Combating militancy
By Talat Masood
PAKISTAN has remained the front-line state and a close ally of the US in the ‘war on terror’ for the last six years. President Musharraf in his dual capacity as COAS and president earned accolades from the international community, especially the US, for his role in supporting this ‘war’.
But his policy has remained highly controversial in the country and has failed to achieve its objectives as militancy and Talibanisation is on the rise.
Now that we have a new army chief and hopefully a representative civilian government in the near future, our leaders need to take a fresh look at this great challenge that faces the nation. Firstly, we have to be clear whether this is our war or if we are fighting as mercenaries for the US, which regrettably is a prevailing perception among many. Moreover, is it not misleading to categorise it as war?
Terrorism and extremism are not a tangible enemy but a threatening concept, which groups and individuals resort to from time to time to achieve their goals. It is not a conventional war that we are fighting in the tribal belt or Swat. It is a war for hearts and minds best fought with the cooperation of the people where all elements of national power should be employed and military power exercised only selectively. As the army is engaged in re-establishing the writ of the state in its own country, the military manoeuvre has to be executed with minimum loss of life and with a majority of people favouring the operation.
Only a united people, in a democratic polity, behind a capable and honest civilian and military leadership can win this ‘war’. Building cantonments for placing troops on a permanent basis as an overall strategy to fight insurgency is a colonial concept that is destined to fail. On the contrary, what the government ought to be doing is building schools, hospitals and roads and providing justice and good governance in these conflict-ridden areas.
Democratisation will help reshape the present social and political climate in which extremism and terrorism is growing in Pakistan. President Musharraf’s justification for the imposition of emergency as a tool for combating extremism and terrorism has proved highly counterproductive. It has alienated a wide cross-section of people and diverted the government’s scarce resources to suppressing innocent members of civil society.
This confirms that there exists a symbiotic relationship between authoritarian rulers and jihadists. Radicals use the growing discontent and the mosque to develop their strength. And military rulers use the fear of the jihadists both domestically and internationally to consolidate and expand their power base.
Apart from religious fanaticism, poor governance and wide class disparities are major factors in the spread of militancy in Pakistan. During the last six years, the ‘war on terror’ has been conducted in Pakistan both at the conceptual and operational levels in such a way that it has failed to gain the support of the masses. In fact, people remain totally indifferent and many oppose it. Not even the main political party supporting President Musharraf, the PML-Q, shares his vision.
Pakistan’s political parties have taken diverse positions on the ‘war on terror’, but none have really looked at this greatest threat in its entirety. Benazir Bhutto sees extremism and terrorism as a clear danger to the integrity and stability of Pakistan and has vowed to fight this scourge with the help of democratic forces. Somewhat unfairly, detractors accuse her of taking this position to garner the political support of the Bush administration and the West.
The MMA and even Imran Khan along with several other small parties and groups believe that President Musharraf has been fighting this war at the behest of the US. The PML-N’s policy is ambiguous although lately Nawaz Sharif made a statement that his party is opposed to terrorism and extremism and, with a potentially larger vote bank in the NWFP and the tribal belt, is better placed to combat it.
Nonetheless his international reputation as a conservative leader who is sympathetic to the religious right led President Bush to make the undiplomatic remark that Nawaz Sharif is not sufficiently committed to fighting terror.
President Bush probably overlooked the reality that Nawaz Sharif was languishing in exile and involved more in fighting his own battles. The ANP and other nationalist parties, though anti-Taliban, give it an ethnic colour. But as we get closer to elections and the formation of a civilian government, political parties will have to take a clear policy position on the issue.
On the one hand the political government will have to mobilise public opinion that this fight against militancy and extremism is not being waged against the people but in their interest. No war either external or internal can ever be won without public support and no military has ever come out victorious against its own people. Moreover, dealing with highly independent and aggressive ethnic communities needs a more nuanced approach.
Gen Ashfaq Kayani assumes the leadership of the army at a crucial juncture. It is expected that with his varied experience and high professionalism he will soon apply himself to enhancing the capabilities of the army, especially in the context of fighting insurgency and asymmetrical warfare. Our armed forces for the last 60 years have been organised, trained and equipped to fight conventional wars and now it is facing a very different threat that requires a radically fresh approach and a changed mindset. Gen Kayani will also have to build a new and dependable relationship with the emerging civilian power structure.
Since 9/11, President Musharraf has brilliantly played on American fears of the extremist threat and mustered the unflinching support of President Bush. But now the deep resentment across the country that the ‘emergency’ and other measures have evoked has further discredited the ‘war on terror’ and created a policy dilemma for the Bush administration.
The criticality of this war is so high for the US that it cannot afford to abandon its strong links with the Pakistan military and the government. Having backed Musharraf to the hilt it is unable to digest another major foreign policy failure in Pakistan, especially after the debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan. While it finds the recently appointed COAS a suitable replacement, it would not like to push Musharraf too hard. The US has nuanced its policy to appear more people- than Musharraf-centric but is prepared to laud him for his smallest concessions.
A classic example of this was repeated when President Musharraf announced the date for elections, with Condoleezza Rice welcoming the move and President Bush saying that he believed “President Musharraf was a democrat”. This reminded us of President Bush praising General Sharon as a “man of peace”. US efforts at facilitating a Bhutto-Musharraf deal are also about to fall apart, which places Washington in an awkward position. Sooner or later Washington will have to choose between the two or maybe look for other alternatives to fight the ‘global war on terror’.
The writer is a retired lieutenant-general of the Pakistan Army.

