IT is with some regret that I note that the year 2007 passed away under mysterious circumstances. Time dies every moment, and we are so inured to its passage that we welcome the arrival of the new, rather than mourn the death of the old, year. So why should 2007 merit regret? The reason is sentimental. It died prematurely on the Indian subcontinent, and one must shed a tear for anything that ends before its time is up.

The remaining weeks between now and early January have been put on hold in both India and Pakistan. (Bangladesh is in an exceptional situation; the whole nation has been put on hold till further notice.)

Was this premature death murder or suicide? The coroner is undecided, but the evidence points to homicide.

President Pervez Musharraf has completed his agenda for the year: sacked his Supreme Court, then packed his Supreme Court; switched Prime Ministers from the submissive World Banker Shaukat Aziz to the pliable Mohammadmian Soomro; put on his uniform and signed a decree giving special powers to the President of the nation to lift the Emergency “whenever he sees fit”, taken off his uniform and gratefully received those powers as President of Pakistan; arrested and incarcerated the bold, house-arrested and released the beautiful; won the endorsement of his mentor President George Bush as an irreplaceable officer in America’s war against terror; received the support of his corps commanders to confirm that the armed forces are stable; and announced user-friendly elections for early next year in which everyone’s job is at stake except his own.

How could life be better for someone who was supposed to have cut the branch on which he was sitting?

It is holiday time in India as well. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has taken his nuclear deal with America to as satisfactory a pause button as he could have hoped for. He and his troubled and troublesome allies on the Left have found a very delicate, if somewhat tenuous, line on which to declare a ceasefire in their war over relations with the United States. The ceasefire line is this; the Left has given permission to the government to go to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but not to go on to its board of directors for approval. This may seem a simple enough compromise, but there are nuances that can be exploited.

India only has to conclude a safeguards agreement, not sign one, in order to begin consultations with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of nations. Technically, the reference to the IAEA board can be made even after the NSG round. So Delhi can argue that it has operationalised nothing after having squeezed out this concession from the Left. The Left has made this concession because it is in desperate need for time: the longer it can delay the inevitable general elections, the better it will feel.

When Indian politicians talk about saving face, you can be certain that what they really mean is saving their necks.

Both sides know that this ceasefire line can hold only up to a point; since the Bush boys will work overtime to rush through the next stages so that it goes on the agenda of the US Congress by late January. The chief American negotiator, Nicholas Burns, has already explained why America wants India to sign on the dotted line.

Let me quote from his article in Foreign Affairs. “The benefits of these historic agreements are very real for the United States. For the first time in three decades, India will submit its entire civil nuclear programme to international inspection by permanently placing 14 of its 22 nuclear power plants and all of its future civil reactors under the safeguards of the IAEA. Within a generation, nearly 90 per cent of India’s reactors will likely be covered by the agreement. Without the arrangement, India’s nuclear power program would have remained a black box. With it, India will be brought into the international nuclear non-proliferation mainstream.”

The deal takes India into the non-proliferation regime, in America’s assessment, through a side door, while America of course continues to proliferate in the name of one war or the other. The Indian National Congress knows this, and is putting in place its political strategy for elections. The All India Congress Committee (AICC) session in Delhi on Nov 17 was summoned to formalise the obvious: castigation of the BJP as an all-weather menace, attacks on the Nandigram-tainted CPI (M) as a seasonal plague, and the anointment of Rahul Gandhi as successor to Mrs Sonia Gandhi and leader of the party in the next general elections.

The party will seek the youth vote through Rahul Gandhi, the “hriday samrat” (emperor of hearts) who can be trusted with the future, when all other parties are led by men of the past. The nuclear deal will be sold as the beacon tracing the way to new horizons.

For the Congress, the utility of 2007 is over.

This, of course, is good news for the rest of 2007. If the politicians need a respite from politics for six weeks, guess how much respite ordinary citizens need from politicians.

2007 is in delete mode, but should it be preserved in the memory bin or sent to the trash can?

There will be no debate in Pakistan: 2007 was a year that they wish had never been born. The genesis of its troubles lay in Musharraf’s uncertainty about whether Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry’s Supreme Court would institutionalise his, and by implication the Army’s, place in the power structure. There would have been no fuss if the Court had readily ruled in his favour. Months of strife later, a reliable Court is in place.

Those who argue that Musharraf has no popular support rather miss the point. He did not become ‘Chief Executive’ through popular support, so why should he worry about it now? He is ready to offer pseudo-democracy to democrats. It does not, in the final analysis, matter much to him whether Shaukat Aziz is his Prime Minister or Benazir Bhutto, as long as he is President. If Ms Bhutto becomes Prime Minister will she dictate what the armed forces do, or will the armed forces dictate what she should do? The answer is obvious.

2007 came and left India on the wings of the nuclear deal with the United States. If governance was crippled in Pakistan, it was certainly hobbled in India. Will the two governments walk by 2008? An Indian general election is medicinal. Whoever comes to power will canter in the first year, slow down in the second, stumble in the third as the medicine wears off and a fresh dose is needed. A Pakistan general election will only elect a parallel government. It will get into office, but not necessarily into power. The future gets dim without power.

So was it murder or suicide? Murder in Pakistan, and a bit of a heart attack in India I think.

The writer is editor-in-chief of The Asian Age, New Delhi

A RECENTLY concluded alliance between two major Pashtun nationalist forces in Balochistan has politically strengthened them in the run-up to the January elections, especially when compared to the Baloch nationalists.

The key Pashtun nationalist forces in the province consist of the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) and the Awami National Party (ANP). Both parties joined hands to fight the problems being faced by the Pashtuns and also to contest the elections from a single platform. Sinking their differences, they formed the impressive-sounding Pashtunkhwa National Democratic Alliance (PNDA).

Before they came under the PNDA umbrella, the PKMAP and the ANP were political rivals. During the 2002 polls and the subsequent by-election in constituency PB-12 of district Qila Abdullah Afghanistan, they were at daggers drawn. Their rivalry ran so deep that the ANP preferred an alliance with the JUI-F and some other groups to block the way of the PKMAP candidates in the local government elections of 2005, paving the way for a JUI man as nazim of the district.

Earlier, during the first term of the district governments, the slot of nazim of district Qila Abdullah was occupied by the PKMAP.

As in the case of Qila Abdullah, the differences among Pashtun nationalists has always benefited the JUI, even though the number of votes the ANP won decreased in 1997 and the 2002 general elections.

Only one ANP candidate from Ziarat managed to get elected to the Balochistan Assembly in 1993. However, the party had a solid vote position before the 1997 elections in different constituencies of the Pashtun areas of the province, while the PKMAP had been taking four to five seats in the provincial assembly and one to two in the National Assembly.

The PKMAP is also part of the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM). The ANP had played an important role in the formation of the PONM but later parted ways over differences with the movement’s demand for a new social contract among Pakistani nationalities under the resolution of 1940.

Though there were informal calls for an alliance among Pashtun nationalist forces, ANP president Asfandyar Wali formally forwarded his hand for an alliance with the PKMAP at the beginning of the year. The latter, despite reservations, reciprocated the gesture.

Political observers are of the view that an increase in the influence of the religious parties of the NWFP and the Pashtun areas of Balochistan was a factor in prompting the Pashtun nationalists to bury their small differences.

However, the May 12 events in Karachi which had claimed the lives of many Pashtun political activists, expedited efforts for uniting both parties under the umbrella of the PNDA. A committee comprising senior leaders of both parties has been constituted for drafting the programme and the manifesto of the alliance.

The alliance will not only benefit both in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan and the NWFP but also in Karachi where a large population of Pashtuns resides. Both parties had planned an effective mass contact campaign but the imposition of the emergency hampered their effort because the heads of both parties were put under house arrest.

Not only are Pashtun nationalists united on a single platform, they are also not facing the same intensity of the government’s wrath as the Baloch nationalists are.

However, some political observers say that the JUI-F, their arch rival, would be the focus of support of the real circles of power, particularly as the party’s strategy after the 2002 general elections helped them to play their cards successfully with regard to the disturbed situation in Balochistan. This also saw the policies — branded as anti-Baloch by Baloch nationalists — of the federal government being toed.

The provincial leadership of the religious party also played an important role in minimising MMA anger against Gen Musharraf which was very high at the time of the US attack on Afghanistan, and paved the way for the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, legitimising all extra-constitutional actions taken by him.

Some critics of the JUI are also blaming the party for giving crucial support to Gen Musharraf in the controversial presidential elections by delaying the dissolution of the NWFP Assembly.

Balochistan’s political pundits are of the view that the real circles of power will see their favourite candidates and parties succeed in the next elections — in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan as well. However, if Pashtun nationalists are given a level playing field then the PNDA could create difficulties for the JUI-F and the PML-Q candidates.

HOW does one describe the current crisis in Pakistan? Is it just an aberration – a passing phase, a cyclical disorder which takes place every ten or so years, pangs of transition from dictatorship to democracy, or does it have far deeper implications?

Government propagandists make us believe that General Pervez Musharraf was moving towards complete civilianisation when the judiciary, the irresponsible media, and some opposition parties tried to derail the process. They had to be stopped with full force because they were working against the interests of Pakistan. Hence, the emergency and the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO).

But perceptive analysts argue that the matter is not so simple. The fact is that in the last 60 years Pakistani society has not remained static. It has changed considerably in terms of mode of production, demography, sociology and economics, and the people’s perception of the state.

But what has not changed is the basic composition and mindset of the ruling elite, archaic mode of governance, and their stranglehold on the levers of power, largely based on the coercive power of the state.

In 2007, what we are witnessing is the conflict between the forces of status quo and the forces of change. On one side are the ruling classes that want to perpetuate their rule, and on the other, millions of Pakistanis with a strong desire for change in order to improve their lives.

Today’s Pakistan is vastly different from what it was in 1947. Urbanisation, spread of education, and the information revolution has changed everything. Today 54 per cent of our population is below the age of 25.

They want jobs. They want better living conditions. They want better educational facilities.

We also have an emerging affluent class which consists of young professionals and social activists. They are part of the fast changing world and want to see Pakistan as a progressive, stable and peaceful country. They get frustrated and angry when they see a culture of sifarish, cronyism, widespread corruption and lack of accountability at all levels. They want an open society, offering freedom of expression and rule of law. More importantly, they also want to be part of the decision-making process.

It is evident that the current crisis has not emerged because Chief Justice Iftikhar M. Chaudhry had taken an independent stance or because some opposition leaders had challenged General Pervez Musharraf’s autocratic rule.

The fact of the matter is that the crisis was inherent in the situation. Some members of the superior judiciary and the black coats merely ignited it.

Our basic problem is that our ruling classes refuse to take any notice of dynamics of social change. On the contrary, they have become so powerful and greedy over a period of time, that they are not ready to accept even the status quo oriented leaders like Benazir and Nawaz Sharif in their fold.

For that matter, they are afraid of any politician who has some sort of mass support and has the potential of gaining strength to challenge the establishment. The Oct 18 attack on Benazir’s rally is to be seen in this context.

Through the ‘suicide attack’, she had to be told that the military junta and their cronies are well entrenched and not ready to take any risk even if it emanates from a leader who has struck a deal with the establishment. The power elite are not afraid of Benazir as a person. They are ready to share privilege and pelf with her. What they are afraid of is the support she enjoys at the grassroots level.

Our tragedy is that in 1947, we inherited an ‘over-developed’ state and a very weak civil society. Consequently, the state was hijacked by the British-trained bureaucracy, which stifled the political process. The assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan (who was both young and popular) in 1951, and dismissal of Khwaja Nazimuddin in

1953, clearly showed that the powerful group of bureaucrats, backed by the army, was out to remove any bottleneck to its unbridled rule.

Finally, the armed forces imposed martial law in 1958 and enjoyed pelf and power for the next 13 years without any fear. They developed a coterie of people whose interest lay in authoritarian rule. Regional disparities, misconceived development strategies, rising corruption and concentration of power in a few hands resulted in the 1971 debacle. What bigger crime can there be than losing half the country?

But by then the vested interests had become so powerful that no heads rolled and the perpetrators of heinous crimes enjoyed full pensions and were buried with full military honours.

Having finished Bhutto, army generals formed the infamous mullah-military alliance and coopted all rightwing elements which included journalists, professional groups, students and teachers. Bureaucrats, judiciary, feudals, business people, industrialists (who were angry with Bhutto’s policy of nationalisation) were already part of the ruling elite.

Slowly it became a very formidable group. State’s support in terms of money, jobs, promotions, concession to the moneyed classes and protection from accountability was ensured.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a God-sent opportunity for General Ziaul Haq and his coterie. It brought billions of dollars worth of armament and huge amounts of Saudi petro dollars for the mujahideen. During this period a new class of people emerged which included gunrunners, narco dealers and money launderers. They were a power unto themselves.

The Ojhri camp disaster and dismissal of Prime Minister Junejo clearly showed the power of these people.

A very brief account has been given of how the power of the vested interests has grown. Every military intervention brings new rent seekers in its fold. In addition to the military business interests (as amply described by Ayesha Siddiqua in her book Military Inc), a new class of people, which consists of top stock brokers, intelligence sleuths, mega project developers, leaders of militant groups, various mafias and ‘qabza’ groups has emerged during the last decade.

How can they allow genuine political activity to blossom? They know that if the working class people, ordinary citizens and professional groups, supported by civil society organisations, organise themselves, or political parties to start a process of mass mobilisation, it will be their death knell.

There is no doubt that vested interests are apparently very strong and civil society still weak and disorganised. The political parties are not ready to challenge the existing order which can only come from effective organisation at the grassroot level. The only silver lining is that the ruling classes are showing signs of nervousness, all the power and resources at their disposal notwithstanding.

For the first time the elite consensus is also under strain as we have seen in the case of judicial activism.

The deepening crisis in the wake of ‘emergency plus’ is proving a blessing in disguise. After a very long time ordinary citizens, journalists, lawyers and students (that too of elite institutions) are involving themselves in the process of change.

It is expected that as time passes, more and more people, especially the trade unions and other professional groups, will join hands for a common struggle against the status quo. But it is clear that it will be a long drawn battle.

Ruling classes are so well entrenched and their tentacles so widespread, that it will be an uphill task to dislodge them from the position they now occupy. The process has begun and is bound to succeed, as world history has shown time and time again.

(On the eve of 23rd death anniversary of Faiz Ahmed Faiz)

Come; let us also lift our hands,

We who do not know the ritual of prayer,

We who, except for the burning fire of love,

Do not remember any idol, any god,

Come; let us present a petition that life, our beloved, Would pour tomorrow’s sweetness into today’s bitterness.

WHEN beauty conveys a message, ethics merge with aesthetics and art becomes inseparable from politics, as it does for Faiz, in whose work poetry fuses with revolution. Faiz knows how to create images that are the essential beauty of time, because they are the very cri de coeur of oppressed humanity.

His art is a weapon in the revolutionary struggle of the masses, even though, paradoxically, he is the most lyrical of the Urdu poets. His lyricism is as much the story of his life, as the chronicle of our tormented times.

Faiz has forged in the smithy of his soul, the consciousness and conscience of his perplexed people, groping in the dark, in search of light.

With the largesse of his mind he has touched upon the largest of themes. Like Orpheus of yore, with a lyre in hand, he has roamed the vast, wide world, strewn with strife and spite. It may be the bombed, burning Beirut or it may be “the streets of the Fatherland, where no man dare walk with head held high”, Faiz holds aloft the lyre.

His poetry catches the ecstasy and the agony in a manner that remains unequalled. Echoing in his poetry is “the still, and music of humanity”.

Hegel defines beauty as the sensuous appearance of idea. What ever Faiz has written is the sensuous appearance of idea. His poetry bears the stamp of beauty-- that is a joy for ever. Faiz is not only the supreme master of je ne sais quoi, indefinable something, but he also for ever exudes joi de vivre, exuberant enjoyment of life, that is born of invincible faith in man, history, peace and progress. Even at the darkest hour, he cries out:

The morning breeze has come again and knocked the prison door,

Daybreak is near; tell your heart not to be agitated.

Faiz is deeply convinced that “all of the arts singly and together are meant to create the most understandable art of all: a humanised society, and its masterpiece, free man”.

He displays a compassionate understanding of the human tragedy that lies at the heart of all great literature, which is impossible without possessing a largeness of heart and catholicity of mind.

It is true that the unforgettable words of Day Lewis are applicable to Faiz:

If a petal floats to earth, I am oppressed,

The grass blades twist, twist deep in my heart.

But Faiz also knows that in our time the destiny of man presents its meaning in political terms, and that it does not do to leave truth to its own power of prevailing over lie, and that truth has to fight to defend itself against falsehood.

His poetry is sombre, having gradual shading of colour from light to dark. While his music is sotto voce, almost an undertone, yet it is con amore, tinged with tenderness, but under stress it is con moto, moves with spirited élan:

What others on that road

Meet, I have met with:

Prison cell solitude,

Market place calumny,

Priestly anathemas

Thundered from pulpits

Threats and revilings From places of power.