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DINA
DAWN - the Internet Edition


January 22, 2008 Tuesday Muharram 12, 1429


Editorial


More of the same?
A question of intelligence
The evil of spurious drugs
Pashtunwali and non-violence
OTHER VOICES Sindhi Press



More of the same?


THE report may be from a relatively unknown NGO but it makes eminent sense. Saying that Nato forces in Afghanistan are entering “a widening and deepening conflict”, the Afghanistan NGO Security Office (ANSO) warns that a few years from now 2007 will be looked upon as the year when the war in Afghanistan began, because there will be “more of the same”. Going by what has been happening in Afghanistan since October 2001, one is appalled to note the lack of any results that could justify the existence of 41,000 Nato forces in that country. There are basically two reasons for the foreign forces’ failure to crush the insurgency. There is too much emphasis on force and little or no attempt has been made to find a political solution. Ignoring the support troops, the Nato forces have only 5,000 to 7,000 combat troops. The commanders on the spot have been demanding reinforcements, and the US has now decided to send 3,200 more troops to Afghanistan. However, this is only one aspect of the situation. The greater truth is that Nato troops do not have their hearts in the fighting. This is evident from the low casualties some European contingents have suffered. In many cases, the troops have orders to fight only when attacked; in some cases, Nato commanders do not send their soldiers on night patrol. Basically, it is the air strikes which are the Nato commanders’ main weapon, and this has served to increase civilian casualties without making a dent in the Taliban’s ability to fight or recruit more soldiers.The “resurgent Taliban”, as the report puts it, are most active in “their traditional heartlands” in the south and east of the country. The traditional area, let us admit, is on both sides of the Durand Line. On this side of the border, Pakistani troops more than twice the number of Nato forces in Afghanistan have been engaged in a far more serious and, in terms of casualties, costly war than those on the other side. The number of the dead and injured in Pakistan’s security forces runs into thousands, and this has led to serious criticism in Pakistan over the government’s handling of the crisis and what appears to be a greater reliance on force than on other options. Regrettably, instead of admitting failure the Nato authorities have chosen to accuse Pakistan of not doing enough. If Islamabad has not done enough, what have Nato forces accomplished as an example for Pakistan to follow?

The Taliban cross the border freely and the Nato boys have done nothing to check their movement. It is time both Islamabad and Washington realised that a political movement cannot be crushed by force and that both have to devise a common political strategy to end the insurgency. At the moment the aim of Nato forces seems to be restricted to keeping Mr Hamid Karzai in office by the use of force.

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A question of intelligence


FINGERS were crossed across the land this weekend but thankfully those bent on bloodshed were either thwarted or forced to stay their hand. Pakistan has a history of sectarian violence in Muharram, particularly on the ninth and tenth of the month, but the level of unease was even higher than usual this year. And understandably so, given the fear gripping the country in the wake of repeated suicide blasts and other deadly attacks by an enemy that is often invisible until it is too late. Not without reason, an increasingly insecure public is becoming more paranoid by the day, and as such the stakes are high for a government whose credibility goes no further than those who comprise the administration or lord over it. Against this backdrop, the relief was palpable when Ashura passed peacefully with no untoward incident reported anywhere in the country. The fervent hope now of the silent majority is that the calm will not be shattered in the days to come.

Perhaps one reason why Ashura remained peaceful this year was the deployment of police, army and paramilitary personnel in the tens of thousands, with the most sensitive areas coming under particularly stringent screening and other protective measures. Security had been heightened to perhaps unprecedented levels and rightly so given the growing threat posed by the fanatical fringe. But it goes without saying that such extreme means, though absolutely necessary on so special and potentially volatile an occasion, cannot be adopted as a matter of course. Not only is deployment on that scale logistically and fiscally unsustainable, the desirability of making Pakistan even more of a police state is also debatable. The security measures seen over the last few days highlight just how difficult it is to check shadowy extremists who are willing to blow themselves up to further their misguided cause. Vigilance on the streets and highways, however, cannot by itself control this menace. The key lies in better intelligence so that the problem can be tracked to its source more readily. Also of critical importance is ridding the security apparatus of the renegade elements who sympathise with extremists. A well-funded intelligence infrastructure, both military and civil, is already in place as is an army of trained operatives whose numbers presumably run into the hundreds of thousands. Unfortunately their energies seem to be focused on politics and civil society, leaving them little time to make battle with the beast.

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The evil of spurious drugs


THE Punjab health department’s Quality Control Board recently recommended legal action against several individuals and firms manufacturing and selling spurious drugs in violation of the Drug Act 1976. The Board has released to the press the names of the companies and the fake medicines to warn the public to be wary of them. Similar action was recommended by the Balochistan authorities two months ago. Although such measures are intended to protect citizens’ health, particularly those belonging to the marginalised sections of the population who are the worst affected, the fact remains that these are nothing more than rituals our health bureaucracy performs periodically. Small wonder they make little impact and have failed to stamp out the age-old menace of spurious drugs in the country. Usually, the cases brought up in court fail to meet the ends of justice for most of them are either not diligently pursued by the prosecution or are dropped halfway through after the accused businessmen manage to strike a ‘deal’ with key officials.

In this context, the role of drug inspectors and shopkeepers is of the essence in bringing to an end the dangerous business of counterfeit and substandard medicines. It goes without saying that medical stores are the key source of availability and disbursement of spurious drugs and that their owners are mostly in full knowledge of the contraband they trade in. Yet they push these products to poor and ignorant patients simply because the latter are unable to buy the prescribed ones that cost more. Their only concern is easy profits, not human health. Similarly, drug inspectors are fully aware of the locations where the manufacture of undesired medicines takes place and the medical stores where they are sold. Yet they prefer to look the other way. It is time the health departments tightened their regulatory mechanisms to nab the manufacturers as well as the sellers to force them to remain within the parameters of law. Deterrent punishments for violations of the Drug Act should help check this evil business.

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Pashtunwali and non-violence


By Adil Zareef

“When I turned back from the outer battle

I set my face towards the inner battle.

We have returned from the lesser jihad….

We are with the Prophet (PBUH) in the greater jihad.”

––Jalaluddin Rumi, Mathnavi-e-Ma’anavi (1386-7)

SIXTY years after independence, Pakistan continues to be shackled by the same oppressive, undemocratic, feudal and militarised political system. There seems to be no end to our woes and no hope for the future.

Violence and mayhem appear to be our destiny and have been linked to the Pashtuns by the Pakistani establishment and its western supporters.

Are Pashtuns really the bloodthirsty holy warriors that the world portrays them to be or another breed altogether? Is the Taliban movement a natural phenomenon of “Pashtun identity and independence”, or is there another aspect to this discourse?

Jan 20 marked the 19th death anniversary of the charismatic Pashtun social reformer Ghaffar Khan fondly remembered by Pashtuns as Bacha or Badshah Khan.

Born in 1890 into a prominent feudal Mohamadzai family in Charsadda, he would briefly turn the violent Pashtuns into law-abiding Khudai Khidmatgars (non-violent soldiers of Islam). This seems to be an oxymoron now, but it was true until 1947 when Pakistan came into being and the NWFP Congress government headed by Dr Khan Sahib was dismissed prematurely.

According to Mukulika Banerjee in The Pathan Unarmed, most historical and anthropological accounts have portrayed the Pashtuns as a wild people living by a strict code of honour in a volatile environment, and as having a penchant for violence. Therefore, the NWFP seems the most unlikely setting for a movement with an ideology of non-violence. How did Badshah Khan blend his ideas of non-violence with Islam and the traditional Pathan code of Pashtunwali?

Of all other nationalist leaders of the subcontinent, Badshah Khan was the closest to Gandhi in character and practice. Both shared the characteristics of asceticism and moral strength that gave them great spiritual authority over their respective communities. They were intensely practical men who tailored participatory social programmes. Both were also conscious that their followers would have to purge themselves of anger and conceit in order to undertake civil disobedience successfully. Demanding high standards from their followers, they did not hesitate to rebuke them for their shortcomings.

However, it would be simplistic to consider this relationship as the plank for the Khudai Khidmatgars’ non-violent ideology. Many critics and commentators have erred on this account, particularly Muslim League and Congress supporters. “Although, drawing inspiration from the Congress experience and the precise techniques of civil disobedience, the needs and shortcomings of Pashtun society inspired Badshah Khan long before he met Gandhi. Gandhi’s philosophical inspiration was Gita, the sacred text of Hinduism, while Badshah Khan was a devout Muslim and had performed Haj, besides being well-versed in the Quran and Hadith.”

Although Islam plays a very important role in Pashtun life as an important component of Pashtun identity, Pashtunwali is as influential as Islam for the Pashtuns. Had non-violence been portrayed as an authentically Islamic way, it may have been acceptable to the Pashtuns who would not have viewed it as being in contradiction to Pashtunwali. Violence was seen not as a criminal aberration but as central to the wider ethical system.

It was, therefore, important for Badshah Khan to assert that non-violence did not compromise the Pashtun code of honour by drawing rhetorically on the traditional elements and idioms of Pashtunwali. Therefore, the wider perspective of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement was essentially indigenous. In this way, the key terms of Pashtunwali such as shame, honour, refuge, and hospitality were subtly redefined. Many affirmed: “Badshah Khan raised our political consciousness so we could understand what was happening.”

In their jihad, the Khidmatgars declined to take an eye for an eye, and instead decided to turn the other cheek. “Rather than conceive a culture passively and an immutable charter, the KK ideology exemplifies the selective and innovative use of traditional cultural elements in order to form responses and solutions to particular historical challenges.”

Mohammad Badshah, an aging KK activist, recalled: “The common man could not make hujras, only the Khans could. Earlier, if they did, then the police came and demolished them. But Dr Khan Sahib changed that. Low castes were given the opportunity to buy land. They also became eligible for government jobs. Female education was started because earlier even the azad schools were only for boys. Dr Khan Sahib reduced taxes by one-third. Moneylenders were done away with… everyone was treated equally.”

Pashtun custom did not grant women the inheritance rights prescribed in the Quran. In 1937, a national Sharia conference of Muslim leaders and theologians passed a resolution by which a daughter could inherit a share equivalent to half of her brother’s, and Dr Khan Sahib’s ministry passed legislation to this effect. “Ours was the only province where this resolution was passed into law. People did not resist the change because as many people stood to gain by it as lose”. Therefore, “The Congress ministers made a big difference in the lives of the people who were happy with the reforms they introduced. In the elections we managed to defeat the big Khans and gained a lot of say for the first time in government.”At the start of the Second World War, when Congress offered to cooperate with the British war effort in return for complete Indian independence afterwards, Badshah Khan resigned from the party in protest. He argued that the principle of non-violence could not be put aside in any context, whether local or international, and neither he nor the Khudai Khidmatgar could go along with this policy.

Thus he emerged as more determinedly non-violent than the rest of Congress. It had taken much effort on his part to persuade the Pashtuns to lay aside their violence and this could not be traded for political compulsions. The Pashtuns had been “officially designated as the martial race and were natural recruits” into the Indian army. This affected the British policy and they did not take kindly to this.

Sarfaraz Nazim reminisces, “Badshah Khan wanted to humanise the Pashtuns. But later the influence of the Muslim League on the people ruined it all and destroyed the tolerant values of the region. All the Hindus were driven out. Hence Partition became a lasting problem.”

Eighty-year old Sher Khan said, “I remember sitting with Badshah Khan by the Sindh river at dusk, talking…I remember telling him that I could not accept Pakistan and that I wanted to kill off the brown sahibs.”

Later, when son Wali Khan was sent to jail by PPP, an enraged Hama Gul challenged the frail and aging Badshah Khan, “I know that it is in the Quran that if anyone wrongs you, you forgive him — but is anyone ever going to forgive us, or are we expected to do the forgiving all the time?” To this and many other questions, however, Badshah Khan’s cool response remained the same: “Violence would get us nowhere.”

adilzareef@yahoo.com

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OTHER VOICES Sindhi Press


Can we have a new beginning?

Ibrat


DIRECTOR-GENERAL, military operations General Ahmed Shuja Pasha at a media briefing about the Taliban’s assault on the South Waziristan fort said that the army was neither fond of military operations in its own land nor keen to speak the language of arms. He said that decisions were made by the government; but admitted that Gen Zia created the jihadis and that the army took this as an order to recruit jihadis in Afghanistan.

Gen Pasha said that the army could not be held responsible for any operation carried out in the country…

History shows that those who imposed dictatorship and martial law came from army. It is true that all army personnel were not involved but persons with responsible positions in this institution were.

The army is a national institution and meant for this nation…. But certain persons encroaching upon the boundaries of their mandate jeopardised the interests of the country. The adventurism of a handful of people made this national institution and its reputation controversial among the masses.

The time has come for the army to consider itself a part of the people and to bridge differences. The army should think of itself as an institution to protect the people … A change of attitude is required. — (Jan 17)

Bid to halt people’s political actions

Awami Awaz


BENAZIR Bhutto was asked before her homecoming not to return as there were threats to her life. After her assassination, President Musharraf said that she herself was responsible for her death because she came home despite threats to her life and addressed public meetings. Recently…all political leaders have been conveyed the same message. The message to Ms Bhutto was intended to keep her away from public meetings as certain elements were afraid of these gatherings. The government was neither concerned about the death of the people nor of the leaders. Ms Bhutto led a welcome caravan of thousands of people and was subjected to a terrorist act. So the remedy to big public meetings was found by removing popular leaders. Vested interests are afraid of mass mobilisation.

…People want democratic policies and economic relief, freedom of expression, provincial autonomy, and a government according to their wishes…When people took to the streets for these demands, the vested interests…resorted to extreme steps. The assassination of Ms Bhutto is one glaring example. They are being told that they should avoid political activities. Is there anything which can change this attitude of rulers and vested interests? — (Jan 17)

— Selected and translated by Sohail Sangi

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