Evolution of judicial activism
By Prof Khwaja Masud
“IT is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is,” says Chief Justice John Marshall of the US. Consequently, the judges necessarily have to exercise their power, irrespective of the posture of the power-hungry executive or the touch-me-not attitude of the legislature.
Judicial activism is a time-honoured trait of judicial function, and to give up that trait is to capitulate before these two mightier organs of the state. History abounds in scintillating examples of judicial activism, when the judiciary came face-to-face with legislative arbitrariness, or executive abuses or interference in the due course of legal proceedings.
In the Dr Bonham case, decided in 1610, the issue was the validity of the charter of the Royal College of Physicians, confirmed by an Act of Parliament, which gave the incorporated society of physicians power to impose fine upon physicians going against its rules. The fines so imposed were payable half to the crown and half to the society. Dr Bonham, who was alleged to have violated the society’s rules by practising medicine in London without obtaining a proper certificate was summoned before the Royal College of Physicians and fined.
When he refused to pay the fine, he was imprisoned. He brought action for false imprisonment. Lord Coke, chief justice of the Court of Common Appeals before whom the case was listed, held the imprisonment wrongful on the ground that the statute which made the college the judge of its own cause, complainant and prosecutor, was against ‘common right and reason’, and was void. He declared: “When an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such act to be void.”
The judicial activism of Lord Coke shocked many people who strongly believed in the supremacy of parliament. Nevertheless, Lord Coke laid the foundation of judicial review, and history has justifiably conferred on him the title of ‘the legal father of judicial review’.
Five years later, another great judge, Hobart, was called upon to decide the Day vs Savadge case. Chief Justice Hobart ruled: “It is against right and justice and natural equity as to make a man judge in his own case.” He emphatically declared: “Even an Act of Parliament, made against natural equity, as to make a man judge of his own case, is void in itself, for the laws of nature are immutable, and they are leges begum (the law of laws).” Chief Justice Hobart’s famous phrase, leges begum, has become the foundation of the modern concept that the constitution, being the basic law, is the law of all laws.
Two hundred years later, John Marshall, chief justice of the US Supreme court, expounded the theory of judicial review in Marbury vs Madison (1803). He had to face a conflict between an act of Congress and the constitution. He said: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”
He ruled that it is a proposition too plain to be contested that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it, and any legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law. He propounded the theory of judicial review in relation to the written constitution, what his predecessors, Lord Coke and Justice Hobart, did with respect to the higher norms of the common law and natural equity respectively.
Chief Justice John Marshall’s proposition not only infused fundamentality into the constitution but also proclaimed that the court could decide on the constitutionality of the laws. He asserted the power of the courts to curb any illegality, whosoever its author may be.
Tocqueville paid a well-deserved tribute: “The power given to the American courts to pass on the constitutionality of statutes constitutes one of the most powerful barriers which has ever been raised against the tyranny of political assemblies”.
‘Judicial auto-limitation’ is a phrase used by Prof Edward McWhinney to describe the principles enounced by Justice Brandies of the US supreme court in the Ashwander vs Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) case. All the principles indicated by Justice Brandies in this case are rules to be observed in exercising the power of judicial review. The Brandies principles have been further developed by Justice Frankfurter. They make up the doctrine of judicial self-restraint. This doctrine has been accepted as “a judicial policy of non-involvement, as far as possible, in great political and social tension issues”.
It is not their view that in the face of legislative tyranny or executive authoritarianism the judiciary must kneel down and muse over its helplessness. If such a situation of judicial helplessness comes to pass, the unique role etched out for the judiciary by the great visionaries of law — Lord Coke, Hobart and John Marshall — would come to nothing.
A striking example of legislative excesses and judicial assertion of its review power in India was witnessed in the Indira Gandhi vs Raj Narayan case. Soon after the Allahabad high court struck down Indira Gandhi’s election to parliament (and when the appeal was pending before the supreme court) the then parliament inserted Article 329-A(4) through the constitution (39th Amendment Act, 1975) to validate her election with retrospective effect. The majority ruled against the validity of Article 329-A (4). Justice Mathew said: “It is the result of the exercise of an irresponsible despotic discretion governed solely by political necessity or expediency.”
The Stuart king, James I, firmly believed that the judges, being his appointees, must obey his order. He ordered Lord Coke that his court must conform to the king’s prerogative to dispense with laws in certain cases or be dismissed. To this Lord Coke replied; “For my place, I little care. I am old and worn out in the service of the Crown. But I am mortified to find that Your Majesty thinks me capable of giving a judgment which none but an ignorant or a dishonest man can give.”
The king replied: “I am determined to have 12 judges who will be of my mind in this matter.” Lord Coke replied: “Your majesty may find 12 judges of your mind, but hardly 12 lawyers.” Lord Coke lost his position, but some of the other judges of that court recanted and prostrated themselves before the king. While Lord Coke attained immortality, the other judges were thrown into the dustbin of history.
Judicial activism is the role etched out for the judiciary in a democratic society governed by the basic law to keep the horizon of liberty clear and to give substance to the all-pervasive concept of the rule of law. If the judiciary fails in this, nothing can save the democratic policy, as Chief Justice John Marshall concludes: “The constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery.”
Let us remind all doubting Thomases; “Be you ever so high, the law is above you. Only knight-errants of executive excesses can fall in love with the dame of despotism, legislative or executive. If the judiciary gives in here, it gives up the ghost.”

