Political crisis on a silent street
By Ali Cheema
THE renowned sociologist Saskia Sassen, having witnessed the suspension of Pakistan’s Constitution during her recent trip to Lahore, raises a critical question in her Guardian article: will the street rise? Based on her experience of the initial reaction to the suspension of the Constitution she concludes that the street in Pakistan will not rise.
Unwittingly Professor Sassen’s Guardian article raises a more fundamental question: why has the good general suspended the Constitution, sacked a large number in the superior judiciary, incarcerated thousands and, like Saturn, eaten his progeny, the free media given that the street maintains its silence? In my view, these acts have been forced upon him by a crisis of political legitimacy that is structural to military rule.
In the popular mind, there was no teleological certainty that would have predicted General Musharraf’s deepening political crisis. Musharraf was hailed as Caesar by all hues of Pakistan’s urban middle class and its urban elite – then as now the street remained silent. He was hailed as the economic saviour and it did not matter whether Pakistan’s macroeconomic crisis had been averted because of the 9/11 windfall or in spite of it – as for the street, business began to stir but otherwise it remained silent. He was hailed as the deliverer of prosperity as massive inflows of money into property, banking and stocks created an unprecedented economic and consumer boom – the street, well, business boomed but it maintained its silence.
In my view three related factors, which are structural to military rule in Pakistan, explain the deepening political crisis faced by the Musharraf regime: the inability of his regime to win the popular vote in a free and fair election; the necessity of gaining political legitimacy for his Presidency; and the need to repeatedly turn to extra-constitutional measures.
The tragedy for rulers like General Musharraf is that democratic constitutions, which draw political legitimacy from the people, reject the famous maxim of Roman law – quod principi legis habet vicem, ‘the ruler’s will has force of law’. Given this, the initial violation of a democratic constitution causes a crisis of political legitimacy, while the uncertainty to win a majority vote forces extra-constitutional measures that exacerbate this crisis in spite of a silent street.
The need to draw legitimacy from the people has haunted Generals Ayub Khan, Ziaul Haq and now Musharraf. Consider what the fortune of General Musharaf’s political party was in the 2002 general election. It won no more than 34 per cent of the general seats and could only win 27 per cent of the popular vote. All this did not give the general’s party anywhere near a workable electoral mandate. It appears that the quiet on the street may have entailed a double-edged sword for General Musharraf. It is worth asking why a ruler with a popular agenda; in control of the military and civil machine; and faced with political parties that were leaderless and unpopular could not ensure an electoral win for his political party.
The answer is that the patronage networks offered by mainstream political parties act as an essential intermediation device for citizens confronted by an oppressive, fractured and dysfunctional state. The challenge for military rulers is that they have not been able to reform state institutions in a way that would substitute them for these patronage networks. Moreover, their strategy of using establishment-dependent politicians to effectively compete away mainstream political parties has not worked. Historically the establishment party may compete away some part of the network of mainstream parties but it has not been enough to ensure the generals’ continued control over the office of the president.
Like his predecessors, it is electoral uncertainty that continues to haunt General Musharraf in spite of the quiet on the street. What puzzles the good general is that in his gut he knows that economic growth in itself is not a panacea for the political and electoral conundrum that he is facing. His electoral trepeditions also indicate that he is aware that the mainstream political parties will get votes even if they cannot mobilise the street. It appears that the power of the vote matters even if it cannot entirely substitute for the muscle of the street.
The uncertainty of electoral politics and the inability to secure absolute majorities forces military rulers, like General Musharraf, to make constitutional compromises and to take extra-constitutional steps in order to retain power. In this spiral, power can only be legalised by nominated judges and by collaborative legislatures and to achieve this control over the gun has to be maintained. However, the more extra-constitutional measures that the ruler takes the more political legitimacy is lost by all organs of the state complicit in legalising these measures. This is because the rule of law and constitutionalism matters to citizens.
A vast majority of the citizens of Pakistan, some silently and some rather vocally, but all non-violently, today stand in opposition to General Musharraf’s regime because its recent actions indicate a grave disregard for the organs of the state and the rule of law. While the constitutionality of his act of filing a reference against the Chief Justice of Pakistan can be debated, what is not debatable is that the sight of a police officer dragging Justice Chaudhry by his hair can only be seen as the unadulterated exercise of the State’s coercive powers.
What is not debatable is that the act of removing superior court judges, who had taken oath of office under General Musharraf’s own Provisional Constitution Order (1999), because they challenged the ruler will be seen by citizens as indicative of personalised rule.
What is not debatable is that the suspension of the Constitution and fundamental rights at the end of a period of five years of his government will make constitutionalism appear arbitrary to citizens, to be invoked and removed without limitation at the behest of the executive.
In short, in Pakistan today it appears to citizens that all rules of the game, even those promulgated by General Musharraf himself, are expendable at his personal whim. This undermines the political legitimacy of the state and exacerbates the crisis of governance as it brings citizens into direct and silent opposition to the state and promotes the rule of expediency, which will erode the remaining vestiges of a functional state. This opposition will manifest itself in a multitude of ways that include: street protests; swing voting; criticism of government actions; growing support for anti-government anarchic forces; lack of credibility of government – all these will have one chant in common: the state is not of the people, by the people and for the people.
The writer is an Associate Professor of Economics at the Lahore University of Management Sciences.
cheema@lums.edu.pk

