It is America’s war
By Zahid U. Kramet
THE visit of the US Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte, to Islamabad recently, was an attempt to pour oil on the troubled waters for a besieged ally. It became clear that the Bush administration had no intention of leaving Pakistan’s president completely in the lurch, despite the US media’s punishing stories suggestive of the general having run his course and outlived his utility.
This Negroponte repudiated, but somewhat guardedly. While expressing America’s reservations on emergency rule, the arrests that went along with it and the clamp-down on Pakistani news channels, he commended Musharraf’s efforts in fighting extremism and terrorism. The US Deputy Secretary of State then applauded the general’s leadership saying, “Pakistan had made great progress…the Pakistani people have witnessed expanded and freer media, unprecedented economic growth and development, and the moderation of gender based laws.”
But Negroponte is not a particularly admired figure outside of Bush’s inner circle. General Musharraf may have taken heart from this inclination, for his reaction post the Negroponte trip has been telling. Subsequent to the positioning of a recently instated and manifestly more cooperative Supreme Court bench to ratify his holding on to power, he has gone the whole hog in issuing a set of constitutional amendments validating his every move since Nov 3. President Bush, in turn, has held firm on what has been termed by Washington Post columnist Michael Abramowitz as “his personal investment in the Pakistani president”, parrying questions on Musharraf’s performance as he defended the general for not having “crossed the line”.
This prompted Senator Joseph Bidden of the US Foreign Relations Committee to marvel “What exactly would it take for the president to conclude Musharraf has crossed the line? Suspend the constitution? Impose emergency law? (Continue to) beat and jail his political opponents?”
He has done all of that, but does President Pervez Musharraf have any real political opponents? Ms Bhutto is in a quandary on how to handle a situation where she could lose all she had gained from her return. And, with her unable to make common cause with the opposition parties standing against the elections being held under President Musharraf, she is left with little choice but to fall in line. So too will eventually arch-rival Nawaz Sharif on his re-entry into the country as he is very much a product of the sensitive agencies.
Then there is Imran Khan, who though he has made some personal headway with the youth after his trying ordeal on the Punjab University campus, still has to impact on society as a whole. As for Qazi Hussain Ahmed’s fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islami, it stands discredited after its student wing, the Jamiat, brutally bundled Imran Khan into a police van (at the behest of the government?). And, finally there is the wily Maulana Falzur Rehman of the purportedly Islamist JUI who, when push has come to shove, has invariably toed the establishment line.
No, Musharraf has little to fear from the mainstream political parties, but what would be the cause of serious concern to him, is the bar and bench’s struggle for the independence of the judiciary along with the support this has drawn from the general public. That, he has effectively stifled for the moment courtesy the newly instated Supreme Court judges sanctifying his right to hold presidential office, buttressed by presidential orders which can’t be challenged in any other court of law. But it is moot how long this will hold up in the face of mounting international pressure for constitutional governance and the independence of the judiciary – more especially after the 53-nation Commonwealth bloc elected to exorcise Pakistan from its body pending “the restoration of democracy and the rule of law”?
Of course, the US’s dilemma is that it has invested close to $11bn in Musharraf’s government since 9/11, and to safeguard this substantial investment it continues to plough in around $200 million in annual assistance, as well as $100m monthly in military aid. All of this says Lisa Curtis an analyst at Heritage Foundation, “is a (direct) cash transfer” with no process of accountability.
Joshua Hammer writing in The Atlantic goes a step further implying much of this money may have found its way into the coffers of the Pakistan military’s corporate sector which is known to have “banks, cable-TV companies, insurance agencies, sugar refineries, private security firms, schools, airlines, cargo services and textile factories.”
But those who are untowardly critical of this fail to take into account that the military’s corporate sector provides employment to a huge number of people, for the bigger part civilians, who might otherwise be found engaged in crime, or with the Taliban.
Keeping this in view the US administration appears predisposed towards an authoritarian figure preferably from a military background and General Musharraf is the chosen one. But as a serving officer who has not run the course of the constitutional two-year time bar on government servants, he surfaces as an aberration on moral grounds. Pakistan thus finds itself once again in a catch-22 situation and the president between a rock and a hard place with a larger revolt brewing in Balochistan and open rebellion on in the North West Frontier Province, and none of the civilian leaders are in a position to confront the crisis without the tacit support of the military. At the same time, the military’s step-brotherly treatment towards civilians has hardly been conducive to resolving the problems being faced. General Musharraf had the solution in the palm of his hand when he came close to calling on a government of national reconciliation to oversee the general elections -- and arguably constitutional reforms that were sustainable -- but he failed to avail the opportunity. Instead, he imposed an emergency under a Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) which suspended key members of the apex court and imprisoned opponents.
In close wake came the killing of yet another Baloch nationalist leader, Balach Marri, at the hand of unknowns, to add fuel to the fire, and leave confounded citizens wondering how many more fronts were to be opened before peace and stability were restored.
Pakistan is in a predicament not entirely of its own making, the only solution to which has been presented by former CIA official Graham Fuller. As reported, Fuller is of the opinion that “the US military presence is perhaps the single most inflammatory element in politics across the region…Sadly Pakistan is now swift on the heels of Iraq and Afghanistan (harbouring) anti-American emotion…The region will only calm down following a withdrawal of US forces.”
But this counsel is unlikely to be heeded given the construct of the US’s presence in the area pending an increasingly doubtful NATO victory in Afghanistan. And, the question hanging on everyone in this country’s lips now is: how long can Pakistan fight America’s war?

