IN one of his well-argued articles for Dawn, Eric Margolis wrote (before President Pervez Musharraf imposed emergency on Nov 3) that the politicians should help him get out of uniform. After all, by getting himself elected by the outgoing assemblies he was merely carrying out the wishes of the opposition, which for eons had focussed on one point — he should shed his uniform.

If there was an esoteric commonality of interests between the opposition and the president then, is there an unbridgeable gulf between the two now? This oversimplified question begs an answer.

Today, the PPP has emerged as the only national party; all others are regional and ethnic in character. This formidable position should enable the party to develop confidence in itself and see where its interests and those of Pakistan lie. Its first interest coincides with the country’s interests —a continuation and consolidation of the democratic process. All other issues must take a back seat. The PPP, it should be clear to the party leadership, has no scores to settle with the army as it exists today. It was the Zia-led army that had unabashedly persecuted the PPP and murdered its founder. Some Ziaist Generals are alive and are still the PPP’s sworn enemies. (Benazir gave an inkling of her mind on this issue after the first attempt on her life in Karachi on Oct 18).

Settling scores with the army, especially with Musharraf, is the PML-N’s agenda; Zardari and Amin Fahim should leave it to the Sharifs and Javed Hashmi to pursue their revanchist policies. It goes without saying that a PPP-PML-N coalition at Islamabad will mean a stable relationship with the Sharif-controlled Punjab. But as a national party, the PPP must worry not only about what the PML-N says about the judiciary but what other parties think about the whole range of issues the PPP-led government will be called upon to face. After all the PPP is in a position to be part of the provincial governments in Balochistan and the NWFP, too, and it has to listen to what its potential coalition partners in these provinces have to say about all issues under the sun.

Does Musharraf’s departure from the President House serve Pakistan’s interests or those of the PPP itself? Pakistan is now the focus of the world’s attention, especially that of the US and EU. These attentions have less to do with human rights and democracy and more with concerns about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. What characterises these concerns are contradictory statements, shocking irresponsibility, and threats, sometimes veiled sometimes open. If those sections of the American media traditionally hostile to Pakistan spew venom, Condi Rice makes a reassuring statement. If one Centcom general talks nonsense, Robert Gates reposes his full confidence in the Musharraf government’s ability to keep those nukes well secured. Musharraf is in the picture, and has been.

Pakistan’s membership of the war on terror isn’t exactly a propaganda stunt, nor is it all about swapping billions for PoWs for Gitmo. A greater part of this war is run not merely on military operations but on a web of intricate diplomatic and security relationships with foreign powers that range from China and Afghanistan to the EU and the US. This relationship is at places tenuous, open to the widest possible interpretation and often leads to mutual suspicions and misgivings.

Undeniably, the scepticism about the benefits to Pakistan from the war on terror is widespread. A change has to come, and only the representatives of the people of Pakistan can manage to effect it through a national consensus. But the shift cannot be sudden and allowed to turn into an overnight somersault that may hurt Pakistan’s interests and leave us isolated and more vulnerable.

The PPP has to evolve a modus vivendi with Musharraf, who is personally identified with the war on terror. But it must be a Musharraf without the article 58-2b at his disposal. The draconic power the president has — inserted into the Constitution by Zia, abolished by Nawaz Sharif through the 13th amendment and reincorporated by Musharraf in the 2002 LFO — must be done away with by parliament. Such an amendment to the basic law will be possible only if the PPP and the PML-N cooperate and work with other parties in the National Assembly and the Senate to have a two-thirds majority.

A leaner Musharraf could be an asset to the PPP. The new foreign minister, whosoever he is, will discover this to his advantage. The world has to be given an assurance that the democratic surge in Pakistan does not mean diplomatic chaos but an element of stability for the region and an asset for the war on terror.