and perhaps other countries too) have systems that leave much room for error.”

These errors include incorrect records, names mis-transcribed so that “Baldev in the admission or Entry Register became Billoo in the Transfer Register”. Other names “were outright absurd and likely to have been made up”.

Kashmir Singh had taken on another identity altogether, Mohammad Ibrahim, the name he initially provided Ansar Burney. Then there is ‘Sarabjit Singh’, arrested in 1990 for bomb blasts at Lahore, Kasur and Faisalabad. His relatives insist that this is a case of mistaken identity, as he is in reality Manjit Singh, a farmer who strayed across the border in an intoxicated state. Whatever his crime, he has already served over 17 years in prison.

Simmi pointed out that additionally, prisoners may languish for a time before reaching a civilian prison. For example, two of the soldiers captured after the Kargil conflict in September 1999, were kept in a place they cannot identify as they were in solitary confinement and blindfolded most of the time, before being brought to Rawalpindi jail for consular access. They were charged with border crossing. The Indian army had classified them as deserters while Pakistan had not disclosed their presence.

Jagseer Singh and Mohammad Arif, were ‘found’ in August 2004 in Rawalpindi Jail, after they managed to send a letter home. But by then, Arif’s family, presuming him dead, had got his wife Guriya married to another cousin, with whose child she was pregnant. This ignited a poignant drama which ended with Guriya being ‘returned’ to Arif after having her other marriage annulled.

Fortunately for Kashmir Singh, his wife Parameet, with whom he had contracted a ‘love marriage’, had waited for him as she knew in her heart, as she told journalists later, that he was alive. They are reunited now in their old age, in a real-life drama that mirrors the popular film ‘Veer Zara’.

Kashmir Singh was liberated on the same day as the high profile lawyer Aitzaz Ahsan, in captivity since Nov 3, for whose release American senators petitioned the president. Like Kashmir Singh, Aitzaz Ahsan too symbolises a larger issue. He has repeatedly expressed outrage at not his own incarceration but at the forced detention of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry and his family, including his wife and school-going children, particularly the youngest, who is a special needs child.

The day the paperwork was finally completed allowing Kashmir Singh to cross Wagah border into India and be reunited with his family, Aitzaz Ahsan also crossed the Punjab-Sindh provincial border, using his first day of freedom to visit the grave of his slain leader Benazir Bhutto. The celebrations and joy on either side as Kashmir Singh crossed the Wagah border contrasted poignantly with the tears at Ghari Khuda Baksh. Several television channels juxtaposed both events on their screens, alternating running commentaries on both.

Hours later, suicide bombers targeted the Naval War College in Lahore, eclipsing for the moment, both Kashmir Singh and Aitzaz Ahsan, and the larger issues they symbolise.

The writer is an independent journalist and documentary filmmaker based in Karachi.

beena.sarwar@gmail.com?

ASIF Ali Zardari’s run of good luck in getting away with his perorations unchallenged seems to have ended. While an advice to him to conserve his words should have been in order, the defenders of the faith have started stoning him for what is presumed to be heresy on Kashmir.

He is however being assailed for his less exceptionable utterances. The charge is that he betrayed the national cause when he stressed the urgency of promoting friendly relations with India, especially in the area of trade, and hoping that consolidation of India-Pakistan goodwill could lead to a satisfactory settlement on Kashmir. This, it is said, is contrary to the inviolable formulation that normalisation of relations with India is unthinkable until the Kashmir issue is resolved.

One of Zardari’s critics says that had he made such observations before Feb 18 his party would have paid dearly. This view can be sustained only if one forgets that the latest general election was fought almost wholly on domestic political issues and the major parties paid marginal attention to external relations, Kashmir and ties with India.

It may be useful, at least for keeping the record straight, to briefly recall what the various manifestos have said on the subject.

In the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl manifesto foreign affairs is the 21st chapter in a total of 25. India and Kashmir are mentioned in the last paragraph, titled; ‘Important issues in foreign policy’, after Palestine, Arab lands and Afghanistan have been allowed precedence: “End of the Zionist, American and British imperialist hold on Palestine, Jerusalem and all Arab lands; end of foreign aggression in Afghanistan; Kashmir’s freedom; and efforts to secure protection of the Indian Muslims’ life and property, honour, belief, occupation, housing etc – these will enjoy foremost and fundamental importance in Pakistan’s external policy.”

Foreign affairs is the last item in the 17-point MQM manifesto. The party stands for “close, friendly and honourable relations with all countries, especially with the neighbouring countries, wants to solve the Kashmir issue through meaningful, sincere and honourable dialogue according to the wishes of Kashmiri people, encourages confidence-building measures and dialogue process with India and desires peace and close cooperation between the countries of South Asia especially in economic fields….”

The PML-Q devotes three points to Kashmir and India in the final chapter (defence). Since the party deals only with subjects that begin with the letter D, defence is in and foreign affairs is out. The party supports the Kashmiri people’s right of self-determination through implementation of UN resolutions. It will support ‘any initiative’ and ‘any settlement’ which is acceptable to the Kashmiri people. “The peace process with India will be pursued with vigour.”

The ANP devotes a longish chapter (third out of four) to foreign affairs. Kashmir and India get two sentences as the sixth of the 13 points in this chapter: “Likewise, high priority will be attached to peaceful and friendly relations with India, based on (good) neighbourliness and cooperation. All problems including Jammu and Kashmir will be solved through negotiations and open negotiations will be the highlight of our relations with India.”

In the PML-N manifesto, foreign policy and national security figure together in the 20th (last but one) point. Kashmir and India are disposed of in two sentences: “Every effort would be made to resolve the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant UN resolutions and in consonance with the aspirations of the people of the territory for their inherent right of self-determination. A peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues with India, in a spirit of fairness and equity would be accorded special priority by the party.”

The PPP also refers to Kashmir and India in the concluding part of its manifesto: “The Pakistan People’s Party supports the rights of the Kashmiri people and will pursue the composite dialogue process agenda that it initiated with India, including Kashmir and Indo-Pak issues. It will not allow lack of progress on one agenda to impede progress on the other.”

The party notes that India and China have a border dispute and yet enjoy tension-free relations. It claims credit for proposing Saarc’s transformation from a cultural organisation into an economic one and will work for a regional economic framework for South Asia, and promote an Asian Common Market. (Emphasis added)

Unless one is an incorrigible hypocrite it should be possible to realise that the country’s major political actors have learnt to temper their traditional rhetoric on Kashmir with pragmatism. All parties are still ritualistically talking of Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination and leaving matters to their satisfaction, but they also seek friendly relations with India and none of them is raising the slogan; “No truck with India until Kashmir is settled in our favour.”

The streak of realism that has disturbed some holy warriors is not new. From the very beginning of the Kashmir stalemate two arguments have dominated the debate. One view has been that no normal relations with India are possible until the Kashmir issue is settled.

The other argument is differences on Kashmir should not prevent India and Pakistan from benefiting from possibilities of bilateral cooperation. For a good five decades all Pakistani authorities have indulged in the rhetoric of the former argument and in practice followed the logic of the latter.

Without waiting for a Kashmir solution, Ayub Khan offered India joint defence and signed the Indus Basin Water Treaty, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto opened trade with India, Ziaul Haq sought the cover of cricket diplomacy, Benazir Bhutto tried accommodation with India via Saarc, Nawaz Sharif could not resist Indian sugar nor a bus ride with Vajpayee, the 1996 caretakers imported Indian cement via Wagah, Pervez Musharraf (of core issue fame) allowed the import of beef, onions, and tomatoes and wheat from India, and the holinesses among the current caretakers now want to import Indian steel.

Thus, on the one hand Zardari has merely repeated what is clearly written in his party’s manifesto and on the other hand he has only suggested what a long line of Pakistani rulers have been doing.

The real issue is not what Zardari says or what his critics allege. In the present political situation statements by party leaders, even party manifestos, should count for less than the need to start establishing the supremacy of parliament. Let it be decided that regardless of what the PPP or its traditional adversaries say or think of relations with India the actual crafting of Pakistan’s policy will be done by parliament, although all parties should be free to air their views outside it.

One should be prepared to concede that every Pakistani firmly stands by the side of the much exploited Kashmiri people, and that everyone wants his own country people to resolve their own problems as well, but at the moment only one task matters – transition from the nightmare of despotism to the sunshine of parliamentary rule.

Anyone trying to cause dissension within the democratic camp, so described for want of a suitable expression, will be guilty of repudiating the barely two weeks old poll verdict. It is too early to start killing people’s hope.

WHEN the new government takes oath of office later this month, it will have a very heavy burden on its shoulders. Poverty alleviation, inflation, fuel and power crises and restoration of the judiciary will probably be its foremost concerns.

However it will also have the Herculean task of improving the image of Pakistan, which has greatly suffered in the last six to eight years for several reasons.

The previous government did make several attempts at ‘image improvement’ but without knowing what a genuine image building exercise really constitutes. Since President Musharraf embarked on a campaign to build a ‘soft image’ of the country, everything was said to be done in the name of image improvement; be it the Lahore marathon or the ridiculously expensive fountain in Karachi in the Arabian Sea. But if only it was that easy! Construction of monuments and holding of festivals remains a largely futile exercise if concrete political, social and economic reforms are not part of the equation.

National image building tools such as public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and nation branding have proved to be successful for many countries but history is proof that they were only effective when coupled with genuine changes in policies and domestic circumstances. Therefore, concrete measures such as restoration of democracy, economic reform, stopping human rights abuses, maintaining law and order, extending international cooperation, fighting extremism and rapprochement with India are essential before Pakistan can hope to improve its image.

No country has a bigger programme for public and cultural diplomacy and cultural branding than the United States. It has spent millions of dollars in attempting to remedy the situation. Yet people all over the world continue to ‘hate’ it. The superpower controls a huge share of the international media but has still not been able to make a difference in how it is perceived by foreign populations. The reason given for this by the general public is that, it has spent far too much time and effort tackling the symptoms while paying little or no heed to the causes. That is to say that public diplomacy and branding without changes in policies are ineffective at best.

This is true for every country including Pakistan. Branding and public diplomacy alone can only be marginally effective. At the end of the day, the ground realities count. No matter how good Pakistan’s investment policy is, if the political situation is not stable and the law and order is in shackles, it will fail to attract adequate foreign investment.

Branding worked for countries like Spain, Croatia, New Zealand and Wales only after substantial institutional and political changes had been made –– after realities had been altered. To be effective, it is essential that branding be credible.

The success of its cultural diplomacy vis-a-vis India should stand as a model for Pakistan. Nowhere had the image of the country been worse than amongst the people of its archrival. But in only a matter of weeks and months the situation began to improve drastically after Pakistan declared a unilateral ceasefire in Kashmir in March 2004 and invited India for a composite dialogue, which initiated a peace process. This was complemented by cultural diplomacy efforts made together by the government and civil society. As the Indians say, now it is fashionable in Mumbai to say that one is going to Karachi or Lahore.

The key point to note is that cultural diplomacy alone could not have worked unless a genuine peace-building initiative had not been undertaken. In other words, there is only so much that cultural diplomacy and cultural branding can achieve on their own. Even if they succeed in initially attracting investment and tourists, once the foreigners come to Pakistan and see lack of democracy, human rights abuses, violence in society and lack of justice, the cultural diplomacy and branding efforts will become counter productive.

That is not to say that Pakistan should not conduct any branding and/or public and cultural diplomacy. Conversely, the prudent thing is to do so simultaneously with tackling issues that are the source of the negative image.

To begin with, the show of desirability for change on Pakistan’s part itself can send a powerful signal to the world. This should then be followed by cultural and educational exchanges and people-to-people contacts and other tools of cultural and public diplomacy foremost of which is the engagement of foreign resident journalists as they are the eyes and ears of the international world. Recognition and differentiation from India and thus identity creation can then be achieved through branding. In doing so, it will be easier to create new, positive associations, than trying to refute old ones. This can be done through the branding of tourist areas, food and drink, products and cultural events. But it is essential that nation branding is a deeply ingrained rather than a superficial effort by the government.

Any nation that has once endured a pariah image knows that the image in itself is more consequential than reality. But history is evident of the fact that images can and do change and that nations can positively re-brand themselves. There is no reason why a coordinated all round effort cannot change the image and the reality for Pakistan, especially since the country is back on the path to democracy. Changing its negative image and positive re-branding is an important step towards changing its destiny. And one hopes that the new government will be more successful in doing so than the previous one.

The writer’s Masters’ dissertation was on national image-building.