PERVASIVE and persistent poverty stalks rural Pakistan. For the economic managers and their tutors, this is a problem of resource scarcity best resolved by aided and indebted economic growth through advisable market reforms. The pound of flesh remains a timeless allegory.

Z.A. Bhutto’s second, serious proposal for land reforms was scuttled by General Zia’s regime. The issue remained sidelined by all subsequent governments. Will Naudero and Raiwind reverse the trend? Does the deposed judiciary acknowledge justice as being inclusive of economic equity?

Optimistically, fair and free elections provide space for renewed discussions on agrarian reforms. Not just as an instrument of eradicating absolute poverty but in order to enable substantive democracy. If not now, when?

The poor are well informed about the cause of their precarious existence — extreme inequality in land ownership. In the last census, 90 per cent of those tilling the land were found to be landless. Among landowners, the bottom two-thirds own less than one-fifth of land since the top five per cent gobble up at least one-third. This is appallingly entrenched inequity — obscene if urban ‘growth’ was not producing even plumper vultures.

Social inequality includes state farms and regular land grants to collaborators as their reward for guiding democracy. A most scandalous scheme is one that seeks to turn 80,000 acres of coastal land into playgrounds for the rich. Surely, such enclosures will diminish and destroy the livelihood of tens of thousands of fisher folk.

When will Islamabad listen to the impoverished citizens? Gwadar aside, China’s support for the generals is curious as it comes from a country that produced Mao to embolden, excite and enrich the hordes outside the Wall.

What about corporate, highly mechanised agriculture that envisages huge farms operated by wage labour? That would be pauperisation, as Professor Jan Breman informed the Asian Development Bank and the Sindh government, especially in view of the indecent work and wages that remain the lot of urban labour.

This article poses some queries and responds with obvious suggestions. The aim is to support public action beyond the prescriptions of Washington’s neo-cons, disciples in Manila, and state and non-state actors in Pakistan, who eagerly wage wars on all fronts except against poverty and inequity. Can democracy have meaning without economic justice?

Inclusive citizenship demands secure freedom from poverty or any other discrimination. Several reasons, not least dignity, point to asset transfers over income transfers. The sceptical are invited to live by the safety nets of Islamabad.

Land reforms are a good instrument of enabling fundamental rights for the rural population. What is the minimum land required to escape income poverty? Is enough cultivable land available to provide such a minimum to all rural citizens? What complementary actions are required to ensure net yields? If land transfers fall short, then what?

One approach for minimum land rests on GDP from crops and livestock. At Rs15,000 per capita, land can provide much more than a conservative poverty threshold of say Rs10,000. As a social resource, enough land is available. The land poverty line (as GDP per acre) is around one-third acre per capita, in comparison to over one-half acre per capita available from over 20 million cultivated acres.

An alternative is to use the basis of the official income poverty line — income and price affordability for the intake of 2,000 calories per day per capita. What amount of land would assure this minimum?

As a very high-calorie item, wheat is a good yardstick. Average yield of over 1,000kg per acre suggests that the annual need for 200kg per capita could be met by around one-third acre per capita; a land threshold similar to the first estimate. If a second harvest is equally productive, then the threshold could be halved — aim for more landless or less land resumption.

Universal entitlement reverses gender discrimination. Similarly, even female children are assured of assets independently of their parents. This is no mean feat in the environment of South Asia’s patriarchy.

This proposal of land-for-income security assumes complementary public action for protecting real income through prices implicit in the expenditure poverty line. Protection against debt bondage calls for assured non-farm income to offset bad harvests (and co-variant downswings). There is an implicit cropping pattern and intensity in the land GDP concept. This is also ecologically sustainable. The latter is a heroic assumption, suggesting an upward revision of the land poverty threshold. At the very least, the state should not reduce productivity, illustrations of which are the devastating LBOD and the future RBOD to drain upland agriculture, as well as the Ghazi-Barotha hydropower project to feed power-hungry elites.

Agrarian reforms could begin with sharecroppers, whose poverty forces many into debt bondage (and worse). A minimum holding would be about two-third acres per capita if net earnings are equally shared. Since net shares get manipulated downwards, a precautionary threshold would be tenant farms of an acre per capita. The vast majority of tenant farms is smaller than 7.5 acres, supporting a family of seven or more. These would require either a higher income share for sharecroppers to escape poverty, or a larger farm. An exclusive plot for subsistence seems to be the best option to ensure food needs to offset riskier cash crops for the landlord.

Why not farming cooperatives? They can protect female entitlements, and realise the economies of scale. Hence, the land poverty threshold may be lowered. The effective constraint may lie in the limits to social cooperation.

Country averages hide much variation, requiring countervailing public action. Since distant dislocations create problems for migrants and host communities, land redistribution would be restricted, say to the same district. Whatever the land threshold, both low and high productivity needs to be taken into account.

District productivity indicates a very wide range — e.g. 200kg wheat per acre in rain-fed Karak, less than one-sixth of the yield in irrigated Ghotki. With restricted population transfers, land-deficit areas need supplementary support for raising yields, and for non-farm assets and income. Land-surplus areas could fund the privilege of excluding migrants.

The Sharia bench of the Supreme Court has ruled in favour of market price for the compulsory acquisition of land. Unchallenged, the government regularly ignores the ruling in mega projects. Will it do so for land reform ceilings? Can one consider interest-free, long-term bonds for land resumption?

Subsidies will be needed for those poor unable to afford land installments even over a generation. Perhaps large landowners could be given lifetime exemption from tax on agricultural income in lieu of the ‘free’ relinquishment of excess land.

Instead of sweeping land reforms, the government could begin with titling minimum land to the poor. At least a third of the rural population would require over 10 million acres to escape poverty. Targeting invites misallocations, and hence may be messy and ineffective as compared to universal entitlements.

Starting with state land and the largest landowners, land reforms would gain mass support to counter local hostility. But an appropriate land ceiling would probably be well under 25 acres, unless the (previously) landless are supported to substantially increase yields, or provided with non-land assets or secure employment.

West Bengal and Kerala are significant examples of slow, government actions versus quick people’s actions for land redistribution. Maoist areas in Nepal are another example. Why do policy thinkers echo the ADB view of Pakistan as West Asia, specially when more Muslims live in the east rather than the west?

The writers work at the Pakistan Institute of Labour Education & Research, Karachi

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